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ABSTRACT
THE CONTRADICTORY IMPERATIVES OF NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS
FEBRUARY 2005
ELLEN D. RUSSELL, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
M.A., QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Stephen Resnick
This dissertation examines the contradictory imperatives ofNew Deal banking
reforms to explore both their notable successes and subsequent erosion. From the
perspective of overdeterminist Marxian class analysis, we explore the conflicting
objectives ofNew Dealers as they reflect the logic of a nascent Keynesianism. We argue
that the Keynesian project for economic growth and stability required the availability of
cheap money capital to promote vigorous investment. However, the provision of money
capital on attractive terms can exert downward pressure on the profitability of financial
capitalist firms, and commercial banks in particular. The potentially detrimental
implications of this agenda on commercial bank profitability was particularly dire given
the crisis in commercial banking that prevailed during the great depression. This dilemma
obliged New Deal banking reforms to institute a complex pastiche of policies, some of
which enhanced and some of which constrained the profitability of commercial banks.
We examine certain aspects ofNew Deal banking legislation, such as the Glass-
Steagall Act (which prohibited the blending of commercial banking with other financial
capitalist activity such as investment banking), the creation of deposit insurance, and the
imposition of interest rate controls, to discern their contradictory implications lor
vi
commercial bank profitability. In conducting this analysis, the dissertation has applied
and extended the class analysis of financial capital provided by overdeterminist Marxism
in order to discern the various struggles both among financial capitalists and between
productive and financial capital shape the profitability of financial capital.
Using this framework, we argue that the success of the New Deal banking refonns
in the post-war period initially produced a “pax financus” in which the competitive
struggles amongst financial capital were moderated. However, the success of these
reforms also produced incentives to undermine the New Deal regulatory framework via a
regeneration of competitive struggles among financial capitalists. As these struggles
intensified, financial innovations designed to circumvent regulatory restrictions changed
the conduct of commercial banking and other financial capitalist activity. As these
developments progressed, there has been a resurgence in the diversified financial
conglomerates (financial holding companies) reminiscent of those that flourished just
prior to the great depression.
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CHAPTER 1
THE NEW DEAL FINANCIAL REFORMS AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
KEYNESIAN AGENDA FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY
Revisiting The New Deal:
A Problemitization Of The Radical Left’s Relationship To Capitalist Reform
The prolonged devastation of the great depression provoked widespread critique of
the prevailing economic system. Many of these critiques wrestled with the question of
whether capitalism per se was indicted by these cataclysmic economic and social
conditions. Faced with the possibility that capitalism itself might be rejected amidst the
suffering and turmoil of the great depression, many advocates of capitalism were
persuaded of the advisability of embracing economic reforms. “’We shall either adopt a
plan that will meet the problem of unemployment under capitalism, or a plan will be
adopted for us which will operate without capitalism.’” Marriner Eccles, depression-era
head of the Federal Reserve Board, warned in February of 1933. (in Hyman 1976, 106) In
this context, the Roosevelt administration advanced the so-called “New Deal” reforms to
address the crisis of the great depression and restore the viability of American capitalism.
President Roosevelt explained in 1936 that his New Deal agenda was intended to
preserve the economic status quo by reforming it:
No one in the United States believes more firmly than I in the system of private
business, private property and private prolit. ... If the Administration had had the
slightest inclination to change that system, all that it would have had to do was to
fold its hands and wait - let the system continue to default to itself and to the
public. Instead ... we acted quickly and drastically to save it. It was because of our
belief in private enterprise that we acted quickly and drastically to save it. (in
Humphries 1970, 10-11)
1
However, many leftists of diverse theoretical proclivities overlooked these explicitly
conservative motivations ofNew Dealers to make common cause with this project of
capitalist reform. Leftists who opposed the concentration of economic power often allied
with the anti-trust elements of the New Deal, while leftists who critiqued the market
allocation mechanism saw commonalties with pro-capitalist advocates of an enlarged role
for the state in economic planning.
1
Leftist that embraced an underconsumptionist
understanding of the great depression often endorsed Roosevelt’s concerns about
inadequate purchasing power." Norman Thomas, the Socialist presidential candidate in
1932, confirmed this co-incidence between New Deal policies and Socialist party
demands, claiming that any platform [Roosevelt] had carried out was mine and the
socialists rather than his." (Thomas, 1967, 1 12) Given these points at which New Deal
and leftist concerns converged, many leftists of the day hoped that the New Deal would
1
For example, the biographer of Adolph Berle, the New Deal braintruster and famous co-author of The
Modem Corporation and Private Property
,
explained the alliance between Berle, who “detested” anyone
who was “enamoured” of Marxism (ix), and leftists (including Marxists) in the following reference to one
particular program of the later New Deal era, the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC):
“Besides Berle, numerous economists, politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen took the TNEC seriously.
Marxists theorists too envisioned TNEC as an opportunity to invoke socialist planning and achieve political
viability amid a mushrooming consensus for state control. In the atmosphere of 1939, the Left also found
the state capitalism of Berle and the punitive taxation of the Brandeisians appealing. Not a few Marxists
then considered Keynesian ‘compensatory fiscal policy’ a reasonable way station on the road to socialism
in America. Thus antitrusters, capitalistic planners, and Marxists would all make TNEC in part ‘ a
showcase for Keynesian economics’.” (Schwarz 1987, 136)
2 One of Roosevelt’s more famous statements in the under-consumptionist vein occurred prior to his
election, in May of 1932 when he explained the depression as follows: “’No, our basic trouble is not an
insufficiency of capital. It was insufficient distribution of buying power coupled with an oversufficient
speculation in production. While wages rose in many of our industr ies, they did not as a whole rise
proportionately to the reward to capital, and at the same time the purchasing power of the great groups of
our population was permitted to shrink. We accumulated such a superabundance of capital that our great
banks were vying with each other, some of the employing questionable methods, in their efforts to lend this
capital at home and abroad.’” (Roosevelt 1967, 79)
2
create an opening through which they might expand upon their radical agendas. Thus
these leftist allied themselves with the New Deal reforms despite the public justification
of these reforms as a means of preempting demands for more radical measures.
The New Deal reforms are often credited as providing some of the foundations for
the period of vigorous post-war economic growth and relative economic stability that is
referred to as the “golden age’ of welfare state capitalism. But despite the economic and
social improvements initiated by New Deal policies, many leftists were ultimately
disappointed in their hopes that these reforms might make way for further radical
transformation. Not only did these reforms fail to fulfill the aspirations of those who
regarded the New Deal as merely a first step towards radical transformation, it has
transpired that many of the achievements of the New Deal have been subsequently
eroded, reversed and even vilified. In light of these disappointments, this dissertation
provides an analysis of both the achievements and limitations of the New Deal in an
effort to provoke a rethinking of leftist strategies to pursue radical agendas by allying
with capitalist reforms.
Many leftists survey the rise and decline of welfare state capitalism in search of
some flaw(s) in the New Deal reforms that, once corrected, would enable the left to seize
future opportunities to craft better (and more enduring) economic reforms. This
dissertation does not depict the New Deal reforms as afflicted by some policy flaw that
later emerged to render these reforms unsustainably dysfunctional. By attending to the
complex and sometimes divergent imperatives that confronted New Dealers, we
3
acknowledge the considerable sophistication with which the New Deal grappled with a
profoundly challenging economic situation. Rather than explaining the downfall ofNew
Deal reforms on the basis of their shortcomings, this dissertation analyzes these reversals
ofNew Deal measures as a consequence of their success. By employing the perspective
of overdeterminist Marxian class analysis, this dissertation examines the contradictory
imperatives that animated New Deal reform. From this vantage point we argue that the
achievements ofNew Deal economic reforms provoked unintended consequences that
ultimately subverted their viability.
While this dissertation focuses on a particular historical incidence of economic
reforms to discern their contradictory dynamics, it is intended as a reflection on the
attempt to craft economic policy in general. Since contradiction (understood in the
overdeterminist sense described below) is ubiquitous, we argue that economic
interventions propel factors that both promote and undermine the stated intention of the
intervention. No economic intervention, within or outside capitalism, including those
advocated by Marxian class analysis, can escape these contradictory dynamics. By the
same token, the decision not to intervene also sets in motion similar contradictory
dynamics. Since neither action nor refraining from action can escape its own negation,
we are obliged to confront the ultimate uncontrollability inherent in policy intervention.
By contending that no policy can be crafted that does not also imply its own negation,
this dissertation argues that we must abandon the quest to design some optimal set of
policies that will be immune from unintended and self-sabotaging consequences.
4
By emphasizing the uncontrollability of policy intervention, this is not to say that
the left should refrain from making interventions. On the contrary this dissertation is
motivated to promote activism (albeit an activism that is not assuaged by hopes of a
certainty that does not exist in a universe animated by contradiction). This dissertation
regards the bringing to consciousness of the futility of the hope for certainty as an
intervention that may support (and also, it must be confessed, undermine) radical anti-
capitalist alliances. If leftists have been persuaded to make common cause with capitalist
exploitation because they perceive that refonns within capitalism offer them a greater
likelihood of achieving their goals, then problematizing this aspiration for “successful”
policy may promote a rethinking of strategy on the left. By repudiating reassurances that
complicity with capitalism offers a greater probability of achieving radical goals, it is
hoped that this dissertation will advance the possibilities of embracing the agendas for
economic change that include the opposition to capitalist exploitation.
Keynesianism, The New Deal And The Role Of Financial Reform
Keynesian economic thought was immensely influential among both radicals and
others who supported the New Deal. Thus part of our exploration of the contradictions
animating New Deal economic reforms requires that we attend to some of the
implications of the Keynesian theory that informed them. Although the early stages of the
New Deal predate the publication of J.M. Keynes’ celebrated The General Theory of
Employment Interest and Money , the general principles of Keynesian thought were
5
having an impact on policy circles in the early 1930s. 3 Federal Reserve officials were
cognizant of the principles of counter-cyclical monetary policy prior as of 1922 (as
Keynes himself acknowledged), although the deliberate use of fiscal policy came
somewhat later. 4 Moreover, prominent advisors amongst the intellectual leadership of the
New Deal claimed to have arrived at Keynesian ideas independently of Keynes. 5 Thus,
despite the varying degrees of self-conscious awareness of Keynesian theory on the part
of the architects ofNew Deal reforms, these early New Deal refonns are portrayed in this
dissertation as Keynesian.
The Keynesianism that emerged as hegemonic 6 attributed economic stagnation
and instability within a capitalist economy to inadequate aggregate demand.
Keynesianism sought to create a full-employment economic equilibrium by means of
state economic intervention to stabilize aggregate demand. Thus Keynesianism offered
the possibility of preserving capitalism, while ridding it of its devastating and recurrent
3
Earlier publications of Keynes had sketched out many of the ideas that were further developed in the
General Theory
,
(for example, see Crotty, 1999) Arguably the full theoretical expression of “hegemonic”
Keynesianism did not appear until after World War two with the refinement of the “neoclassical Keynesian
syntheses” articulated by John Hicks, Paul Samuelson, Lawrence Klein, Franco Modigliani and others.
4
See A Treatise on Money (1930, 255), concerning Keynes’ acknowledgement of the use of counter-
cyclical monetary policy at the Federal Reserve. Despite being obliged to abandon balanced budgets and
engage in stimulatory government spending early in the depression, the deliberate use of deficits to
promote economic recovery began in 1938, according to Arthur Smithies, of the Bureau of the Budget, (in
Greer 1958, 54)
5
Mariner Eccles, chairman of the Federal Reserve in the 1930s, wrote of Roosevelt’s brain trust: “ I doubt
whether any of the men in my room had ever heard of John Maynard Keynes, the English economist who
has frequently been referred to as the economic philosopher of the New Deal. . .The concepts I formulated,
which have been called Keynesianism’, were not abstracted from his books, which I had never read, (in
Mayer 2001, 158)
6
Other interpretations of Keynesianism exist that differ from the Keynesianism that will be discussed
below. However, we will refer to the Keynesianism described in this section as “hegemonic"
Keynesianism, in that it was the interpretation of Keynes’ work that had such a dramatic impact on both the
mainstream of the economic profession and on the design of public policy.
6
economic instability and depression, if the means could be found to stabilize aggregate
demand. Many leftists were persuaded that they could make common cause with a
Keynesianism that opposed economic stagnation and cyclical crises, particularly since
many additional demands for redistributive and egalitarian economic and social change
might be pursued via Keynesian interventionism.
Keynesianism traced the inadequacy of aggregate demand back to the component
of aggregate demand that they deemed to be the most volatile: investment spending .
7
Keynesianism concurred with Marxism in the rejection of Say’s Law, claiming instead
that firms are reluctant to produce if they fear detrimental aggregate demand conditions.
Weak or volatile aggregate demand contributes to instability in investment spending
(since firms are insecure about their ability to sell their output), and unstable or low
investment exacerbates (via the Keynesian multiplier) aggregate demand problems. Thus
Keynesians sought to create a virtuous circle in which brisk and stable investment
spending would contribute to stabilizing aggregate demand at a level consistent with full-
employment, while strong aggregate demand, buttressed with state initiated counter-
cyclical aggregate demand management, would attenuate the volatility of investment.
7
Keynesian theory regards investment spending as the most volatile component of aggregate demand for a
variety of reasons connected to the uncertainty afflicting the investment process itself. Keynesians argue
that because investment is largely irreversible and the profitability of any new investment will be
determined in an unknowable future, investment spending is a significant commitment undertaken on the
basis of expectations about the future. Investment can fluctuate (or stagnate at low levels) according to a
host of factors that affect these expectations, including expectations about the future state of aggregate
demand.
8
Activist monetary and fiscal policy might simultaneously pursue additional political objectives such as
income redistribution or the provision of services to disadvantaged sections of the population
7
With the judicious mix of policies to both encourage investment spending and facilitate
counter-cyclical state economic intervention, Keynesianism offered the hope that a
capitalist economy could be “fine-tuned” to avoid stagnation and economic instability.
Since the New Deal was comprised of a variety of policy interventions that
influenced many dimensions of economic activity, only a subset of these reforms can be
given thorough consideration in this dissertation. For a variety of reasons, our focus will
be on several of the financial reforms implemented by the New Deal. The catastrophic
financial crises that characterized the great depression compelled New Dealers to regard
the reform of finance as a critical priority. In part this was politically expedient, since
financial reform policies enhanced the New Deal's populist credibility by appealing to
the popular distrust of financiers. However, the focus on financial reform also follows
from the logic of Keynesian economic theory. Given that Keynesianism sought to
maintain investment spending at the full employment level, it was obliged to scrutinize
the conditions of existence for vigorous investment spending. Since the US economy
continued to be organized as a private capitalist economy, the investment decision
remained in the hands of private capitalist firms. Keynesian reformers were compelled to
address a variety of factors that influenced the firm’s investment decision in order to
support their investment agenda. One of the factors that shape investment spending is the
accessibility and price of external sources of financing for investment projects.
,
Thus
9
Although firms may be able to generate funds internally to finance their investment projects, we focus
here on the role of externally provided funding in the investment process.
8
New Deal reforms addressed the dramatic disarray of American finance in order to create
conditions in which funds would be forthcoming to promote investment spending and
thereby enhance aggregate demand.
The external provision of funding for investment projects is generated via the
process of financial intermediation, whereby the savings of the economy are collected
from savers and allocated among many potential users . 10 For this reason, advocates of
Keynesian financial reform were compelled to pay careful attention to the relationship
between “production ’ (understood as firms which undertake investment) and “finance”
(understood as firms which engage in financial intermediation). In order to promote
vigorous investment spending, Keynesianism sought to ensure that funding for
investment would be readily and cheaply available to the “real” or productive sector of
the economy. Often this was understood as creating an environment of low real interest
rates, so that prospective investors would pay less to secure borrowed funds and thereby
be encouraged to increase their investment spending . 1
1
In Keynesian parlance, this goal is
sometimes articulated as the prescription that finance should be the “servant”
subordinated to the needs of production
,
meaning that finance should conduct itself to
10
Savings in the economy are not channeled exclusively to private firms engaged in investment. They may
be channeled to consumers, the state or to entities abroad. These uses of the economy’s savings also affects
the investment decision, as when savings that are channeled to consumers act as a stimulus to aggregate
demand.
1
1
As will be discussed below, their interest rate is the payment made to secure debt capital. However,
investment may be financed via the issuing of stock, in which case a different sort of payment (dividends)
may be paid to secure equity capital. However Keynesian analysis usually emphasizes the interest rate
rather than both forms of payment for access to money capital.
12
Helleiner (1994, 6) claims that “members of this new [Keynesian] alliance favored more interventionist
policies that would make finance the ‘servant’ rather than the ‘master’ in economic and political matters .
This sort of “servant” relationship of finance to production is referred to in other ways in Keynesian
discourse, as when finance is depicted as having “second class status".
9
provide access to money capital on terms favorable to the promotion of investment. By
shaping financial intermediation in a manner that compelled finance to act as the servant
of production, Keynesian financial reforms sought to promote rapid and stable economic
growth by supporting the availability of cheap funding for investment.
This dissertation will explore how certain domestic 13 New Deal financial reforms
attempted to shape the process of financial intermediation in accordance with the
Keynesian prescription that finance ought to play a servant role vis a vis production. The
argument is presented that a number of financial reforms contained in the Banking Acts
of 1933 and 1935 reflected or were consistent with financial restructuring in the service
of this Keynesian objective. The first, and possibly most famous of these reforms was the
Glass-Steagall Act, which dramatically reorganized financial intermediation in the United
States. The restructuring of financial intermediation accomplished by New Deal financial
regulation created some of the conditions of existence for the so-called “paxfinancus”
(Gart 1994, 4), a long post-war period in which the conduct of financial intermediation is
often perceived as supportive of the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism.
Yet as time passed, these financial reforms began to unravel. The dissertation will argue
that the ultimate subversion ofNew Deal financial reforms is a reflection of the
contradictory imperatives that animated the Keynesian agenda, namely the attempt to
promote capitalist economic growth and stability by compelling finance to act as servant
to production.
13 We leave aside international interventions, particularly the later Bretton Woods agreement, that pursued
Keynesian objectives in the international arena.
10
An Overdeterminist Marxian Perspective On The Keynesian Reform Agenda
There are various divergences and convergences between the Keynesian
economic theory and the overdeterminist Marxian class analysis employed in this
dissertation. However, we will emphasize two important differences between these
theoretical traditions. First, unlike Keynesian theory, the Marxian focus on the
production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor emphasizes exploitation.
Secondly, the overdeterminist theory of causation employed by the Marxian class
analytic approach differs from the theory of causation employed by Keynesian discourse.
These differences generate differing perspectives on economic growth and crises,
terminological differences, as well as differing attitudes towards the purposes of studying
economic history.
The Marxian class analytic character of this dissertation diverges from the
Keynesian analysis outlined above because its focus on surplus labor highlights the
exploitative character of the capitalist class process. The presence or absence of the
concept of exploitation has implications for the terminology employed in both of these
theories. Some Keynesian terms, such as “investment”, do not have an exact equivalent in
Marxian analysis. In Keynesian analysis, investment refers to spending by firms on new
plant and machines as well as spending on new housing. Thus the Keynesian term
“investment” is not equivalent to the Marxian term “accumulation”, which is defined as
the purchase of additional means of production and labor power. The Keynesian term
“investment” focuses attention on the creation of physical capital only, and overlooks any
concomitant expansion in the scope of exploitation. In addition, the Keynesian term
11
investment does not focus on the class character of the spending. Investment spending
may include the purchase of means of production in productive and unproductive
capitalist firms and in non-capitalist class structures. Since the dissertation will be
conducted using Marxian terminology, we will consider the Keynesian category of
investment as a rough approximation of the Marxian term accumulation while
acknowledging the above caveats. Thus the Keynesian goal of promoting economic
growth and stability via vigorous investment spending can be restated in Marxian terms
as the pursuit of rapid and stable capitalist accumulation.
From a Marxian perspective, the rapid and stable capitalist accumulation sought
by advocates of Keynesian welfare state interventionism is fueled by the exploitation of
workers, and results in the extension of exploitative capitalist class relations to greater
numbers of workers. Given that Marxist class analysis condemns the capitalist class
process for this exploitative organization of production, it cannot endorse any attempt to
insulate workers from the devastating effects of economic stagnation and volatility in
return for exploitation on an ever larger scale (and possibly at a greater rate of
exploitation as well). Moreover, a Marxist perspective regards even this Faustian bargain
as illusory, since Marxism relates the exploitative character of the capitalist class process
to the crisis tendencies that debilitate capitalism. The production, appropriation and
distribution of surplus labor in an exploitative class structure is afflicted by both
fundamental and subsumed class conflicts 14 that can generate debilitating economic
instability and stagnation. Thus the success of any policies designed to promote capitalist
14 The Marxian class analytic terminology of fundamental class, subsumed class, and non-class processes
are explained in Resnick and Wolff (1987).
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economic growth and stability will set in motion crises that undermine this goal. For
these reasons, Marxists reject Keynesians’ retention of an exploitative class process in
pursuit of economic growth and stability. This is not to say that the abolition of
exploitative class processes is ipsofacto, any guarantee of rapid and stable economic
growth. Such an assertion would be contrary to the insistence of overdeterminist Marxian
class analysis that economic growth creates its antithesis, economic stagnation, while
economic stability carries with it the germination of economic instability. The Marxian
class analytic project prefers to confront the incessant possibilities of economic
stagnation and instability within a class process that is not exploitative, in hopes that such
a non-exploitative class process might generate the conditions of existence for preferable
approaches to handling these dilemmas that are inherent in economic life.
The Marxian surplus labor perspective condemns New Deal reforms in that they
did not challenge capitalist exploitation. Marxists of this theoretical disposition may well
share others' demands for diverse economic and social transformation, including such
“non-class”
15
economic transformations as the creation of a more egalitarian distribution
of economic power, income, or property, or non-market allocative mechanisms.
However, class analytic Marxists predicate their support of these non-class agendas on
the demand that these agendas be partnered with the opposition to capitalist exploitation.
In the absence of a critique of exploitation, class analytic Marxists fear that these
progressive economic changes may be complied with exploitation. Instead of creating the
15 Where “non-class” economic changes refers to changes that do not address “class” understood as the
production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor.
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conditions of existence of the opposition to exploitation, it may be that these progressive
non-class economic measures serve only to make acquiescence to capitalist exploitation
more palatable to the exploited. Under certain conditions, capitalist exploitation may in
fact be intensified despite progress made enhancing wages, improving the distribution of
property or power, or facilitating state economic intervention in pursuit of various
redistributive measures.
Despite the possibility that non-class economic transformation may be complied
with the perpetuation of class exploitation, this is not a necessity. Since a variety of non-
class economic characteristics form the conditions of existence for capitalist exploitation,
Marxian class analysis is open to the possibility that an alliance among advocates of class
and non-class economic transformation may have mutually beneficial implications. A
persuasive case may be made that those who would oppose poverty, inequality, business
cycles, and a host of other contemptible economic characteristics might be well served by
considering the contextually specific ways in which capitalist exploitation contributes to
these travesties. The parallel case can be made that the opposition of class exploitation
may be furthered in specific instances by interventions that affect non-class economic
(and other) characteristics that have helped to perpetuate class exploitation. Thus the
possibility exists for an alliance between class analytic Marxists and other radicals
concerned with non-class economic change.
14
The second way in which Marxian class analysis differs from Keynesian
economic theory is in its overdeterminist theory of causation. Overdetermination
understands all aspects of a totality as mutual constitutive. Since all parts of a totality
both shape and are shaped by each other, any change in a part has repercussions for all
other parts, and these consequences reflect back to impact the initial change. As a
dialectical theory, overdetermination views every part as existing in a contradictory
relationship with each other. The stabilizing and destabilizing dynamics among all parts
of the totality produce a contradictory unity in constant motion as these complex
dynamics among all of the parts provoke a ceaseless process of interactive effects. The
overdeterminist use ot the term "contradiction” differs from many non-overdeterminist
usages of that term. Frequently the depiction of an intervention as “contradictory” is
intended as a rebuke, comparable to depicting that action as flawed or logically
inconsistent. This suggests that some preferable course of action could be adopted that
would be absent of contradiction. From an overdeterminist perspective the term
“contradiction” has no pejorative connotation. Any policy intervention (or other
economic event) is necessarily contradictory, in that adherence to a mutually constitutive
theory of causation implies that any course of action will both promote and detract from
its stated objective. Thus there is no possibility of crafting some course of action that is
not subject to the negative moment of the dialectic.
The ceaseless process of mutual constitutivity depicted by overdetermination
precludes the possibility of stasis, thus overdeterminist economic theory rejects any
attempt to stabilize an economy (or any other totality). Instability is not regarded as the
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unfortunate result of a defect in one (or several) of the totality’s parts; overdetermination
regards instability is the inherent characteristic of any unity in contradiction. Since
everything is always unstable, the possibility of identifying and correcting the “causes” of
instability is contrary to the logic of overdetermination. Remedial action intended to
ameliorate one source of instability will have unintended consequences on all other
aspects of the mutually constitutive totality of economic relations in a capitalist class
process. In turn, these ramifications will reflect back upon the source of instability that
the original intervention sought to correct. Thus even a “successful” intervention will
have unintended consequences that both enhance and undermine the intended outcome of
that intervention.
This overdeterminist perspective diverges from the Keynesian theory in its
rejection of the pursuit of economic stability via policies intended to stabilize aggregate
demand. Because Marxism shares Keynesianism’s rejection of Say’s law in a non-barter
economy, there are considerable points of similarity between the Keynesian analysis of
insufficient aggregate demand and the Marxian analysis of realization crises. However,
overdeterminist Marxism regards the realization crisis as only one of multiple crises that
may afflict the capitalist class process. From an overdeterminist perspective, it is
misleading to elevate one crises tendency as the singular or most important form of crisis.
It may be that at a given historical juncture a realization crisis develops, but any
attenuation of this crisis tendency does not produce a capitalism free of contradiction.
The attenuation of a realization crisis may exacerbate other crisis tendencies. For this
reason, overdeterminist Marxism insists on seeing the interaction among multiple causes
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of instability. This is not to say that a program for economic change informed by
overdetermimsm may not include policies that are consistent with the Keynesian attempt
to stimulate aggregate demand. However, from an overdetermini st perspective, this
intervention could not be perceived as creating economic stability, but would instead be a
strategy to advance a program for economic transformation that is cognizant of its
inevitable role in unleashing forces that will have both stabilizing and destabilizing
implications.
The Contradictory Implications Of “Finance As Servant”: The Class Analytics Of The
Subsumed Class Struggle Between Productive And Financial Capital
Using the perspective of overdetenninist Marxism, this dissertation presents a
critical reflection on the Keynesian motivations of the New Deal financial reform agenda.
In doing so, Marxian class analysis of financial capital is extended to a variety of issues
concerning financial intermediation. In Marxian class analytic categories, financial
intermediaries are understood as financial capitalist firms. Financial capitalist Finns
engage in the process of financial intennediation in order to gather together funds and
expand value by advancing these funds to productive capitalist firms (in return for a
subsumed class revenue), and other capitalist finns, individuals and other entities (in
return for a non-class revenue). 16 The saver provides the savings to financial
intermediaries in hopes of both preserving their principal and earning some rate of return.
16
In addition to this subsumed class activity and non-class revenue in the form of interest payments and
dividends, the second chapter expands on some additional non-class dimensions of financial capitalist
activity.
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Thus the financial capitalist is also frequently (although not always) obliged to pay some
form of return to the saver for access to the funds with which the financial capitalist earns
subsumed class and non-class revenues.
In order to examine the Keynesian agenda for financial reform, the dissertation
will focus on the subsumed class role of financial capital and the subsumed class
struggles that animate this role. However, it is important to acknowledge that these
subsumed class issues are overdetermined. Chapter two, for example, will consider the
non-class value expansion pursued by financial capital as one overdeterminant of
subsumed class role of financial capital. Another overdeterminant of financial capitalist
activity that will play a recurring role throughout the dissertation concerns the risks
inherent in financial intermediation. It is always possible that the saver will not receive a
rate of return on their savings, or they may lose their initial savings entirely, because of
various difficulties that may arise in the process of financial intermediation. Thus
financial capitalist activity is constantly overdetermined by struggles concerning the
extent to which the financial intermediary (or intermediaries), the saver, the user of the
funds or some fourth party (i.e. the state) will bear this risks.
The Keynesian agenda that finance should be the servant of production can be
restated in class analytic terms by referring to the Marxian analysis of the subsumed class
relationship between productive and financial capital concerning the provision of money
capital to the capitalist fundamental class process. One of the ways that financial capital
can facilitate accumulation is via the provision of money capital to productive capital in
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return for a low subsumed class payment . 17 This subsumed class payment is determined,
in part, in the process of subsumed class struggle between productive and financial
capital. Thus, to the extent that capitalist accumulation is assisted by low subsumed class
payments for access to money capital, the Keynesian desire that finance should be the
servant of production can be reinterpreted in Marxian class analytic terms as the desire to
favor productive capital in its subsumed class struggle with financial capital. In this light,
the financial reforms ushered in by the New Deal are seen as an attempt to intervene in
the subsumed class struggle between productive and financial capital in order to support
the ability of productive capital to access money capital cheaply.
To foreshadow the contradictions that afflicted the Keynesian agenda for financial
reform, we consider the difficulties implied in the attempt to oblige financial capital to
provide money capital to the capitalist fundamental class process in return for a low
subsumed class payment. Despite the desirability of this outcome from a Keynesian pro-
accumulation perspective, this situation poses a problem for financial capitalist firms. As
unproductive capitalists, financial capitalists are motivated to fulfill their subsumed class
role in the attempt to expand value. Downward pressure on the subsumed class revenue
received in return for the provision of a given amount of money capital reduces the
incentive of financial capitalists to pursue profits by fulfilling this subsumed class role,
and, as we shall discuss in chapter two, they may find other uses for the funds at their
disposal. Ironically, low subsumed class payments for access to money capital may
jeopardize accumulation, in the sense that this situation squeezes the profitability of
17 A low subsumed class payment for access to money capital means that a given subsumed class
distribution to financial capitalists secures more money capital and thereby enables increased accumulation.
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financial capitalist firms, and in response financial capitalists may reduce their provision
of money capital to fund further accumulation
.
18
Thus Keynesian financial reforms were
compelled to balance the desire to promote accumulation with the possibility that the
success of this goal might inadvertently undermine accumulation by causing financial
capitalist firms to rebel from their subsumed class role.
As a result of this contradiction in the Keynesian agenda for accumulation, the
architects of New Deal financial reform legislation were obliged to address a seemingly
unmanageable dilemma. They sought to pursue a pro-accumulation agenda which was
potentially injurious to the profitability of financial capital, yet they were obliged to
intervene to insure that financial capitalist firms were sufficiently profitable that they
would fulfill their subsumed class responsibilities in a manner consistent with vigorous
accumulation. To make matters worse, they were attempting to manage these divergent
imperatives at a time of profound crisis for both productive and financial capital. During
the great depression, financial capital was experiencing a devastating crisis of
profitability that threatened to slow financial intermediation to a glacial pace. Unless
financial capitalist firms (in particular commercial banks, as will be argued below) could
be returned to profitability, they would be unable to fulfill their subsumed class
responsibilities of channeling money capital to the capitalist fundamental class process,
and the prospects for renewed accumulation would be further compromised. Thus the
18
Other factors as well contribute to the profitability of financial capitalist firms. For example, low
subsumed class revenues (per unit of money capital advanced) might be consistent with higher profits for
financial capitalist firms if the volume of money capital advanced increases. This argument leaves this
possibility aside to concentrate on the downward pressure on the profitability of financial capitalist turns
when the subsumed class payment required to secure access to a given amount of money capital is reduced.
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architects of Keynesian financial reform were obliged to introduce a pastiche of
regulatory provisions that attempted to both compromise the profitability of financial
capital (by supporting the ability of productive capital to access money capital cheaply)
while attempting to protect the profitability of financial capital.
Ihe Subsumed Class Struggle Among Financial Capitalist Finns: New Deal Financial
Reforms From The Perspective Of Commercial Banks
In their desire to make financial capital the servant of productive capital,
Keynesian financial reformers contended with a second form of subsumed class struggle.
The subsumed class struggle between productive and financial capital is overdetermined
by the subsumed class struggle among financial capitalists. Subsumed class struggle
among financial capitalists over the division of that portion of surplus value allocated to
securing money capital puts downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required
to secure money capital. Thus this form of competition among financial capitalists firms
is in some ways supportive of the Keynesian agenda to promote accumulation. However,
this same competition may also squeeze the profitability of financial capitalist firms, thus
overdetermining the contradiction of financial capitalist profitability discussed above. For
these reasons, Keynesian financial reforms grappled with a complex and contradictory set
of goals vis a vis subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms.
The dissertation will consider how the New Deal financial reforms conferred both
advantages and disadvantages among different types of financial capitalist firms in an
attempt to manage the diverse requirements of the Keynesian reform agenda vis a vis
financial capital. The emergence ofpaxfinancus was enabled, in part, because of the
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remarkable dexterity with which the New Deal financial reforms managed these complex
and sometimes entropic imperatives. However, the contradictions inherent in this
financial regulatory framework also contributed to the subversion of these financial
reforms. To explore how these contradictions ultimately thwarted the intentions
Keynesian financial reform, we pay particular attention to the evolution of subsumed
class struggles involving financial capital over time. As the overdetermined context
changed, this differential regulatory treatment of financial capitalist firms shaped the
evolution of subsumed class struggles among financial capitalist firms. As these
subsumed class struggles among financial capitalist firms unfolded, this in turn reshaped
the subsumed class relationship between productive and financial capital. These changes
in both types of subsumed class struggles involving financial capital contributed to
undermining the New Deal financial reforms that supported Keynesian welfare state
capitalism.
The dissertation explores these contradictions in the New Deal financial reform
from the perspective of commercial banks. While commercial banks are only one among
several types of financial capitalist firms (including investment banks, pension funds
insurance companies and so on), for a variety of historically and institutionally specific
reasons commercial banks were a prominent concern for New Dealers. Commercial
banks they are the oldest (Roussakis 1997, 3)
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and arguably the most prominent type of
US financial capitalist firm. At the beginning of the New Deal era, the total financial
assets held by commercial banks dwarfed those held by any other financial capitalist
19 However banking functions were performed prior to this by colonizing companies, merchants and
colonial governments that were engaged in the provision of credit, (see Hammond 1941, 5)
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firm, and this dominance continued until 1991 when the total financial assets of both
private and government pension funds surpassed those of commercial banks. In addition
to their role in the provision of debt capital and other lending, commercial banks are
unique among financial capitalist firms for other institutional characteristics (as a
prominent Federal Reserve official has famously quipped, commercial banks are
special ). It has evolved historically that commercial banks play an important role in
the payments system whereby transactions are cleared, and via their lending activities
they act as the transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Because of their many
important roles in the US economy, the Federal Reserve System has been organized to
support and oversee commercial banking, and to provide the commercial banking system
with unique forms of assistance, including lender of last resort support.
In addition to these unique characteristics of commercial banks, New Deal
financial regulation was obliged to focus on commercial banks because of the acute crisis
they faced in the early 1930s. Between 1930 and 1933, about a third ofUS commercial
banks failed or were forced into distressed mergers. One conventional measure of
commercial bank profitability, the return on assets (ROA) 21
,
depicted in Figure 14,
chapter 5, stood at about negative .77 percent in 1934 for FDIC member commercial
banks who had survived the waves of bank failures. This profound crisis in the
20
The argument that banks are unique among financial capitalist firms is articulated most famously from a
non-Marxian perspective by E. Gerald Corrigan in his “Are Bank’s Special?”. (1982)
21 The return on assets is measured as the net income divided by total assets.
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commercial banking system compromised its ability to act as a provider of loans22
,
its
ability to execute transactions, and its effectiveness channel for the transmission of
monetary policy. The situation had reached such urgent proportions that immediately
upon assuming office the Roosevelt administration was compelled to announce a national
bank holiday to contain the banking crisis. In order that commercial banks could resume
their vital role as financial intermediaries, as well as resume their role in the payments
system and act as an agent for the transmission of monetary policy, it was an urgent
priority for the architects of the New Deal to stem the crisis in the commercial banking
system.
As we shall argue below, the resolution of the crisis in commercial banking
required that New Deal financial reforms support the profitability of commercial banks.
Yet the Keynesian pro-accumulation agenda, which entails low subsumed class payment
for access to money capital, implied a further squeeze on commercial bank profitability.
Thus the architects ofNew Deal financial reform were obliged to restore commercial
bank profitability while at the same time attempting to avoid exerting upward pressure on
subsumed class payment made to acquire debt capital. In their attempt to reconcile these
22
In 1929, commercial banks held $36. 1 billion in loans, which constituted 57.9% of their total assets. By
1934, total loans held by commercial banks had dropped to $15.7 billion, or 34.9% of total commercial
bank assets. (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 450)
23 The Federal Reserve was unable to increase the money supply despite increments to high powered-
money because of the disarray of the commercial banking system. Friedman and Schwartz estimate that the
increase in the amount of high powered money made available to the commercial banking system should
have produced a rise in the stock of money of 17.5% in the absence of a commercial banking crisis. (1963,
332-333) However, the crisis in the commercial banking system reduced the money stock by one third
despite this increase in high powered-money. (352)
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potentially divergent imperatives, Keynesian financial reforms contained contradictory
provisions that supported commercial bank profitability in some respects and impeded it
in others.
Given the delicate task facing New Deal financial reforms, they achieved
considerable success to the extent they supported several decades of relative economic
growth and stability while also presiding over a period of high commercial bank profits
and low numbers of bank failures. However, as time passed the reforms that had helped
to create this fortuitous situation were increasingly blamed for the return of commercial
bank profitability problems and a renewed occurrence of commercial bank failures (albeit
on a smaller scale that those of the 1930s). In response to this crisis, commercial banks
increasingly engaged in activities that undermined the New Deal financial reforms that
had been originally designed to enhance their profitability.
The dissertation is organized as eight chapters. In addition to the introduction
(chapter one) and the conclusion (chapter eight) the dissertation can be viewed in three
major sections, each of which is composed of two chapters. The first set of two chapters
(chapters two and three) are devoted to class analytic concerns. They consider the general
analysis of the subsumed class struggle involving financial capital, and the specific class
analysis of the commercial bank. The second set of two chapters (chapters four and five)
present a class analytic account of the New Deal financial reforms. Chapter four presents
issues concerning financial capital that emerged prior to the great depression, while
chapter five details the New Deal response to those issues. The final set of two chapters
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(chapters six and seven) consider the subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist
firms that provoked the unraveling of the New Deal financial reforms toward the later
phases of Keynesian welfare state capitalism. Chapter six presents the competitive
icsponse of non-bank financial capitalist firms to the restrictions contained in New Deal
financial reforms, while chapter seven details the response of the commercial banks to
these competitive threats. Chapter eight concludes with some comments concerning some
of the contributions offered by an overdeterminist and class analytic treatment of the
economic history ofNew Deal financial reforms.
26
CHAPTER 2
A CLASS ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL-
AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE KEYNESIAN
FINANCIAL REFORM AGENDA
Introduction
As chapter one argued, the Keynesian agenda for financial reform was motivated
to encourage financial capital to act as a “servant “ to productive capital by providing
access to money capital in return for a low subsumed class payment. Chapter two
elaborates on the overdeterminist class analytic framework that will be used in
subsequent chapters to analyze the New Deal regulatory intervention designed
accomplish this goal. In order to discern what sort of conditions might promote a low
subsumed class payment for access to money capital, the current chapter focuses on the
subsumed class struggles involving financial capital. The subsumed class payment
required to obtain money capital is shaped by both the subsumed class struggle between
productive and financial capital and subsumed class struggles among financial capitalists.
By developing the class analytic tools with which to analyze these subsumed class
struggles involving financial capital, this chapter begins to outline some of the
complexities confronted by the New Deal financial refonns in their attempt to compel
financial capital to act as servant to productive capital.
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The chapter begins by analyzing the subsumed class struggle between productive
and financial capital over the payment made to secure money capital. The second section
of the chapter explores subsumed class struggles among financial capitalists in order to
examine the ways in which this type of subsumed class struggle overdetermines the
subsumed class struggle between productive and financial capital. Following this, the
process of financial intermediation is examined in more detail in order to develop a
generic class analytic equation for a financial capitalist firm. This class analytic equation
highlights the diverse effects of the various forms of competition among financial
capitalist firms on the Keynesian agenda for low subsumed class payments for money
capital. The forth section expands the initial class analytic equation for a financial
capitalist firm to consider the possibility that financial capital may expand value via the
receipt of non-class revenue as well as subsumed class revenue. This facilitates the
analysis of how these non-class roles of financial capitalist firms may overdetermine the
subsumed class struggles involving financial capital.
Subsumed Class Struggles Between Productive And Financial Capital:
A Preliminary View Of The Contradictions Of Keynesian Agenda For Financial Reform
In order to set production in motion, a productive capitalist firm requires money
capital. Money capital is value in money fonn that is used to expand value. When a
productive capitalist firm employs money capital to initiate production, it does so in the
hopes of expanding value via the appropriation of surplus value at the conclusion of the
production process. Although it is possible that a productive capitalist firm has sufficient
money capital internally to initiate production, we shall assume that the productive
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capitalist firm requires access to external sources of money capital
.
1
A financial capitalist
firm may step in to supply the money capital needed by a productive capitalist firm to set
the circuit of productive capital in motion." We further assume that productive capitalist
firms employ all inflows of funds received from financial capitalist firms as money
capital to initiate production
.
3 By supplying money capital used to initiate production,
financial capitalist firms are engaged in a subsumed class process since they help to
secure one of the conditions of existence of productive capital.
In keeping with our focus on the provision of money capital to the capitalist
fundamental class process, a financial capitalist firm is initially defined as an
unproductive capitalist firm that provides money capital to productive capitalist firms
.
4
In
return for the provision of money capital, it is assumed that the financial capitalist firm
receives a distribution from the surplus value appropriated by the productive capitalist
firm (referred to as a subsumed class revenue ).
5
The financial capitalist firm initially
1 To the extent that productive capitalist firms can generate funds internally to expand the production
process, they will be less reliant on money capital supplied by financial capitalist firms. This greater
autonomy will in turn overdetermine the subsumed class struggle between productive and financial capital.
2 Money capital might be provided to productive capitalist firms by entities that are not ordinarily thought
of as financial capitalist firms. These entities, such as the state, individuals, or participants in non-capitalist
class processes, could provide money capital directly to productive capitalist firms without the
intermediating presence of a financial capitalist firm. To simplify the analysis, we assume that money
capital is forthcoming to the capitalist fundamental class process only via the financial intermediation of a
financial capitalist firm.
3 However, the possibility exists that a productive capitalist firm might obtain funds from a financial
capitalist firm and use them for other purposes.
4
The definition of a financial capitalist firm is enlarged later in the chapter to consider some of the non-
class means by which a financial capitalist firm might expand value.
5
There are circumstances in which financial capitalist firms may provide money capital to productive
capitalist firms without receiving a distribution of surplus value in return. At present, this possibility is
excluded, but it will be considered in the discussion of equity capital below.
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begins with some quantity of value (M), which is advanced to surplus value appropriating
firms, and later the financial capitalist firm expands value (to M') as a result of the receipt
of the subsumed class revenue. The financial capitalist firm has expanded value, therefore
it meets the Marxian definition of a capitalist firm. However, the financial capitalist firm
has expanded value in a manner other than the appropriation of surplus value, thus the
financial capitalist firm is referred to as an unproductive capitalist firm.
In the third volume of Capital
, Marx points out that the size of this subsumed class
payment made by productive capital to financial capital to secure access to money capital
is indeterminate/ The size of the subsumed class payment for access to money capital is
overdetermined by a large variety of political, cultural, natural and economic processes.
These political and cultural processes can include domestic and international legal and
regulatory constraints, electoral pressures, the historically specific evolution of
institutional structures, as well as religious beliefs and psychological and emotional
proclivities concerning risk and liquidity preference. Numerous economic factors, such as
the impact of the business cycle, the pace of technological change and the level of
indebtedness of productive capitalist firms also exert diverse influences on the payment
required to secure money capital.
All of these overdeterminants shape the struggle between productive and financial
capitalist firms to determine the size of the subsumed class payment. Because this
struggle concerns the distribution of appropriated surplus value, it is referred to as a
b Marx explains that the maximum subsumed class payment would be the entire “profit”(surplus value)
itself, while minimum limit is “altogether indeterminable”. (1967, 358)
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subsumed class struggle
.
7
This struggle is antagonistic, in that productive capital seeks to
minimize the required distribution of surplus value, while financial capital seeks to
maximize it. However, the relationship between productive and financial capital is
animated by cooperation as well as conflict. Productive capitalist firms rely on providers
of money capital, given that (under current assumptions) the productive capitalist firm
requires access to external money capital as a condition of its existence. Financial
capitalist firms also rely on productive capitalist firms, given that (under current
assumptions) financial capitalist firms expand value by receiving a distribution of the
surplus value appropriated by the productive capitalist firm . 8 This mutual dependence
between productive and financial capitalist firms confers a cooperative dimension on
their relationship
.
9
Thus the subsumed class struggle between financial capitalist firms
and productive capitalist firms is a contradictory dynamic shaped by both antagonism and
cooperation.
In light of our analysis of the subsumed class struggle between financial and
productive capital, the Keynesian agenda vis a vis financial capital can be reexamined
from a class analytic perspective. As was mentioned in chapter one, the Keynesian
7
In addition to the struggles over the size of the subsumed class payment, productive and financial capital
are also engaged in struggles over other dimensions of their relationship, such as conflict over the terms
under which money capital is provided (these may include struggles over what information is to be
disclosed by either party in the course of negotiating the transaction, the legal recourses if one party fails to
fulfil its contractual obligations, and questions of conditions that may be attached to the procurement of
money capital and so on).
8
Further on in the chapter we will introduce non-class avenues through which financial capitalist firms
expand value.
9
Thus their antagonistic struggle over the size of the subsumed class payment made to secure money
capital is tempered because neither party wants to dramatically undermine the conditions of existence of the
other, for to do so would jeopardize their own conditions of existence.
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agenda to compel financial capital to act as the “servant” of productive capital can be
interpreted as the attempt to encourage a subsumed class relationship between financial
and productive capital that promotes a low subsumed class payment for access to money
capital. However, the success of this Keynesian agenda is potentially injurious to
financial capitalist firms qua capitalist firms. As unproductive capitalists, financial
capitalist firms are motivated to fulfill their subsumed class role in the attempt to expand
value via the receipt of subsumed class revenues. Downward pressure on their subsumed
class revenue reduces the incentive of financial capitalist firms to fulfill this subsumed
class role. Financial capitalist firms finding their subsumed class revenue squeezed may
cease engaging in financial capitalist activity, or they may respond by refraining from
advancing money capital to the capitalist fundamental class process and find other uses
for the funds at their disposal (for example, they may engage in financial capitalist
activities that earn non-class revenues, as is discussed below).
Thus the Keynesian agenda to compel financial capital to act as the servant to
productive capital by providing money capital to the capitalist fundamental class process
in return for a low subsumed class payment for access to money capital wrestles with the
following contradiction. A low subsumed class payment for access to money capital
supports accumulation by making inflows of money capital less expensive to obtain. Yet
ironically, low subsumed class payments for access to money capital may jeopardize
accumulation, in the sense that this situation squeezes the profitability of financial
capitalist firms. In response financial capitalist firms may reduce their provision of
money capital to fund further accumulation. Since this contradiction between the
32
Keynesian agenda to lower the subsumed class payment for access to money capital and
financial capitalist profitability will be the focus of much of attention in the dissertation,
it merits a way of referring to it succinctly. It will be referred to in the remainder of the
dissertation as the “master/servant contradiction’' of the Keynesian agenda. This
terminology acknowledges its debt to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, as the present
analysis seeks to reflect the Hegelian insight that the act of compelling the servitude of
one entity entails setting in motion negation of that servitude.
This master/servant contradiction of the Keynesian agenda varies dramatically in
its implications depending on the overdetermined context. The degree to which the
reduction in the subsumed class payment for money capital detracts from financial
capitalist profitability varies according to a host of factors that shape the demand and
supply of money capital. It may be that the payment for access to a given amount of
money capital decreases, but productive capitalist firms foreseeing vigorous demand for
their output increase the total amount of money capital demanded. In this event, it may be
possible that the total value inflow received by the financial capitalist firm increases. This
would be a situation in which the success of the Keynesian accumulation agenda (and its
stimulation in the demand for money capital) alleviates the pressure on financial capitalist
profitability. Moreover, the response of financial capitalist firms to pressure on their
profitability will be shaped by the options open to them. If there are many alternative
ways of earning revenues apart from the receipt of subsumed class revenue for the
provision of money capital, then there is greater potential that financial capital will rebel
from their “servant” status to pursue value expansion by other means.
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The master/servant contradiction of the Keynesian financial agenda implied
complex challenges for the development ofNew Deal financial reforms. New Deal
financial reforms attempted to privilege productive capital in its subsumed class struggle
with financial capital, while at the same time ensuring that financial capitalist
profitability was not impaired to the extent that it might provoke responses on the part of
financial capital that might sabotage the Keynesian agenda. At some junctures the New
Deal regulatory framework dealt startling blows to the profitability of financial capital,
while other regulatory provisions attempted to insulate financial capital from the
ramifications of these blows. However, the coherence of these diverse regulatory
interventions can be discerned by appreciating the contradictory imperatives that
animated Keynesian financial reform. What may appear as irreconcilable inconsistencies
in Keynesian financial regulation are the consequences, in part, of the struggle among the
conflicting imperatives of the Keynesian financial reform agenda.
The Keynesian Financial Reform Agenda
And The Question Of Competition Among Financial Capitalist Firms
One overdeterminant of the subsumed class payment for access to money capital is
the competitive struggles among financial capitalist firms. Given assumptions made thus
far in the analysis, each financial capitalist firm is reliant on subsumed class revenue to
expand value, thus each financial capitalist firm must compete with all other financial
capitalist firms to maximize their share of the distributions of surplus value allocated by
productive capitalist finns for securing access to money capital. Because this competitive
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struggle among financial capitalist firms concerns distributions of surplus value, it is also
referred to as a subsumed class struggle. This subsumed class struggle among financial
capitalist firms is in turn overdetermined by a great variety of factors, such as the number
and relative size of financial capitalist firms, the existence (or not) of barriers to the
mobility of money capital 1
1
and so on. Like all subsumed class struggles, the subsumed
class struggle among financial capitalist firms is animated by contradictory impulses. It is
an antagonistic struggle, in that financial capitalist firms compete with one another over
the division of that portion of surplus value that is allocated to securing access to money
capital. However, the subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms is
animated by cooperation as well as conflict. Financial capitalist firms are allied in their
wish to maximize the amount of surplus value that productive capitalist firms are obliged
to earmark for securing access to money capital generally. To some extent, they may
cooperate in attempting to enhance the political, cultural, natural and economic
conditions that enhance the importance of (and payment made to secure access to)
externally provided money capital. 1
1
From the perspective of Keynesian agenda for financial capital, the competitive
dimension of subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms supports the
Keynesian agenda of a low subsumed class payment for access to money capital. As
10
Barriers to capital mobility, such as legal or regulatory obstacles to the movement of funds across
national or sub-national borders, will shape the degree to which financial capitalist firms of a given
jurisdiction face competition from financial capitalist firms of other jurisdictions.
1
1
However, as providers of a subsumed class process, financial capitalist firms are constrained by their
dependence on productive capital. If financial capital is so successful in enhancing the subsumed class
payment made to secure money capital that the ability of productive capital to secure its other conditions ot
existence are compromised, financial capital will have unintentionally undermined their own conditions ot
existence.
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financial capitalist firms compete in the process of providing money capital to the
capitalist fundamental class process, this competition exerts downward pressure on the
subsumed class payment required to secure access to money capital. Thus the Keynesian
agenda of promoting low subsumed class payments for access to money capital is
consistent with a policy of intensifying this subsumed class struggle among financial
capitalist firms. However, to the extent that subsumed class struggle among financial
capitalist firms puts downward pressure on this subsumed class payment, it may also
exacerbate the previously mentioned master/servant contradiction of the Keynesian
agenda. Vigorous subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms that reduces
the subsumed class payment required to secure money capital may undermine financial
capitalist profitability to the extent that financial capitalists rebel from this subsumed
class role, which in turn may jeopardize access to funds to support accumulation.
While subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms is supportive of a
lower subsumed class payment for access to money capital, the same cannot be said for
all competitive struggles among financial capitalist firms. In order to discern these
various and opposing implications of competition among financial capitalist firms, the
class analysis of financial capitalist firms must be developed in more detail. Thus far
financial capitalist firms have been analyzed in terms of their expansion of value by
providing money capital to productive capitalist firms. However, the question of where
the financial capitalist secures the funds which are used to earn subsumed class revenues
must now be addressed. While it is possible that financial capitalist firms use their own
funds for this purpose, in general financial capitalist firms secure their initial money
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capital via the process of financial intermediation. As financial intermediaries, financial
capitalist firms gather together the savings in the economy, and these amassed savings
constitute the initial money capital that financial capitalists use to expand value (under
present assumptions, via the receipt of subsumed class revenues).
Financial intermediation can be analyzed by breaking this process into two
interrelated phases: the gathering together of savings to form the money capital at the
disposal of the financial capitalist firms, and the provision of this money capital to
productive capitalist firms in order to secure subsumed class revenue. 12 To illustrate these
two moments of financial intermediation, the “generic” 13 class analysis of a financial
capitalist firm is depicted in Figure 1 below. The first moment of financial intermediation
consists of accessing savings in the economy in the form of non-class revenues. 14
Associated with this non-class revenue is typically some sort ofY expense, as the savers
in the economy are usually compensated for the provision of their savings by some form
of return (such as the interest paid funds deposited in a savings account). 1 '^ In addition,
12
In non-Marxian parlance, this is first phase is often referred to as the “sources of funds” while the second
phase is described as the “uses of funds”.
13
It is referred to as “generic” because, at this stage, we are not explicit about the particular way in which
the financial capitalist firm gathers savings or the way in which the financial capitalist firm provides these
savings to productive capitalist firms.
14
If the initial savers chose to withdraw their savings from the financial capitalist firm, this would be
reflected as a reduction in this non-class revenue. If savings withdrawn from a financial capitalist firm
exceeded the inflow of new funds, this non-class revenue would become negative.
15 Below we extend the class analysis of financial capital to consider the possibility that capital gains (a
non-class revenue) may compensate the provider of money capital to the extent that the subsumed class
payment for access to money capital is reduced to zero.
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non-class revenues may be generated if a recipient of money capital repays this money
capital to the financial capitalist firm, and these funds are then available to support new
advances of money capital to productive capitalists.
The second moment of financial intermediation is distinguished by a variety of other
expenses and revenues associated with the disbursement of savings to productive
capitalist firms and the subsequent earning of subsumed class revenue. An X expense is
incurred when the financial capitalist firm advances money capital to the productive
capitalist firm, and the financial capitalist firm has expanded value when it receives
subsumed class revenue as payment for the use of the money capital. Further X expenses
include the costs associated with research, monitoring and collection that accompanies
the receipt of subsumed class revenue. Additional expenses include all of the costs
associated with the operation of a financial capitalist firm, such as occupancy costs,
salaries and so on that may be difficult to categorize as X or Y expenses. 1 *' For simplicity,
it is assumed that costs that are debatable in this respect, and all remaining costs, are Y
expenses.
Figure 1: Value Inflows and Expenditures of a Generic Financial Capitalist Firm
Value Inflows:
NCR inflow of savings obtained ~^SSCR payment from productive capitalist firm for access to money capital
+NCR repayment of money capital advanced to productive capitalist firm
Value Expenditures:
Y expenses associated with securing savings inflows + x
expenses associated with advancing money capital to surplus value appropriators ' * any additional expenses
money capital advanced to surplus value appropriators
+Y
+ X other
1(1
For example the salary of a bank employee may be partially an X expense (to the extent that this
employee in involved in securing the receipt of subsumed class revenue) and partly a Y expense (to the
extent that this employee is involved in securing deposits for the bank).
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In the first moment of financial intermediation, all financial capitalist firms are
engaged in a competitive struggle with one another in order to maximize the funds they
can attract from savers, while seeking to minimize the Y expenses associated with
attracting savings. To refine the analysis of competition among financial capitalist firms
in the first moment of financial intermediation, financial capitalist firms are often
grouped according to the avenues through which they typically access the savings of an
economy. For example, depository institutions such as commercial banks are
distinguished because they secure funds by accepting deposits, while pension fund
companies collect funds via pension fund contributions, and insurance companies receive
funds via insurance premiums. These groupings of financial capitalist firms according to
the manner in which funds are accessed in the first moment of financial intermediation
will be referred to below as the “types” or “categories” of financial capitalist firms.
Competition among financial capitalist firms occurs both within a particular category,
and across categories. In the first moment of financial intermediation, the competition
across categories will be animated by the efforts of financial capitalist of each different
category to compel savers to hold their savings in the form corresponding to their
particular category. This in turn will be shaped by the particular expenses as well as the
particular advantages related to each category, as financial capitalist of each category
seek to minimize the expenses and expand the advantages pertaining to their category.
17
For example, savings held in the form of deposits are attractive from a financial capitalist firm’s point of
view because is relatively easy for savers to open bank accounts and store savings in them, however this
ease of access also means that the funds can be withdrawn quickly. It is somewhat more complex for savers
to initiate holding their savings in pensions (they may, for example, need to be employees of a certain
company to participate in the pension fund). However savings held in pension funds are attractive from the
financial capitalist firm’s point of view because these savings are often left in place for long periods ot
time.
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Unlike competition among financial capitalist firms in the second moment of
financial intermediation, competition among financial capitalist firms in this first moment
of financial intermediation is not a subsumed class struggle, in that it is not a struggle
concerning distributions from surplus value. Is However, competition for access to
savings is, of course, a condition of existence for subsumed class struggle in the second
moment of financial intermediation. Competition among financial capitalist firms in the
first moment of financial intermediation may be contrary to a Keynesian agenda for low
subsumed class payment for access to money capital, in that this competition may
increase the rate of return that financial capitalist firms are obliged to pay to attract
savings. If circumstances permit, financial capitalist firms may pass this cost increase on
to productive capitalist firms by increasing the cost of securing money capital. Even if
financial capitalist firms are not in a position to pass these increased costs along to
productive capitalists via an subsumed class payment required to secure money capital,
competition over access to savings may still exacerbate the master/servant contradiction
of the Keynesian agenda. If financial capitalist firms absorb these cost increases without
any corresponding increase in revenues, this will squeeze the profitability of financial
capitalist firms, and this may in turn subvert accumulation.
18 We assume that the savings come from a variety of sources, such as savings from workers’ wages,
savings from the state’s tax collection and other revenue generating activities, and savings from a variety of
participants in non-capitalist class processes and unproductive capitalists. However, it may be that savings
are the retained earnings of productive capitalist firm, in which case competition among financial capitalist
firms for the opportunity to intermediate these savings might arguably be considered a subsumed class
struggle. For simplicity we leave this possibility aside.
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Competition among financial capitalist firms in the second moment of financial
intermediation takes the form of a subsumed class struggle over distributions of surplus
value. Each financial capitalist firm would like to maximize the subsumed class revenue
that it receives, while minimizing the X expenses associated with earning these subsumed
class revenues. This subsumed class form of competition among financial capitalist firms
is beneficial to the Keynesian agenda, in that it may exert downward pressure on the costs
of securing money capital. However, the benefits of this subsumed class struggle among
financial capital vis a vis the size of this subsumed class payment must be viewed in light
of the master/servant contradiction, since it is possible that very vigorous subsumed class
competition might impair the profitability of financial capitalist firms to the extent that
they might take actions that are inconsistent with the Keynesian agenda for financial
capital.
In the second moment of financial intermediation, the financial capitalist firm may
provide money capital to the productive capitalist firms in one of two forms. The
provision of money capital may take the form of a loan, in which case it is referred to as
debt capital, or by the initial 1
}
purchase of stock, in which case it is referred to as equity
capital." These two forms of money capital are related to the provision of different
conditions of existence for the productive capitalist firm, and they carry with them
19
The term “initial” indicates that the stock is purchased directly from the productive capitalist firm, thus
the revenues from the sale of the stock can be employed as money capital by the productive capitalist firm.
Purchases of stock on the secondary market do not provide revenue for the productive capitalist firm.
20 To simplify the analysis in its preliminary stages, we will assume in this section that the financial
capitalist firm directly provides loans or purchases the stock from the productive capitalist firm. We will
relax this assumption below to consider how financial capitalist firms may facilitate access to money
capital by arranging loans or the stock purchases by third parties through activities such as securities
underwriting.
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different implications. Debt capital (the condition of existence of credit) carries with it
the necessity of making subsumed class payment referred to as interest payment
,
21
and
the repayment of the principal of the loan. Equity capital (the condition of existence
ownership) does not carry with it the necessity of making a subsumed class payment,
although firms may choose to pay the subsumed class payment referred to as a dividend.
The advance of money capital in equity form does not require repayment, however the
receipt of equity capital does entail other obligations (such as the entitlement of
stockholders to vote in the election of the board of directors) and opportunities (such as
the opportunity for capital gains, as will be discussed below).
One of these forms of subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms can be
competition between providers of debt and equity capital. Debt and equity capital
providers are engaged subsumed class struggle with each other as each attempts to
maximize the distribution of surplus value allocated to secure the particular condition of
existence that they provide. Because productive capitalist firms have two alternative
means through which to secure access to money capital, the productive capitalist firm
may benefit from subsumed class struggles among these two types of providers of money
capital to reduce the subsumed class payment required to secure access to money capital
generally. From the point of view of a productive capitalist firm in need of money capital,
21
In practice, some providers of debt capital also charge fees in addition to interest. In this event, such fees
could be treated as additional subsumed class revenues, if they are fees that the financial capitalist firm is
able to compel borrowers to pay in order to have access to money capital. However, it may be argued that
such fees could be considered surplus value, as when the fee is paid in return for something (say monthly
statements or automatic account debiting) which is arguably a service. It may also be the case that a “fee" is
really a component of the interest payment, but it has been presented as two separate payments (perhaps in
order to disguise the costs of a loan from a potential borrower).
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debt and equity capital are often close substitutes. Thus the productive capitalist may be
able to alter their mix of debt and equity capital to enhance their ability to bargain over
the size of the subsumed class payment required to secure access to both types of money
capital. Alternatively, providers of both types of money capital may ally in the hopes of
enhancing their ability to increase the subsumed class payment that productive capitalist
firms must make to secure money capital in either form. In this way, the subsumed class
struggles among providers of debt and equity capital overdetermine (and are
overdetermined by) subsumed class struggle between productive capitalist firms and
providers of money capital.
By analyzing the two distinct moments of financial intermediation we can see the
varying effects of competition among financial capitalist firms on the subsumed class
payment required to secure money capital. The Keynesian financial reform agenda to
promote low subsumed class payment for access to money capital was obliged to deal
with these diverse implications of competition among financial capitalist firms. In
general, Keynesian financial reform sought to intensify the subsumed class competition
among financial capitalist firms in the second moment of financial intermediation, while
moderating competition among financial capitalist firms in the first moment of financial
intermediation. However, this general orientation of Keynesian financial agenda was
subject to the proviso that financial capitalist firms needed to maintain adequate
profitability in order that they would behave in a manner consistent with the overall
Keynesian financial agenda. As we shall see, this divergent agenda with respect to
competition among financial capitalist firms compelled the architects ofNew Deal
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financial reform to create regulatory interventions that sought to simultaneously
encourage competition among financial capitalist firms in some respects, while
discouraging it in other respects.
Non-Class Elements Of Financial Capitalist Activity:
A_Further Overdeterminant Of Subsumed Class Struggles Involving Financial Cap ital
Thus far in our analysis we have defined a financial capitalist firm as an unproductive
capitalist firm that expands value by providing money capital to productive capitalist
firms. In order to proceed further with our analysis of the contradictory imperatives
animating Keynesian financial reform, we must extend our class analytic framework to
consider some of the ways that financial capitalist firms may expand value in addition to
their receipt of subsumed class revenue. These non-class revenues interact with the
subsumed class revenues analyzed above to overdetermine the subsumed class struggles
involving financial capital. This more complex picture of both the subsumed class
struggle between productive and financial capital and the subsumed class struggle among
financial capitalist firms illuminates further challenges for the design of Keynesian
financial reforms.
We begin with the generic class analytic equation of a financial capitalist firm
presented in Figure 1 above. At that point, non-class revenues entered into the class
analysis of financial capitalist activity only as inflows of savings gathered in the first
moment of financial intermediation, or the repayment of money capital previously
advanced to productive capitalist firms. However, financial capitalist firms have other
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ways of earning non-class revenues in the second moment of financial intermediation. To
facilitate this discussion, financial capitalist firms that advance funds by means of loans
and those that advance funds by means of purchasing equities will be analyzed
separately. In this manner, a more specific class analytic equation for both types of
financial capitalist firms can be derived by considering the non-class revenues that are
relevant to each group. By discerning the impact of non-class revenue on both types of
financial capitalist firms, further nuances animating the subsumed class struggle among
financial capitalist firms are highlighted.
A financial capitalist firm that lends funds may elect to make loans to entities that are
not productive capitalist firms. These entities can include workers or other individuals,
unproductive capitalist firms, states or other domestic or international organizations. 22
When a financial capitalist firm lends funds to one of these entities, the interest income it
receives is a non-class revenue. By incorporating the possibility that money-lending
financial capitalist firms may advance funds to both productive capitalist firms and other
borrowers of funds, we derive a general class analysis of money-lending financial
capitalist firms (Figure 2). Now loans advanced may be either X loans (to surplus value
appropriators) or Y loans (to others). The interest income earned on these loans will take
the form of a subsumed class revenue (on a loan to surplus value appropriators) or non-
class revenue (on a loan to others), and the expenses associated with earning interest
income may be X or Y expenses accordingly. The varied costs associated with earning
22
It is also possible that a money-lending financial capitalist firm might make loans to surplus labor
appropriators in non-capitalist class process. In that event, the interest income from the loans would not be
a non-class revenue, but rather a subsumed class payment from a non-capitalist class process. We leave this
possibility aside in the class analytic equations below.
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interest income are either X or Y expenses, depending on the type of loans advanced, and
these costs are depicted in the term “(X+Y) expenses associated with advancing
.cans”. However, the
additional dimension of non-class revenues from lending has not directly affected the first
moment of financial intermediation, in that the financial capitalist firm still requires non-
class revenue in the form of savings inflows and must bear some Y costs associated with
securing these savings inflows.
Figure 2. Class Analysis OfA Money-Lending Financial Capitalist Firm
Value Inflows:
NCR inflow of savings obtained SSCR interest payment from surplus value appropriators + NCR interest payment
from non-surplus value appropriators TNCR repayment of loans
Value Expenditures:
expenses associated with securing savings inflows X money capital advanced to surplus value appropriators Y ioans
advanced to non-surplus value appropriators +(X+Y) expenses associated with advancing loans +Y any additional
expense
The possibility that a money-lending financial capitalist firm may mix both
subsumed class and non-class revenue generation overdetermines the subsumed class
struggle between productive and financial capital. Conditions may be such that the
subsumed class revenues obtained from supplying money capital to productive capitalist
firms are overshadowed by non-class revenues. In this event, the conditions of existence
of the financial capitalist firm may become more tenuously related productive capitalist
firms’ success in securing their conditions of existence. 2 ' It is possible that the capacity
23
However, even a financial capitalist firm which derives its revenues principally through non-class
revenues may still be concerned about the wellbeing of productive capitalist firms. A condition of existence
of non-class revenue may be the continued prosperity of productive capitalist firms, as occurs when a
financial capitalist firm makes loans to workers of productive capitalist firms.
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of the financial capitalist firm to rely on non-class revenues may put it in a better position
to demand a higher subsumed class payment in return for the provision of money capital
to productive capitalist firms. However, the pursuit of non-class revenue by financial
capital may also assist productive capital. The productive capitalist firm has various
condition of existence in addition to access to money capital, and a financial capitalist
firm’s non-class lending may aid in the provision of some of these conditions of
existence. For example, the provision of funds to consumers, states and unproductive
capitalist firms may ameliorate realization problems for productive capital if these funds
are used to buy the commodities produced by productive capitalist firms.
Financial capitalist firms that provide equity capital to productive capital also have
the opportunity to earn non-class revenue. We have assumed thus far that providers of
equity capital may earn a subsumed class revenue in the form of dividends. However, a
financial capitalist firm may also resell their stock on the secondary stock market, and if
it is able to resell the stock at a price higher than what was originally paid, the resulting
capital gain is a non-class revenue."
4 A class analysis of a financial capitalist firm that
provides equity capital is depicted in Figure 3. In the first moment of financial
intermediation, a financial capitalist firm that provides equity capital continues to be
similar to money lending financial capitalist firms, in that they obtain savings as a non-
class revenue and they incur Y expenses associated with this. However, now financial
capitalist firms that provide equity capital have two ways of expanding value. They may
24
Money-lending financial capitalist firms may also realize capital gains when a debt security, such as a
bond, appreciates in price.
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receive dividends (a subsumed class revenue that obligates the firm to incur
corresponding X expenditures) or they may receive capital gams (a non-class revenue
that carries with it corresponding Y expenses involved with stock market research,
tiansaction fees etc). The initial purchase of the stock subsequently earns subsumed class
revenues as dividends constitutes an X expense, since we have assumed throughout that
the stock purchased is issued by a productive capitalist firm.25
Figure 3: Class Analysis Of Financial Capitalist Firm That Provides Equity Capital To
Productive Capitalist Firms
Value Inflows:
NCR inflow of savings obtained +SSCR dividends +NCR cap j tal gains
Value Expenditure:
Y expenses associated with securing savings inflows + X initial purchases of stock + X other expenses associated with
purchasing stock ~^~Y expenses associated with securing capital gains ~^~Y any additional expense
The possibility of capital gains also overdetermines the subsumed class struggle
between productive and financial capital. This increased diversity of revenue sources
increases the flexibility of financial capital. Such a financial capitalist firm may refrain
from channeling money capital to productive capitalist firms and elect instead to engage
in the pursuit of capital gains by buying and selling stock on secondary markets.
However, productive capital also gains greater flexibility as a result of the possibility of
capital gains on stocks. The possibility of capital gains on the sale of equities may enable
productive capitalist firms to reduce the subsumed class payments made as dividends in
25
For completeness, it should be acknowledged that financial capitalist firms may advance equity capital to
firms that are not productive capitalist firms, as when they buy the stock of other financial capitalist firms,
merchant capitalist firms, or firms involved in non-capitalist class processes. These possibilities will be left
aside.
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order to attract equity capital, since stockholders may be compensated for low dividends
by the receipt of capital gains. This possibility in turn shapes the subsumed class struggle
between financial capitalist firms and productive capital. In the absence of other
overdetermining factors, such as a differences in the tax treatment between debt and
equity capital inflows, we assume that debt and equity capital are close substitutes from
the point of view of a productive capitalist firm
.
26
Thus to the extent that possibility of
capital gains enables productive capitalist firms to reduce the subsumed class payment
made in the form of dividends, this situation affords productive capitalist firms the
opportunity to intensify subsumed class struggle between the providers of debt and equity
capital and thereby put downward pressure on the subsumed class payment made to
secure both forms of money capital.
One final complication in the class analysis of a financial capitalist firm concerns the
possibility that a firm involved in financial capitalist activity may pursue the expansion of
value via the appropriation surplus value. In addition to the financial capitalist activities
analyzed above, financial capitalist firms often provide financial advice, record keeping,
the safekeeping of securities, automatic bill payment and so on. These activities must be
scrutinized to discern whether they might constitute the production of a commodity, and
if so the income generated from these activities would be appropriated surplus value. A
firm that appropriates surplus value in addition to the financial capitalist activities
26
This principle was articulated in mainstream economic literature by Modigliani and Miller (1958).
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previously analyzed would occupy multiple class positions as both a financial capitalist
and productive capitalist firm. To make the subsequent analysis more manageable, we
omit surplus value appropriation in the analysis for the remainder of this chapter.
Potential Financial Capitalist Responses To Support Their Profitability
In The Face Of The Keynesian Financial Reform Agenda
Now that we have examined some of the additional ways in which financial
capitalist firms can expand value through non-class revenues, we can anticipate some of
the potential responses on the part of financial capital to the Keynesian pro-accumulation
agenda. If financial capitalist firms experience pressure on their profitability as a
consequence of downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure
money capital, they may intensify their pursuit of non-class revenues. In some ways this
may be supportive of accumulation, as when funds advanced for purposes other than
accumulation support demand for the commodities produced by productive capitalist
firms. However, the orientation towards non-class revenues may pose a problem for the
Keynesian pro-accumulation agenda to the extent that this response may siphon funds
away from the provision of money capital the capitalist fundamental class process.
The pursuit of non-class revenues to support financial capitalist profitability can
have further implications that may jeopardize the Keynesian accumulation agenda. The
non-class revenues pursued by financial capitalists may be predicated on the pursuit of
capital gains. This may occur when financial capitalists engage in the direct pursuit of
capital gains in the secondary markets for securities, or this may occur less directly, as
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when financial capitalists engage in money-lending designed to support the purchase of
securities on secondary markets for the purpose of securing capital gains. From the point
of view of Keynesian theory, this increased orientation of financial capitalists to the
pursuit of capital gains may have negative consequences for the stable and vigorous
accumulation that Keynesians wish to promote.
Switching briefly into Keynesian terminology, the Keynesian analysis of the
volatility of investment spending is informed by the concept of “fundamental
uncertainty
. Keynes argues that investors must commit to long-term investment projects
despite their inability to foresee the future outcome of their investment decisions.
Investors are compelled to make investment decisions on the basis of expectations, which
are informed by a variety of social conventions, including perceptions about movements
in financial asset prices. An environment characterized by the aggressive pursuit of
capital gains can exacerbate the volatility of financial asset prices, thereby provoking
instability in expectations and further intensifying the perils of embarking on investment
decisions .
27
" 7
Unlike Neoclassical, Keynesians appeal to no underlying “fundamentals” that govern financial asset
prices. While both theories concur that investors consider the future rate of return on a proposed investment
project, Keynesians believe that investors have no possibility of even probabilistic information about the
future rates of return on so-called “momentous 11 investment decisions. Thus for Keynesians, arbitrage in
financial assets does not have the stabilizing properties of establishing the correct price reflecting
underlying fundamentals (a la neoclassical economic theory), but instead the attempt to profit from short
term price fluctuations can exacerbate price instability and thereby distort the expectations formation
process. (See Crotty, 1994)
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From a Marxian class analytic perspective, the Keynesian analysis of fundamental
uncertainty and the expectations formations process implies a contradictory attitude
towards the pursuit of capital gains. The possibility of realizing capital gains can put
downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure money capital.
However, Keynesians do not wish the pursuit of capital gains to dominate the conduct of
financial intermediation to the extent that productive capital is made hostage to the
vagaries of speculation in financial assets. Although Keynesians do not commit
themselves on the precise point at which the pursuit of capital gains begins to undermine
the subsumed class role of financial intermediaries, the laudable situation (financial
intermediation geared primarily towards the promotion of accumulation) is usually
distinguished from the undesirable situation (financial intermediation geared toward
capital gains in financial assets) by reference to Keynes' distinction between
speculation and enterprise ’. In the General Theory
. Keynes contrasts “enterprise”, or
the “activity of long term investment concerned with the yield of assets over their whole
life” (Keynes, 1973, 158) with “speculation,” or the attempt to garner profits by
anticipating market psychology to take advantage of short-term fluctuations in prices. 28 It
is interesting that the famous passage condemning speculation in the General Theory is
followed by a less frequently quoted condemnation of the speculative proclivities of Wall
Street:
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the
position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of
Grabel quotes a useful definition of speculation devised by Nicholas Kaldor: “’[speculation is] the
purchase (or sale) of goods with a view to re-sale (or repurchase) at a later date, where the motive behind
such action is the expectation of a change in the relevant prices ... and not a gain accruing through their
use, or any kind of transformation effected in them or their transfer between different markets.’” (in Grabel
1999
,
1076 - 1077 )
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speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product ofthe act iv
Jt
ies of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of success
attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the proper social
purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of
uture yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire
capitahsm - which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains ofWads Street have been in fact directed towards a different object. (Keynes 1973,
Keynes also acknowledged that speculation may have damaging consequences for
economic growth for other reasons. Keynes’ Treatise on Money published in 1930,
included references that pointed out that a central bank may seek to deter excessive
speculation on financial markets by increasing interest rates in the attempt reduce the
flow of funds into speculative purposes. Such a policy also increases the subsumed Alass
payment required to secure money capital. Keynes was persuaded that the Federal
Reserve had taken this course of action during the late 1920s, and that this had put
sufficient upward pressure on the costs of investment that it provoked the subsequent
economic downturn:
Nevertheless, the high market-rate of interest which, prior to the collapse, the
Federal Reserve System in their effort to control the enthusiasm of the speculative
crowd, caused to be enforced in the United States — and as a result of sympathetic
self-protective action, in the rest of the world — played an essential part in bringing
about the rapid collapse. For this punitive rate of interest could not be prevented
from having its repercussion on the rate of new investment both in the United
States and throughout the world, and was bound, therefore, to prelude an era of
falling prices and business losses everywhere.
Thus I attribute the slump of 1930 primarily to the deterrent effects on
investment of the long period of dear money which preceded the stock-market
collapse, and only secondarily to the collapse itself. (Keynes 1930, 196)29
The question of the actual orientation of monetary policy prior to the stock market crash is somewhat
contentious, with authors such as Friedman and Schwartz claiming that monetary restraint was actually
eased after 1927. Our purpose is not to resolve this debate, but rather to suggest that Keynes believed this to
be true, and thus this perception was likely influential among Keynesians.
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A third potential response of financial capitalist firms to pressure on their
profitability concerns a migration towards the assumption of increased risk in their
financial capitalist activities. This method of increasing value inflows differs from those
discussed in the previous paragraphs since it can concern a change in the way that
financial capitalist firms conduct their subsumed class lending as well as their non-class
lending. The interest income received by a financial capitalist firm increases in instances
wheie the perceived risk associated with the provision of money capital increases. Thus
by engaging in lending to borrowers that seek to undertake activities that are perceived as
risky, financial capitalist firms may enhance their profitability. However, with the
assumption of greater risk comes the increased likelihood that the borrower may not be
able to make required interest payment, or the money capital may be lost in its entirety.
When a borrower defaults entirely, there may be some collateral that the bank can
use to defray the loss of the principal ot the loan. However, the conditions that
culminated in the inability of the borrower to meet its interest payment obligations (say
the inability to appropriate surplus value in their productive capitalist firm) may also
depreciate the value of the collateral backing the loan. For example, if the borrower has
been unable to appropriate surplus value because of a crisis in a particular industry, then
any means ot production or securities related to the industry in distress are likely to fetch
less for the commercial bank seeking to recover its losses on the defaulted loan. In a
general economic downturn, the liquidation of all of the forms of collateral backing bank
loans in default creates a general asset deflation, and increases the likelihood that the
solvency of commercial banking system will be jeopardized.
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Defaults by borrowers have the potential to plunge the financial capitalist firm
into a crisis. If many financial capitalist firms face defaults simultaneously, this has the
potential to destabilize financial intermediation generally, as losses of this kind can
persuade savers to regard financial capitalist firms as insecure places in which to hold
savings. Thus the migration to riskier activities implies a further contradiction. Because it
enables financial capitalist firms to earn greater subsumed class revenues, it may be that
migration toward greater risk will enable financial capitalist firms to enhance their
profitability. However, in the event that greater risk leads to crisis among financial
capitalist firms, this can destabilize financial intermediation, which in turn threatens
capital accumulation.
Financial capital may also blend various avenues of non-class revenue generation.
For example, loans may be made for the purchase of securities on secondary markets.
The degree to which financial capitalist engage in this form of lending will exert
influence on the demand conditions on securities markets, which in turn may accentuate
the volatility of financial asset prices. Financial capitalists may migrate towards making
these loans for increasingly risky attempts to secure capital gains. Securities may even be
offered as collateral to support loans to purchase additional securities, which renders
financial capitalists (and the conduct of financial intermediation in general) vulnerable
should securities prices drop and destabilize loan portfolios. The synergies amongst these
strategies can culminate in a situation that is an anathema for Keynesian financial reform.
If financial intermediation is increasingly conducted in a manner that exacerbates the
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volatility in financial markets and compromises the stability of financial intermediaries,
Keynesians fear that the conditions of existence for stable and vigorous investment
spending will be compromised. While not opposing the pursuit of capital gains outright
(since it may be a condition of existence for low subsumed class payment to secure
money capital) or the assumption of risk on the part of financial capitalists (since risk is
inherent in the provision of money capital), Keynesians tend to condemn financial
environments that they perceive have become overly speculative.
The potential for financial capitalists to engage in all of these avenues of earning
non-class revenues further overdetermines the Keynesian pro-accumulation agenda. In
the event that this Keynesian agenda exacerbates the Keynesian master/servant
contradiction, financial capitalists could respond to pressure on their profitability by
engaging in the pursuit of capital gains and the assumption of heightened risk. In turn,
these responses may undennine the Keynesian accumulation agenda. Thus each
intervention on the part of Keynesian financial regulators that is potentially injurious to
financial capitalist profitability has the potential to set in motion actions that might
undennine the accumulation agenda that Keynesian financial refonners intended to
support. The Marxian class analytic perspective appreciates the enonnous complexity of
attempting to manage these sometimes entropic contradictions. Without the perspective
of overdetermination, Keynesian financial refonns may appear as a pastiche of
incongruent regulatory impulses. Indeed, as the New Deal financial refonns were being
unraveled in the 1990s, opponents of this Keynesian financial regulatory framework
portrayed themselves as advocates of “financial modernization”, thus positioning
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themselves in opposition to a regulatory structure that was implied to be archaic or
perhaps even perversely irrational. However, from an overdeterminist point of view, it is
not surprising the New Deal financial reforms had multiple objectives as it attempted to
cope with both the positive and negative moments of the Keynesian master/servant
contradiction.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CLASS ANALYTICS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING-
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SUBSUMED CLASS STRUGGLES
INVOLVING FINANCIAL CAPITAL
Introduction
The second chapter presented a generic class analysis of financial capital in order
to describe the Keynesian master/servant contradiction and some of its implications for
New Deal financial reforms. The third chapter develops the class analytics of a particular
type of financial capitalist Finn, the commercial bank, to refine the analysis of subsumed
class struggles involving financial capital that overdetermined the New Deal financial
reforms. As chapter two argued, the terms “types” or “categories” of financial capitalist
activity is used to refer to the characteristic way in which a financial capitalist gathers
savings in the first moment of financial intermediation. Thus a commercial bank is
distinguished by its acceptance of deposits, a pension fund by its receipt of pension fund
contributions and so on. The class analysis undertaken in this chapter begins with the
assumption that financial capitalist firms conduct only one type of financial capitalist
activity. Thus a firm called a “commercial bank” engages only gathering savings via
deposits, and refrains from engaging in other types of financial capitalist activities
connected with investment banking, the provision of insurance 1
,
pensions and so on.
Later this assumption is relaxed to consider the “diversified financial capitalist firm”,
meaning a financial capitalist firm that engages in multiple types of financial capitalist
activities.
1
The insurance provision referred to is insurance with a savings element.
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Commercial banks have been selected as a particular focus of this dissertation for
a variety of reasons. Historically the money-lending activities of commercial banks have
been an important condition of existence for the capitalist fundamental class process. For
a variety of historically and institutionally specific reasons, it has evolved that
commercial banks also facilitate transactions in a market economy, and act as the
transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Because of the multiple conditions of
existence that commercial banks provide for contemporary surplus value appropriation,
and because of the vulnerability of commercial banks inherent in a partial reserve system,
it has evolved that the state has a unique relationship with the commercial banking
system. By exploring the peculiarities of commercial banking as a unique type of
financial capitalist activity, we arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the subsumed
class struggles among financial capitalist firms, which in turn overdetermines the
subsumed class payment required to secure money capital.
The Class Analysis Of Commercial Banking
Commercial banks acquire funds for subsequent re-lending by accepting deposits.
The inflow of funds that commercial banks receive when they obtain new deposits is a
non-class revenue. The majority of these new deposits are used to make loans, either to
surplus value appropriators (in which case the new loan is an X payment) or to others
such as individuals, unproductive capitalist firms or states 2 (in which case the new loan is
' For simplicity, we omit the possibility that the bank makes a loan to non-capitalist surplus appropriators.
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a Y payment). However, the "partial reserve system” employed in the United States
3
legally obliges commercial banks to withhold a portion of their new deposits as required
reserves. Required reserves constitute a Y payment for commercial banks, and these
funds must be held in non-interest bearing accounts at the Federal Reserve. 5 The interest
income that is received by commercial banks when interest is paid on loans is either a
subsumed class revenue (if the borrower is an appropriator of surplus value), or a non-
class revenue (if not). Banks, like other financial capitalist finns, also may incur expenses
associated with acquiring loanable funds. Since we assume that banks acquire loanable
funds only via deposits, the interest paid on deposits is a Y expense. In addition, there are
other Y expenses associated with occupancy costs, salaries and so forth, and these and
other residual expenses comprise the term “Y other expenses” Finally, when a loan is repaid
to the commercial bank, this constitutes a non-class revenue.
Figure 4: Commercial Banking Value Inflows and Expenditures
Value Inflows:
Abank deposits F SSCR interest income from loans to surplus value appropriators F NCR interest income from
loans to non-surplus value appropriators FNCR ioan repayment
Value Expenditures:
Y interest paid to secure bank deposits F X loans to surplus value appropriators F Y loans to non-surplus value
appropriators F(X+Y) expenses associated with advancing loans FY Arequired reserves FY other expenses
1
The partial reserve system is the traditional manner in which depository banking has been conducted.
However, recently some jurisdictions have excused depository institutions from the necessity of holding
required reserves. Chapter six will discuss some of the ways in which depository institutions have been able
to reduce and in some cases eliminate required reserves.
4
This is an approximation of how required reserves are created. In fact, required reserves are generally
acquired by trading among commercial banks in the Federal Funds market, rather than by holding aback a
portion of each new deposit. However, this approximation is employed in standard texts as an explanation
of the banking process and the money multiplier.
5 Cash held on the premises of commercial banks (vault cash) is also counted as required reserves.
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To derive a statement of commercial bank profits, the relevant value inflows and
expenditures connected to value expansion are extracted from Figure 4 to create Figure 5
below.
Figure 5: Commercial Banking Profits
Commercial Banking Profit
[SSCR interest income from loans to surplus value appropriators + NCR interest income from loans to non-surplus value
appropriators ] [Y interest paid to secure bank deposits +(X+Y) expenses associated with advancing loans +Y other
expenses]
The preceding class analysis of commercial banking makes several important
assumptions concerning both the first and second moments of financial intermediation. It
is assumed that banks access savings exclusively by accepting deposits. This precludes
the possibility that commercial banks might issue certificates of deposit or commercial
paper, and use these so-called “purchased make loans. These forms of non-
deposit liabilities used by commercial banks to fund loans may be used by many types of
financial capitalists. In order to focus on the unique activity of commercial banking, these
types of non-depository activities common to all financial capitalists have been
eliminated from the class analytic definition of commercial banking. In terms of the
second moment of financial intermediation, we assume that commercial banks are
exclusively engaged in making loans. We thus disallow the possibility dividends or
capital gains may be earned in commercial banking. Furthermore, we assume that loans
are made to both productive capitalist firms and others, so by this definition we exclude
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any specialized depository institutions, such as savings and loan associations, that were
designed to make loans for solely non-class purposes (such as loans to individuals for
residential housing purchases).
The preceding analysis of commercial banking is highly simplified in order to
highlight the unique properties of this particular type of financial capitalist activity.
However, in seeking to analyze the commercial bank as a firm, we must confront other
value inflow and expenditures that typically occur inside this type of financial capitalist
firm. For example, the preceding class analysis assumed that banks are fully “loaned up”
(i.e. that all funds on deposit are either directed to new loans or required reserves).
However, it is possible that commercial banks may leave funds idle if conditions are such
that extending new loans is not perceived as lucrative for the commercial bank. In that
event, the commercial bank is deemed to have “excess reserves”. Since required reserves
bear no interest, holding funds as reserves in excess of the legal requirement represents
forgone income for a commercial bank. In order to earn income on funds that are not in
use as either required reserves or new loans, commercial banks may hold these funds in
the form of government securities. It has evolved that holding funds in this form is
deemed permissible by banking regulators, since government securities allow commercial
banks to earn some interest income, yet they are regarded as being highly liquid and
having little risk of default (although they are not a substitute for required reserves, since
in a banking crisis the holding of government securities offers less effective protection
than do required reserves
6
). In the event that a commercial bank holds government
6
Required reserves are always accessible at face value, but if large amounts of government securities are
liquidated at the same time, this may reduce the amount that these securities fetch in the market for
62
securities in this manner, the class analysis of commercial banks presented above would
be amended. Interest earned on government securities would be a non-class revenue, as
would be any capital gains made on the sale of these securities. Another non-class
revenue would be any repayment of the principal of the government security. On the
value outflow side, the Y costs associated with purchasing these securities constitutes an
additional expense.
A second consideration in the class analysis of commercial banks are the various
activities that are typically incidental to commercial banking but are outside of the
definitional limits of commercial banking imposed above. Revenues which are not
interest payments on loans advanced by the commercial bank are deemed non-interest
income. For example, any gains realized because of fluctuating exchange rates that affect
foreign currency transactions would be recorded as non-interest income. Within the
category of non-interest income are various revenues typically referred to as “fee
income". Fee income is generated by a great range of activities, from fees levied on
deposit accounts (say for the use of an automatic banking machine) to fees earned in
return for the provision of a safety deposit box. As chapter seven explains, fee income is
also earned on a host of activities that are increasingly peripheral to the traditional
commercial bank role of taking deposits and making loans. It would require a detailed
class analysis of each fee-generating activity to see if that activity constitutes the
production of a commodity. This analysis is forgone here, and we shall assume that all
fee income should be considered a non-class revenue. Any such non-class revenue will
government securities. Thus in the event of a banking panic, funds held in the form of government
securities offer less certain liquidity for commercial banks.
63
entail expenses, but in practice it is difficult to match commercial bank expenses to the
income they generate. 7 We simplify this issue by recording all of these expenses under
the term “Y other expenses
The class analysis of the profits of a commercial bank can be created by taking
the class analytic statement of the profits of commercial banking (depicted in Figure 5)
and adding these additional forms of value expansion that typically occur within a
commercial bank. Figure 6 presents this as the class analytic statement of commercial
bank profits. Whereas Figure 5 represented the profits of commercial banking as a
financial capitalist activity (that is the strictly defined activity of taking deposits and
using those deposits to fund loans), Figure 6 includes the other forms of revenues and
expenses that are incidental to the practice of commercial banking in order to represent
the profits of the financial capitalist firm referred to as a commercial bank.
Figure 6: Class Analysis of Commercial Bank Profits
Commercial Bank Profits — [SSCR interest income from loans to surplus value appropriators + NCR
interest income from loans to non-surplus value appropriators NCR interest income from securities NCR capital
gains on securities ~t”NCR non-interest income] “ [Y interest paid to secure bank deposits "F(X+Y) expenses
associated with advancing loans Y purchase of government securities other expenses]
7
For example, a bank employee may be involved in multiple activities during the workday that include
both activities associated with securing the traditional subsumed class and non-class revenue from loans
and activities associated with earning fee income.
64
Using Conventional Banking Data To Conduct A Class Analysis Of Commerriai R»nio
The class analytic statement of commercial bank profits presented in Figure 6
provides the framework for our analysis in subsequent chapters ofNew Deal financial
reforms and their impacts on commercial bank profitability. An empirical application of
this class analytic framework requires data with which to assess the developments in the
various value inflow and outflow categories. However, the non-Marxian format in which
banking data is collected does not immediately lend itself to class analytic concerns. This
section confronts this problem by dissecting the non-Marxian categories used to format
available data in order to reconstitute them in a manner that can address class analytic
concerns more directly.
The Historical Statistics on Banking (HSOB) published by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has been selected as the primary source of data used to
create a class analytic account of commercial bank profitability. FDIC data is considered
an authoritative source of the aggregate information contained in the income statements
and balance sheets of FDIC-member commercial banks, and it has been collected in a
relatively consistent fashion since the inception of the FDIC in 1934. 8 All data used from
this source pertains to commercial banks that are members of the FDIC, but this arguably
constitutes a reasonable proxy for all US chartered commercial banks. In some instances,
FDIC data is not appropriate for a particular discussion, and in that event data is used
8 Of course, the FDIC has adapted the ways in which it categorizes and presents bank data as commercial
banking, accounting protocols and public policy concerns have evolved. Thus within FDIC statistics there
are some inconsistencies in the way in which particular items are classified over time. A very detailed
account of the various changes made in the presentation of data contained in the Historical Statistics on
Banking is presented on the FIDC website at www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes
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from the flow Of Funds published by the Federal Reserve. Prior to 1934 the availability
of data that is commensurate with both the Flow of Funds and the HSOB is more limited.
Chapters four and five will rely on the Banking and Monetary Statistics published by the
Federal Reserve for this purpose.
The reconstitution of non-Marxian banking data into class analytic categories is
divided into the revenue and expenditure components. Table 1 summarizes the ways in
which the four non-Marxian revenue categories of commercial banks are decomposed
and rearranged as the five class analytic value inflow categories. The aggregated FDIC
data makes it impossible to determine the extent to which loans are made to appropriators
of surplus value versus other entities. Thus for present purposes, the two Marxian
categories SSCR mterest income from loans to surplus value appropriators and ‘NCR interest income from loans to
non-surpius value appropriators are combined. This combined subsumed and non-class interest
income category corresponds to a subset of the FIDC categories that constitute “total
interest income”. From “total interest income” we have extracted “interest income loans
and leases and the majority of “other interest income”9 as the approximation of the
interest income from subsumed class and non-class loans. The final elements of FDIC’s
“total interest income”, namely “interest income on investment securities” and “other
interest income: trading account assets”, has been displayed separately to illustrate the
non-class revenue earned as interest income on investment securities. “NCR non-interest
'
Interest income on trading account assets are not included as interest income from loans in the class
analytic category SSCR interest income from loans to surplus value appropriators NCR interest income from loans to non-surplus value
appropriators.
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income” is composed of both “total non-interest income” and “net extraordinary items”
from the FDIC classifications. Finally “NCR •, , • » • • , ...in
capita! gains on securities is considered to be the
FIDC category “securities gains/losses”.
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Table 1: A Comparison Of FDIC Revenue Categories And Class
Categories Related To Commercial Bank Profit
Analytic Value Inflow
FDIC CATEGORIES CLASS ANALYTIC CATFGORTFQ
Income Value Tnflnwc
Total
Interest
Income
• Interest income loans
and leases
• Interest income
investment securities
• Other interest income
(trading account
assets
10
,
federal funds,
balances due from
depository institutions)
SSCR interest
income from loans to
surplus value
appropriators
T NCR interest
income from loans to
non-surplus value
appropriators
• Interest income
loans and leases
• Other interest
income (federal
funds, balances due
from depository
institutions)
NCR interest income
from securities
• Interest income
investment securities
• Other interest
income(trading
account assets)
Total non-
interest income
• Fee income"
• Other non-interest
income 12
NCR non-interest
income
• Fee income
• Other non-interest
income
• Net extraordinary
items
Securities
gains/losses
• Securities
gains/losses 13
NCR capital gains on
securities
• Securities
gains/losses
Net Extra-
ordinary items
• Any additional
income 14
This statistic was not collected until 1983. Prior to that, any interest income from trading account assets
was included under “non-interest income- all other”.
" Fee income includes “service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices such as maintenance fees,
activity charges, administrative charges, overdraft charges, and check certification charges”.
(www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
Other non-interest income includes “income from fiduciary activities; gains, losses and fees relating to
foreign currency or foreign exchange transactions; gains, losses and fees from assets held in trading
accounts; net gains from the sale or disposition of loans, premises (including branches and offices) and
fixed assets, and other real estate owned; all service charges, fees and commissions (other than those
relating to deposits in domestic offices); fees charged on bank issued credit cards; net gains on futures and
forward contracts; and other miscellaneous income”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
13
This category represents “the net value of profits on securities sold or redeemed less losses on securities
sold”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
14
Net extraordinary items represents “the results of material events and transactions that are both unusual
and infrequent, net of income taxes”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
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The comparison of FD1C expense categories and class analytic value outflow
categories is presented in Table 2. On the expense side “Y^ Y interest paid to secure bank deposits
consists of one of the two elements of total interest expense, namely “interest on
deposits”. The class analytic category “CX+Yt a »>J 5 J V Y 1 y expenses associated with advancing loans Consists
of the other subcategory ot total interest expense, namely “other interest expenses”.
Other interest expenses” consists of the interest expense on funds that commercial banks
have borrowed, including borrowings to support their lending activities. Since this is a
non-deposit source of funds for commercial banks, this constitutes a movement away
from commercial banking as it has been defined in this dissertation. Thus this category is
separated out to facilitate the discussion in chapter seven of changes in the roles of
commercial banks. The class analytic category “Y other expenses” acts as a residual for all
other expenses.
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Tabte 2: A Comparison Of FDIC Expense Categories And Class Analytic Value OutflowCategories Related To Commercial Bank Profit
FDIC CATEGORIES CLASS ANALY'l 1C CATEGORIES
Expenses Value outflows
Total interest
expense
• Interest on deposits
• Other interest
expenses 15
Y
interest paid to secure bank
deposits
• Interest on deposits
(^"*"^0 expenses
associated with advancing
loans
• Other interest
expenses
Total non-
interest expense
• Employee Salaries
and Benefits
• Occupancy costs
• All other non-
interest expenses 16
Y other expenses • Employee Salaries
and Benefits
• Occupancy costs
• All other non-
interest expenses
• Total applicable
taxes
Total applicable
taxes
• Total applicable
taxes
By dismantling the FDIC categories and rearranging them to create an
approximation of class analytic categories, it is possible to work within the confines of
mainstream data to pursue class analytic concerns. This is convenient in that it enables
Marxists to use many of the conventional banking statistics for class analytic concerns.
For example, conventional measures of profitability in banking literature include the
l?
Other interest expense consists of interest expenses on federal funds purchased, borrowed money,
subordinated notes and debentures.
16
Non-interest expense includes “fees paid to directors, trustees and advisory board members; premiums on
fidelity insurance and deposit insurance; retainer and legal fees; net losses from the sale or disposition of
loans, premises and fixed assets, other real estate owned, and branches; management fees assessed by
parent bank holding companies; advertising, public relations, and promotional expenses; amortization
expense of intangible assets; charitable contributions; net losses on futures and forward contracts; office
supplies; telephone expenses; examination and audit fees; charge-offs and writedowns of securities prior to
sale; and other miscellaneous expenses”. (www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBNotes)
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Return on Assets (ROA), the ratio of net income to average total assets, and Return on
Equity (ROE), the ratio of net income to average equity capital. Since this method of
reconstituting FDIC data preserves the overall totals of revenues and expenditures, the
numerator of these ratios remains unchanged in our Marxian analysis. Thus the ROA and
ROE can also be employed as a class analytic depiction of commercial bank profitability
(expressed relative to the size of assets or the equity of commercial banks). This is
advantageous in that it allows us to use the indicator of profitability familiar to
mainstream banking analysis, yet re-present this profitability indicator in order to discern
the class analytic dynamics that shape it.
Unique Aspects O f Commercial Banks And Their Impacts On Subsumed Class Struggles
Commercial banks are unique among financial capitalist firms in that they provide
several conditions of existence for surplus value appropriation in a contemporary market
economy. Like other money-lending financial capitalist firms, commercial banks provide
credit to productive capitalist firms and others, but in addition commercial banks also
help to execute transactions and implement monetary policy. While commercial banks
have the capacity to be immensely supportive to the capitalist fundamental class process,
they also have the capacity to threaten it, both by refraining from providing money
capital and by difficulties stemming from the other roles of commercial banks. In a
partial reserve system in which deposits are payable on demand to facilitate transactions,
commercial banks are vulnerable to a contagion of bank failures, which can expose the
entire economy to profound crisis. Because of the unique capacity of commercial banks
to both support and devastate economic activity, it has evolved that commercial banks
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have a relationship with the state that is unlike that of other types of financial capitalist
firms. This section presents some of these unique qualities of commercial banks in order
to analyze how these considerations overdetermine the subsumed class struggles among
the various types of financial capitalist firms.
Savings held as deposits play a role that savings held in other forms have traditionally
not played. It has evolved that checkable “transactions” deposits may be used to execute
purchases. Thus in addition to providing credit, commercial banks also facilitate the
payments system in a contemporary market economy. To enable deposits to serve as a
means of payment, these so-called checking deposits are payable on demand. This
requirement that checking deposits be payable on demand exacerbates the mismatch
between the potentially short-term longevity of the liabilities (deposits) and the longer-
term longevity of assets (loans) of commercial banks. In a partial reserve system it is
possible that a bank may fail if it does not have sufficient funds available to meet the
withdrawals of depositors. Moreover, the partial reserve system creates a web of
interconnection among commercial banks since the loans made by one bank become the
deposits held by other banks, which fund further lending and deposits in still more banks.
Thus bank failures may spread if the contraction in the deposits of a failed bank puts
pressure on otherwise solvent banks to contract their deposits. The ensuing contagion of
bank failures compromises both the subsumed class role of commercial banks (since it
contracts lending) and the ability of deposits to execute transactions (since checks may
not be honored if the capacity of banks to settle their accounts with one another is put
into question).
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In addition to the provision of credit and the facilitation of transactions, commercial
banks are also involved in the provision of a third condition of existence for a
contemporary capitalist economy. The partial reserve system involves commercial banks
in the creation of money, since any new money acquired by commercial banks for use as
required reserves (so-called high powered money) can expand the money supply by many
times the initial increment in reserves. Thus the state can manipulate the money supply
by affecting the ability of commercial banks to access reserves. However, the money
multiplier also works in reverse to destroy money when commercial bank failures force
loans to be called in, thus potentially provoking further bank failures that can depress
economic activity by contracting the money supply. Since a banking sector in distress is
no longer a reliable transmission mechanism for monetary policy, widespread bank
failures cause the state to lose control over the money supply.
Since the state s ability to allect the level of the money supply is only discharged via
the lending activities of commercial banks, the state and commercial banks have a
principal agent relationship. This principal agent relationship inherent in monetary policy
transmission under these institutional arrangements reinforces the unusual characteristics
of the state's relationship to commercial banks. The state’s subsumed class
responsibilities include safeguarding the general conditions of existence of the capitalist
class process, including the availability of credit, the capacity to execute transactions, as
well as control over the money supply. Thus the state regards commercial banks as
special among financial capitalist firms because of the multiple roles they play in
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supporting the capitalist fundamental class process. Hence commercial banks are
distinguished among financial capitalist finns because the state has a unique incentive to
promote the solvency of commercial banks, since insolvent commercial banks may
provoke the contagion of bank failures that compromises all three of the roles of
commercial banks. Since commercial bank profitability helps to deter bank failures, the
state has an incentive to ensure that commercial banks on the whole are adequately
profitable lest insolvencies among commercial banks provoke a crisis in commercial
banking. While the failure of other types of financial capitalist finns may produce crises
of various sorts, other financial capitalist activities lack the particular institutional
mechanisms that compel the state to regard their failure as a systemic threat. 17 Shutt
quotes a recent OECD report explanation of the unique importance of commercial
banks :
Because of the banks role in the creating money in this institutional context, it
is of utmost importance to the state that banks be sound. A continuous supervisory
role for the state in the area of commercial banking occurs because banks and their
liabilities are seen as special. They are special because they have the attributes of
public goods. Money is the means of payment in a capitalist economy .... And in
order to preserve systemic stability confidence in the institutions that hold these
liabilities is a public policy necessity. (1998, 69)
This unique incentive on the part of the state to promote commercial bank
profitability overdetermines the master/servant contradiction of the Keynesian agenda.
The Keynesian agenda to secure a low subsumed class payment for access to money
17
To the extent that the provision of money capital is a condition of existence of capitalist exploitation, the
state has an interest in the continued functioning of all financial capitalist firms. However, these additional
conditions of existence provided by commercial banking give the state additional incentive to enable
commercial banks to continue to fulfil their various roles.
iH
Regulatory Reform In The Financial Services Industry: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?
No. 67, June 1997.
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capital potentially jeopardizes the profitability of the financial capitalists that are obliged
to provide money capital on terms that are attractive to productive capital. Chapter two
argued that financial capitalists may resist this squeeze on their profitability by finding
alternative avenues for value expansion rather than fulfilling their subsumed class role of
providing money capital to surplus value appropriators. Thus the attempt to support
accumulation via low subsumed class payments to obtain money capital may subvert
accumulation. This master/servant contradiction is further overdetermined if the financial
intermediaries in question are commercial banks. A profitability squeeze on commercial
banks potentially has additional disruptive impacts given the institutional characteristics
of contemporary commercial banking. Thus a state contemplating the implementation of
a Keynesian agenda faces additional complications because of the unique characteristics
of commercial banking. Not only must it assure that financial intermediaries are
sufficiently profitable that they continue to fulfill their subsumed class responsibilities; it
must also insure that commercial banks are sufficiently profitable that the commercial
banking system is protected from the potentially far-ranging damage generate by bank
failures.
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Ihe Stale AndI Regulation Of Commercial Banking Further Overdeterminanu t»
Subsumed Class Struggle Among Financial Capitalists;
Given the unique relationship between commercial banks and the state, it has evolved
that the state has assumed the authority to regulate commercial banks in an effort to
safeguard the stability of the commercial banking system. Regulators seek to prevent
behavior on the part of commercial banks that may induce commercial banking crisis,
and the state also has some extraordinary powers that are designed to safeguard the
stability of the banking system should difficulties arise. In the course of exerting their
regulatory authority to shape commercial bank behavior, the state provides commercial
banks with certain privileges that are not available to other types of financial capitalist
firms. At the same time commercial banks are also subject to various constraints that do
not affect other financial capitalist firms. This assortment of both privileges and
constraints entailed by this unique relationship between the state and commercial banks
further overdetermines subsumed class struggle involving commercial banks.
In an effort to enhance the stability of a partial reserve commercial banking system
where deposits are payable on demand, the state often imposes required reserves to
protect commercial banks from so-called “liquidity risk”. Required reserves were
conceived as a source of funds that would be readily accessible to meet the demand of
depositors for cash and thereby deter bank failures. Thus the solvency and stability of the
commercial banking system as a whole is enhanced to the extent that required reserves
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are held. 19 However required reserves also overdetermine commercial bank profitability.
Required reserves are funds that are made unavailable to create new loans, thus reserve
requirements constrain the profitability of commercial banks. By enforcing required
reserves, banking regulators face the contradictory consequences of both detracting from
commercial bank profitability (which is a condition of existence for the solvency of the
banking system), and paradoxically enhancing the solvency of the banking system (which
is a condition of existence for commercial bank profitability). Other financial capitalist
firms are not subject to this constraint on their ability to generate income with the funds
they attract in the first moment of financial intermediation, therefore required reserves
put commercial banks at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis other financial capitalist
firms. For this reason, commercial bankers derisively refer to required reserves are as a
“tax” on commercial banking.
State banking regulators constrain commercial banking activity in other ways in order
to compel commercial banks to conduct themselves in a manner which is seen as
conducive to the stability of the commercial banking system. In keeping with this desire
to preserve the stability of the commercial banking system, regulators seek to constrain
the risks that commercial banks incur, since higher risk activities are associated with a
greater likelihood of failure (as well as an increased payoff if they are successful). In each
case that regulators constrain the risks undertaken by commercial banks, they also affect
commercial bank profitability (which reacts back to overdetennine the stability of the
19
Paradoxically, the existence of sizable required reserves may render them unnecessary, since awareness
of the sufficiency of required reserves dissuades depositors from instigating a nin on the bank, while the
diminution or removal of required reserves may render them vital.
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commercial banking system), and they put commercial banks at a disadvantage vis a vis
their non-bank competitors. For example, commercial banks are often prevented from
extending a large percentage of their lending to a single borrower (or even a single sector
of the economy, such as mining, oil etc.). This restriction is intended to shield banks from
a crisis that emanates from a single firm (or sector), however it prevents commercial
banks from participating fully in the profitable opportunities when a boom is experienced
in that firm (or sector). Restrictions are also placed on the types of securities commercial
banks are entitled to hold. Commercial banks are often permitted to purchase only those
government securities that were judged to be of very high quality. The intention of
regulators is that there securities provide banks with modest income while enabling them
to manage incidental mismatches between inflows of funds, lending opportunities, and
the potential withdrawals of depositors. Regulators wish to dissuade commercial banks
from using their securities portfolio to speculate in pursuit of capital gains, since is
deemed excessively risky and likely to expose the banking system to heightened risk of
bank failures. However, to the extent that the state constrains the profit generating
options of commercial banks, this creates a dilemma for commercial banks cjuci capitalist
firms and further overdetermines the master/servant contradiction. Thus the state is
perpetually engaged in discerning how to balance the risk-aversion inherent in
maintaining the stability of the banking system, with the desires of commercial banks to
enhance their profitability, possibly via the pursuit of activities associated with increased
risk.
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In the event of a serious threat to the stability of the commercial banking system, the
state is legally empowered to take certain actions designed to prevent bank panics. For
example, the state, via its central bank, may act as “lender of last resort” to commercial
banks to prevent a banking panic. Since the central bank stands ready to supply funds to
commercial banks in crisis, depositors are dissuaded from instigating bank runs. Access
to lender of last resort support further distinguishes commercial banks from other
financial capitalist firms, since no other type of financial capitalist firm enjoys a legally
enshrined mechanism of state support in the event of a crisis
.
20
Thus lender of last resort
support overdetermines the subsumed class struggle among financial capitalists, in that it
constitutes a competitive advantage of commercial banks over their non-bank financial
capitalist competitors.
From the point of view of the state, the regulation and support of commercial
banks is intended to reduce the vulnerability of the commercial banking system to crisis.
But ironically, the existence of state support in the event of crisis may induce commercial
banks to increase the risks they take and thus increase the possibility of inducing a crisis
among commercial banks. Comforted by the possibility of lender of last resort support,
commercial banks may migrate towards taking more risk in hopes of enhancing their
profitability if risky activities succeed, while they hope to be assisted by the state if these
risky activities fail. Thus banking regulators face a perpetual contradiction which is
inherent in the principal agent relationship between banks and the state. The state is
20 Of course, many capitalist enterprises (including non-commercial bank financial capitalist firms) may
receive state support when they face a crisis. But it is rare that a private capitalist firm has access to an
explicitly acknowledged and formalized mechanism through which an agency of the government (the
central bank) provides liquidity in times of crisis.
79
obliged to stand ready to assist commercial banks to avoid the possibility of widespread
banking crisis, but the possibility of this assistance has the unintended consequence that it
may induce commercial bank behavior that may provoke commercial banking crisis. This
moral hazard contradiction implies that the particular principal agent relationship
between commercial banks and the state has the perverse result of creating incentives that
encourage behavior on the part of commercial banks that the state seeks to avoid.
The principal agent relationship between commercial banks and the state creates
the possibility, but not the necessity, that the state will intervene to prevent a commercial
banking crisis. Banking regulators exercise discretion in their decision to offer assistance
in the event of a commercial bank crisis. Regulators may let commercial banks fail,
especially when they judge that a particular commercial bank failure will not have unduly
damaging ramifications for the commercial banking system as a whole. Thus the decision
to intervene to avert or moderate any given commercial banking crisis is overdetermined
by many factors as banking regulators consider the multiple implications (the number of
commercial banks involved, the geographic dispersion of commercial banks in crisis, the
amount of deposits at risk, the makeup of the depositors who stand to be affected by bank
failure, the economic climate in which the crisis erupts, etc.) before deciding whether to
intervene in any given commercial banking crisis. Although the context of each particular
commercial banking crisis is important in determining whether state authorities will
provide assistance to avert crisis, in general the larger the potential crisis, the more likely
it is that state assistance will be forthcoming. Ironically, prominent commercial banks
that provoke very large crises may be more assured of state protection, for the very
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magnitude of the crisis that their failure might generate makes them “too big to fail”.
Thus the moral hazard dilemma implicit in state support for commercial banking may
tend to predispose commercial banks to increase risk in ways that are most disruptive for
the commercial banking system, since any commercial bank in crisis is more likely to
receive support if their failure will provoke widespread crisis.
The moral hazard contradiction implicit in state support for the commercial
banking system creates the possibility, but not the necessity, that commercial banks will
migrate into increasingly risky behavior. Since commercial banks cannot be assured that
the state will intervene in any given commercial bank crisis, each commercial bank must
weigh the possible benefits of increasing the risk they assume against their assessment of
the likelihood that state support will be forthcoming if the risky activity fails. Even if
state support is forthcoming, a commercial bank in crisis will face costs in terms of the
reputation of the bank and increased regulatory scrutiny (so-called “frown costs”).
Moreover, an individual commercial bank that assumes risks that are appreciably higher
than its competitors may be less likely to receive state support, both because it is
perceived as pathological by regulators, and because it is likely that a crisis generated by
an individual bank will not be of sufficient magnitude to compel the regulators to fear for
the safety of the commercial banking system ." 1 Thus the moral hazard contradiction as it
is considered in this dissertation is not emphasized for its encouragement of maverick
21
Unless the individual bank in question is sufficiently large that it is deemed “too big to fail”.
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behavior on the part of anomalous commercial banks. From the point of view of state
regulators, the moral hazard problem is more ominous if it encourages commercial banks
to migrate collectively towards more risky activities.
Commercial Banking And The Diversified Financial Capitalist Finn
The preceding analysis has assumed that commercial banking takes place exclusively
in a financial capitalist firm called a commercial bank, and that such a firm engages in no
other form of financial capitalist activity. This type of specialized commercial banking
firm was recommended by generations of banking theorists in the 19th and early 20 th
century. Banking theorists held that the stability of the commercial banking system was
best insured by preventing commercial banks from engaging in non-banking financial
capitalist activity, especially activities associated with securities markets. Thus the term
commercial bank was developed to refer to a financial capitalist firm that facilitated
commerce by using deposits to fund self-liquidating short term loans made to support
the needs ol trade (d Arista 1993, 63-64).““ A separate type of financial capitalist firm,
the investment bank, was views as the appropriate financial capitalist firm to involve
itself with the much more risky financial capitalist activity associated with dealing in
securities : “Recognized banking authorities [in England] considered] investment
Much of this lending took the form of bridging the time period between the sale of goods and the receipt
of payment, or the facilitation of payment for international trade. Until the great depression, when medium
term lending became more common on the part of commercial banks, this orientation of commercial banks
towards short term lending remained in force. Thus commercial banks were often engaged in the provision
of so-called '‘working capital”, rather than the promotion of long term accumulation.
“ 3 As other types of financial capitalist activity have proliferated (associated with pension funds, mutual
funds
,
the provision of insurance and so on) this principal has been extended to argue that commercial
banks ought to be precluded from any financial capitalist activity other than commercial banking.
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banking an inherently risky and speculative venture and, for that reason, considered any
dealings in stocks and bonds an improper business pursuit for financial institutions
entrusted with the savings of the general public.” (Perkins 1971. 485)
In order to appreciate the rationale for prohibiting commercial banks from engaging
in investment banking activity, the class analysis of investment banking is briefly
considered. An investment bank is somewhat distinctive among financial capitalist firms
in that it facilitates the ability of productive capitalist firms to access money capital from
third parties. Productive capitalist firms seeking an infusion of debt or equity capital may
issue securities and sell them to a variety of financial capitalist firms (pension funds,
insurance companies and so on) or to individuals and other entities. However, the issuing
firm may prefer to obtain the assistance of an investment bank to reduce the risks and
delays associated with selling its stock or bonds. 24 Investment banks typically engage in
securities underwriting, in which case the underwriter purchases the securities from the
productive capitalist firm at a price below what the securities are expected to fetch when
sold to the public. The productive capitalist firm receives its money capital initially from
the securities underwriter, and the underwriter recovers this amount of value, plus
additional value, by reselling the securities to the public. This differential between the
buying and selling price of the securities is forthcoming in part because of conditions in
" 4
For simplicity, we leave aside the possibility that investment banks underwrite securities of non-surplus
value appropriating capitalist firms or the securities of non-capitalist surplus appropriating firms.
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securities markets, but also because the issuing firm sells the securities initially at a price
below the expected market price. Since the underwriter expands value by buying low and
selling high, this value inflow is considered a non-class revenue from capital gains
.
25
An investment bank is a financial capitalist firm that conducts securities underwriting,
together with earning various commissions and fees for dealing in securities in both
primary and secondary markets, (as well as earning revenues from the provision of advice
on mergers and acquisitions, research to investors, supplying margin credit, storing
securities for safekeeping and so on). While we will forgo a detailed class analysis of
investment bank profitability, it is apparent that in many ways investment bank
profitability is reliant on the likelihood of capital gams. In an environment in which
capital gains are easily forthcoming, the demand for securities is stimulated and thus
productive capitalist firms will be encouraged to select this means of accessing money
capital. In addition, since securities underwriters bear a risk that they may not be able to
sell securities to the public at a price higher than they acquired them, this risk is
diminished in a climate in which capital gains are more easily forthcoming. Moreover,
many of the other forms of income that an investment bank typically generates are
indirectly connected to likelihood of achieving capital gains (for example, the
Unfortunately, the non-class categorization of this revenue obscures the security underwriter’s role in
providing money capital to the productive capitalist firm. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the class
analysis of merchant capital, we can view this payment as coming from the productive capitalist firm, in the
sense that it forgoes a portion of its inflow of money capital which instead is retained by the underwriter.
However, even from this perspective, the payment for securities underwr iting is not a subsumed class
payment, in the sense that it the funds come from forgone inflows of money capital and not appropriated
surplus value.
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commissions earned via facilitating trading on secondary securities markets and the
degree of mergers and acquisition activity may all be enhanced in a context in which
capital gains earnings are vigorous).
This close affiliation of investment bank profitability and capital gains made an
important impression on theorists of commercial banking regulation. Since the existence
of capital gains depends on the vagaries of securities markets, these revenues are subject
to considerable volatility. In the time interval between the purchase of securities and their
retail sale, the investment bank is particularly vulnerable to any change in market
conditions that may reduce the market price of the securities it holds. If a commercial
bank becomes involved in securities underwriting, and if that commercial bank uses its
funds to carry inventories of securities, it is possible that changes in the value of the
securities portfolio may undermine the solvency of the commercial bank. Given that
commercial bank regulators seek to prevent commercial bank failures, they sought to
shield the commercial banking system from disturbances emanating from securities
markets by prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in investment banking.
While the prohibition on blending commercial banking with other financial
capitalist activities is intended to support the stability of the commercial banking system,
financial capitalists resent having to forgo the profit-enhancing aspects of diversified
financial capitalist firms. Diversified financial capitalist firms can vary their revenue mix
according to prevailing economic, political, or cultural conditions that may, in a given
context, advantage one of the various financial capitalist activities over the others.
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Financial capitalist activity involves information costs, and a diversified financial
capitalist firm may be able to benefit by spreading these costs over multiple financial
capitalist activities. The administration of bank accounts can give commercial banks
informational advantages (such as details about the financial affairs of their depositors26)
that may prove helpful in the conduct of other financial capitalist activity. In terms of the
first moment of financial intermediation, diversified financial capitalist firms that gather
funds in a variety of ways may benefit from this diversity. Since depository financial
capitalist firms face the perpetual possibility of instant withdrawals of savings, they may
wish to add insurance or pension activities to their firm, since savers tend to leave funds
in these forms for long periods of time. Of course, there are disadvantages that
accompany diversification. Financial capitalist firms that specialize in only one subset of
financial capitalist activities may acquire specific expertise or other advantages that is
mote diluted in diversified firms. Diversified financial capitalist Finns are exposed to the
crises that erupt in any form of financial capitalist activity. Thus a diversified financial
capitalist firm is obliged to be vigilant lest a crisis in one aspect of its activities
compromise the entire firm.
There are some distinctive advantages to blending of commercial banking and
investment banking in a diversified financial capitalist firm. The capacity to make loans
often assists the ability of an investment bank to attract underwriting revenue, since it
Lenin remarks that by having access to the confidential transactions information of the bank’s clients, the
financial capitalist firm gains informational advantages: “the running of a current account for a given firm
enables the bank - and this is what happens - to obtain fuller and more detailed information about the
economic position of its client, the result is that the productive capitalist becomes more completely
dependent on the bank.’’ (Lenin 1975, 45) Thus these informational advantages may assist financial
capitalist firms in their subsumed class struggle with productive capitalist firms.
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enables the financial capitalist firm to provide debt financing in the period before a
productive capitalist firm is able to issue securities. In their eagerness to participate in
future lucrative investment banking revenues, a diversified financial capitalist firm may
even be enticed to make questionable loans. Conversely, a commercial bank that finds
itself with loans at high risk of default may be able to use the underwriting capabilities
elsewhere m the diversified financial capitalist firm to enable its problem borrowers to
issue securities and thereby repay the troubled bank loans. Such synergies between
commercial banking and investment banking are made more compelling by the existence
oflender of last resort support for commercial banking. Given the moral hazard dilemma
implicit in lender of last resort support, commercial banks may migrate to riskier lending
opportunities, particularly those connected with securities, if they are comforted with the
possibility oflender of last resort support. While lender of last resort is intended to apply
to only commercial banking activity, it is possible that a diversified financial capitalist
firm may impose upon these supports to assist them in the event of a non-commercial
banking crisis. During the tumultuous unfolding of a crisis in financial capitalist activity,
a diversified firm may succeed in misrepresenting a non-commercial banking crisis as
one emanating from commercial banking activities, or regulators may judge that the
implications of a crisis in the non-commercial banking aspects of a diversified financial
capitalist firm are likely to provoke a crisis in the commercial banking system. The
possibility that a diversified financial capitalist firm may access lender of last resort
support via its commercial banking arm can enhance the perceived security of the
diversified financial capitalist firm as a whole, thus reducing costs for the diversified
financial capitalist firm in its non-commercial banking activities.
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The Diversified Financial Capitalist Firm
And The Keynesian Agenda For Financial Reform
From a class analytic point of view, the Keynesian agenda to make financial
capital the servant of productive capital may be at odds with the organization of financial
capitalist activity within diversified financial capitalist firms. If a diversified financial
capitalist firm is sufficiently large, it may enjoy a degree of monopsonistic power over
the access to savings, and/or a degree of monopoly power over the provision of funds to
productive capitalist firms. In a situation characterized by a small number of large
diversified financial capitalist firms that enjoy considerable market power, financial
capital may be able to shift the subsumed class struggle between productive and financial
capital to the detriment of productive capital. Thanks to their domination of access to
money capital generally, a few large diversified financial firms may be in a position to
extract a higher subsumed class payment for assess to both debt and equity capital
.
27
This
outcome is precisely the opposite of that desired by Keynesian financial reformers.
Within the Marxian tradition, Hilferding considered the possibility that financial
capitalist firms might dominate productive capitalist firms by virtue of their market
power in the second moment of financial intermediation. His Finance Capital described
conditions in which large and diversified financial capitalist firms grew to dominate
productive capitalist firms that were facing an acute need for large inflows of money
Of course, such a situation also carries with it its own negation. To the degree that a group of financial
capitalist firms may hold market power in these respects, the incentive exists for new financial capitalist
firms to enter in order to compete away this advantage.
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capita !.
28
While the sources of funds were arguably not so d,verse as they are today2’, the
financial capitalist firms in Hilferding’s day were able to both provide loans and purchase
shares
.
30
To the extent that these large financial capitalist firms were able to parlay their
position as the gatekeepers to money capital into a position of dominance vis a vis
productive capital, they were in a position to demand high subsumed class payment for
access to money capital
.
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In the United States, Hilferding’s concept of finance capital found its expression
in the financial enterprises described as the “money trust”. These diversified financial
capitalist firms, epitomized by J.P. Morgan and Company, blended debt and equity
capital provision. The House of Morgan was one of the leading investment banks that had
supported the development of the railroads 32
,
and the Morgan empire grew to have
28
Hilferding argued that years of bitter competitive struggles and vigorous technological change produced
a rapid concentration of capital in Germany at that time. The creation of cartels shielded productive
capitalist firms somewhat from this ruinous competition, but these mergers and acquisitions required large
infusions of money capital. Faced with these exorbitant financing demands, productive capital became
increasingly reliant on financial capitalist firms, particularly large banks, while at the same time financial
capitalist firms became increasingly concentrated in order to mobilize more financial resources.
'’Many of the vehicles in which savings are held today, such as pension funds, mutual funds and even the
widespread use of insurance were not present in the early part of the 20th century.
At this time, the lack of a well-developed stock market meant that finance capital often acted as
shareholders in these productive capitalist firms rather than as underwriters that sold stock in these
productive capitalist firms to a third party.
11
Another possibility that Hilferding considers is that finance capital constitutes not just the ascendancy of
productive capital over financial capital, but the merger of the two under the dominance of financial capital.
For example, he considers circumstances in which financial capital is able to demand seats on the board of
directors of the productive capitalist firms and exerts profound control over its distribution of surplus value.
32 _
Morgan’s investment banking activity originally took the form of underwriting securities to select group
of European investors, rather than acting as underwriters for public offerings made widely available. In
addition, Morgan used its own funds to buy and hold securities. Hence Morgan’s activities represent an
older form of investment banking that gave way to new types of investment banking in the 1920s that were
engaged in underwriting securities for wider distribution.
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significant influence in commercial banking. 33 Morgan parlayed its extensive stock
ownership and loan portfolio into 72 directorships in 47 of the largest US corporations,
and thereby exerted considerable influence over both the path ofdevelopment of
productive capital 34 and on the determination of the subsumed class payments reverting
to Morgan and Company. Money trusts were an increasing object of public hostility, as
was evidenced in the 1912 Pujo commission analysis that money trusts constituted:
.
. ,
'
' f C0lllmuni ty of interests between a few leaders of finance, created andheld together through stock ownership, interlocking directorates, partnerships andjoint account transactions, and other forms of domination over banks, trust
companies, railroads and public searches and industrial corporations, which has
resulted in great and rapidly growing concentration of the control of money and
credit in the hands of these few men. (in Meerschwam 1987, 68)
In addition to the possibility that diversified financial capitalist firms may exert
upward pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure money capital in
direct opposition to the Keynesian agenda for a “servant” relationship of financial capital
to productive capital, Keynesians have additional reasons to disapprove of diversified
financial conglomerates. To the extent that diversified financial capitalist firms blend
commercial and investment banking, commercial banking may become increasingly
animated by concerns related to securities markets. For example, it may be that the
earnings related to the pursuit of capital gains within a diversified financial capitalist firm
The House of Morgan did not necessarily operate as a commercial bank. At that historical time, personal
relationships and informal agreements were often sufficient to create alliances between Morgan and
commercial banks. The partners of J.P. Morgan and Company owned stock (directly or indirectly) and/or
had interlocking directorships in many large banks, trust companies, insurance companies and savings
banks. In this manner, Morgan’s was aligned with the First National Bank ofNew York, and by 1912,
Morgan and Company and the First National Bank of New York controlled Banker’s Trust, Guarantee
Trust and the National Bank of Commerce, (see Kotz 1978, 36-37)
4When the money trust was investigated by the Pujo Committee in 1912, they found that “tightly held bank
control had been instrumental in bringing about large corporate mergers at the turn of the century and that
these mergers had resulted in furthering the strength of the bank’s responsible for bringing these about.”(de
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overshadows the commercial banking revenues earned by providing loans. In this event.
the commercial banking system may become increasingly organized to facilitate capital
gains rather than lending money capital.
To the extent that diversified financial capitalist firms create opportunities for
commercial banking to become increasingly oriented to the promotion of speculation, the
diversified financial capitalist firm is an anathema from a Keynesian point of view. Such
a situation threatens to harness the deposit base of the economy towards the pursuit of
capital gams. Worse still, given the unique institutional characteristics of commercial
banking, any crisis that follows a period of speculative excess may be intensified if the
activities undertaken during the period of vigorous speculation compromise commercial
bank solvency. As subsequent chapters point out, difficulties associated with the crash of
the stock market in 1929 put additional pressure on the commercial banking system, in
part because commercial banking activity had become increasingly oriented towards the
needs of the securities markets in the context of diversified financial capitalist firms.
Saint Phalle 1985, 52) In particular, Morgan’s is credited with encouraging the consolidation of the
railroads and the promotion of the mergers that produced General Electric and United States Steel.
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CHAPTER 4
™ RISE AND SUBSEQUENT REPUDIATION OF THE DIVERSIFIEDNANCIAL CAPITALIST FIRM IN THE 1920s AND EARLY 1930s
Introduction
During the 1 920s, the organization of financial capitalist firms underwent
dramatic transformation as commercial banks created diversified financial capitalist firms
that branched into investment banking. While many factors shaped the development of
these new diversified financial capitalist firms, chapter four will focus on two particular
subsumed class pressures that contributed to this phenomenon. First, the pressure of
competitive struggles among commercial banks in a crowded commercial banking sector
compelled commercial banks to search for value expansion outside of traditional
commercial banking. Secondly, the intensification of subsumed class struggle between
commercial and investment banks in the context of the flourishing stock market provoked
commercial banks to search out ways of earning revenues connected with investment
banking. These subsumed class conditions interacted to compel commercial banks to
expand into investment banking, and by 1927 significant legal barriers to the blending of
commercial and investment banking within a diversified financial capitalist firm were
removed.
The current chapter discusses these subsumed class struggles among financial
capitalists that contributed to the development of diversified financial capitalist firms
during this time period, and explores some of the ramifications of the development of
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these diversified financial capitalist firms on the subsumed class struggle between
productive and financial capital. Because the development of these diversified financial
capitalist firms coincided with the acceleration of the stock market boom in the later
1920s, the chapter considers how the blending of commercial and investment banking
within diversified financial capitalist firms in this historical context had implications for
commercial bank solvency during the great depression. By the time of the Roosevelt
presidency, recurring commercial banking crises represented a debilitating obstacle for
economic recovery. Thus because of their association with speculative excesses that had
compromised the stability of financial intermediation in the United States, the architects
ofNew Deal financial reforms came to regard the abolition of these diversified financial
capitalist firms as a prerequisite for the Keynesian agenda for economic stability and
growth.
Competition in Commercial Banking: The Legacy of “Free Banking”
One of the distinctive aspects of commercial banking in the United States has been
the relatively large numbers of commercial banks in operation. This profusion of
commercial banks was, in part, a reaction against the bank chartering process of the late
1700s and early 1800s. At that time a special legislative act was required to enable a firm
to engage in commercial banking. This element of discretion afforded officials the
opportunity to grant entry into commercial banking in return for financial or political
favors. Strenuous arguments were made to “'destroy ... the odious features of bank
monopoly"’(in Klebaner 1990, 13) by attenuating the ability of officials to manipulate the
right of entry into commercial banking. Critics of this chartering system embraced “free
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banking”, meaning the ability of any firm to enter commercial banking so long as it
satisfied certain general conditions that were uniformly applied to all market entrants. In
1838, the state ofNew York passed the Free Banking Act, and ultimately the principle of
tree banking was enshrined by many states and in the National Banking Act of 1863.
Until free banking was officially abandoned by New Deal financial reforms, this policy
of relative ease of entry into commercial banking helped to create the large number of
commercial banking firms that has characterized US commercial banking (see Figure 7),
However, free banking often was accompanied by low initial capital requirements in
order to encourage market entry. Thus free banking also contributed to the proliferation
of commercial banks of dubious solvency and notorious banking practices. 1
Following the adoption of free banking, many small banks emerged that were engaged in all sorts of
unsound and fraudulent banking practices. As Hammond describes “ Notes were issued by banks with no
known place of business, and no regular office hours; and kegs of nails with coin lying on top were moved
overnight from ‘bank’ to 'bank’ to show up as cash reserves just ahead of the bank examiners.”(194 1,9)
The term “wildcat” banking emerged in this period to describe the tendency of these dubious banks to
locate their headquarters in rural areas.
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Figure 7: Numbers OfCommercial Banks Prior To The Great DepressionSource: Banking Studies 418 r
In addition to free banking, a number of regulatory peculiarities also promoted the
large numbers of relatively leniently regulated commercial banks in the United States.
The United States has a dual banking system, in that commercial banks may be organized
at the state or national level. This creates multiple regulatory structures, as the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency regulates national commercial banks, while various state
authorities (and later the Federal Reserve to various extents over time) regulates state
commercial banks. Under these circumstances, regulatory agencies compete with each
other to charter and regulate commercial banks. This context of competitive chartering
provides commercial banks the opportunity to threaten to change the jurisdiction in which
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they are chartered in order to compel regulators to match the permissiveness of rival
jurisdictions. As Arthur Bums, former Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve observed in a later context, multiple jurisdictions produced a “’competition in
laxity’" among banking regulators, (in Sinkey 2002, 572) To the extent that regulatory
competition and the dilution of regulatory standards facilitated new market entrants, this
fragmented regulatory environment contributed to the proliferation of commercial banks. 2
This competition in laxity also contributed to the questionable banking practices that
culminated in the banking panics that were a familiar feature of the American finance
prior to the New Deal. 3
Between the turn of the century and 1920, the number of commercial banks
accelerated rapidly until the total number of commercial banks reached a highpoint4 of
29,41 7 or a ratio of approximately one bank for every 3,500 Americans. (Klebaner
1990,124) In the tace ol this dramatic growth, the term “overbanking” was coined to refer
to the intense competition in a crowded commercial banking market. 3 In their
retrospective examinations of events that contributed to the crisis in commercial banking
2
For example, in the six months tollowing the March 1900 decision of the Comptroller of the Currency to
tespond to pressure fiom nationally chartered commercial banks to reduce capital requirements for
commercial banks in smaller communities (in order that they could compete with state chartered
commercial banks in those communities), 509 new commercial banks were approved, which represents a
14% increase in the number of nationally chartered commercial banks. (Fischer 1968, 192 and author’s
calculation)
After the passage of the National Banking act in 1863, there were four major banking panics (1873, 1884,
1893, and 1907) as well as numerous regional and local panics.
Bank failures, particularly in agricultural areas hard hit by depressed agricultural prices, as well as
mergers and acquisitions among commercial banks, reduced the number of commercial banks during the
1920s.
Of course the degree of competition among commercial banks varied in each state and even by city in
jurisdictions where unit banking was enforced.
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during the great depression, many banking authorities became convinced that
overbanking had resulted in excessive competition among commercial banks, which had
both squeezed the profitability ofcommercial banks and enticed commercial banks to
incur heightened risks to enhance their profitability. For example, state regulators in
Indiana issued a report in 1932 that examined “indiscriminate” chartering, and they came
to the inescapable conclusion that many of the practices leading to bank failures were
directly caused by cut-throat competition which sprang up in various communities as a
result of too many banks”, (in Fischer 1968, 207) The architects ofNew Deal financial
reform were particularly persuaded that overbanking had contributed to the crisis in
banking in the great depression. In 1938, J.F.T. O’Connor, a prominent financial
regulator privy to the high level policy debates of the New Deal era6
,
produced an
analysis of the banking crisis of the 1930s in which he claimed that the ease of entry into
commercial banking had created a precarious situation:
It was simple to be a banker. Charters were comparatively easy to obtain. With
money necessary for initial capital, the depository money was anxious to find a
resting place in return for the privilege of safekeeping and check drawing. Banks
became too numerous; competition too great; necessity for profit too urgent.
(O’Connor 1938, 7)
While data on commercial bank profitability is limited prior to the publication of the
FDIC statistics on which this dissertation relies, some indications can be found that
confirm that the period of overbanking in the 1920s was exerting pressure on commercial
bank profitability. In the first moment of financial intermediation, fierce competition to
O Connor was Comptroller of the Currency between 1933-1938, as well as a member of the Federal
Reserve Board between 1933-1935 and the first vice-chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
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attract deposits can exert upward pressure on the Y costs associated with interest paid to
depositors. Thus attracting a given volume of deposits is more expensive for a
commercial bank, and its Y expenses associated with attracting deposits increases relative
to its income earned. This trend is illustrated in Figure 8. This chart is prepared using
information published by the Federal Reserve, and applies only to those commercial
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System during this time period. The
numerator corresponds closely to our class analytic category ofY expenses paid to attract
deposits
,
however the denominator is only an approximation of the subsumed class and
non-class revenue earned by making loans on the basis of deposits. 8 Despite the
difficulties in finding data that corresponds exactly to class analytic categories. Figure 8
illustrates a downward pressure on the profitability of Federal Reserve member banks to
the extent that the expense of attracting deposits was increasing relative to earnings that
those deposits help to produce in the second moment of financial intermediation.
The numerator consists of interest paid on time deposits, interest paid on demand deposits, and interest
paid on interbank deposits. The numerator excludes interest paid on borrowed money.
8
Prior to 1927, the Banking and Monetary Statistics did not distinguish between interest and discounts on
loans versus interest and dividends on securities. Thus denominator used in Figure 8 overestimates the
value of interest income on subsumed class and non-class loans, since it includes interest and dividends on
securities.
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Figure 8: Interest Paid By Commercial Banks On Deposits
Related Earnings From Loans And Securities
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics:
,
262.
As A Percentage Of Interest-
Vigorous competition among commercial banks also affects commercial bank
profitability in the second moment of financial intermediation. As large numbers of
commercial banks vie to provide loans, this intensified subsumed class struggle among
commercial banks can result in downward pressure on the interest rate that banks are able
to demand from borrowers. While interest rates are overdetermined by many factors, this
downward pressure that subsumed class struggle among commercial banks exerts on the
cost of securing loans is consistent with the behavior of interest rates charged by
Specifically, the denominator consists of interest and discounts on loans plus interest and dividends on
securities.
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commercial banks between 1920 and 1927. Figure 9 illustrates the behavior of the
average interest rates that banks charged on loans to “customers” 10 of Federal Reserve
member banks in leading cities during this time period.
Figure 9: Interest Charged on Customer Loans in Leading Cities
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics
. 463.
Thus overbanking intensified the subsumed class struggle among commercial
banks both directly and indirectly. Intensified competition among commercial banks over
the provision of loans constitutes increased pressure in the subsumed class struggle
among commercial banks. In addition the increased competition to access deposits
overdetermines the subsumed class struggle among commercial banks by augmenting the
10
These “customer” loans are described as “commercial loans and time and demand security loans” in the
notes provided on page 426 of the Banking and Monetary Statistics
.
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costs ofcommercial banks in the first moment of financial intermediation. Since
accessing funds in the first moment of financial intermediation is a condition of existence
of earning subsumed class revenue, the competition over access to funds overdetermines
the subsumed class struggle among commercial banks. Thus the intensity of competition
facing commercial banks undermined commercial bank profitability in both moments of
financial intermediation.
Commercial Banking and the Stock Market Boom of the 1920s
Alongside the phenomenon of overbanking, subsumed class struggles between
commercial and investment banks were also being transformed by the rapid development
of the stock market. With the conclusion of the first World War and the arrival of
economic prosperity in the 1920s, the US public became increasingly enthusiastic
purchasers of securities. 1
1
Corporate securities offerings mushroomed during the 1920s
(see Figure 10) as public offerings of securities gained in importance as a way for
productive capitalist firms to raise money capital. This development provoked entry into
financial capitalist activities that benefited from the opportunities associated with the
booming stock market, and in particular there emerged a “mad scramble” (Edwards 1967,
230) to enter investment banking activities.
The increased stock market participation of the US public is credited to various factors including the
popularity of wartime Liberty bonds and the increasing availability of securities issued in smaller
denominations, (see Carrosso 1970, 249-250) Carroso states that the total number of shares traded on the
New York Stock Exchange grew from 227 million in 1920 to 1125 million by 1929.
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Figure 10: Corporate Securities Offerings, 1919-1941
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics 487.
As productive capital made use of securities markets as new avenues to secure
access to money capital during the 1920s, commercial banks suffered. Despite the brisk
demand for money capital during the economic growth of the 1920s, many scholars claim
that the demand for loans was undermined as productive capitalist firms found that they
could secure money capital via the sale securities (d’ Arista 1993, 64) or via retained
earnings:
After 1919, corporations of all types, not just railroads and heavy industries,
discovered an American public, now committed to the investing habit, were
receptive to new securities issues of unprecedented frequency and dollar volume.
As a consequence of this new access to the supply of long-term capital, many
companies found they were far less reliant on banks to provide short-term, seasonal
financing. In addition, high profits gave many corporations such a large cash flow
that outside borrowing was unnecessary. (Perkins 1971, 493)
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Substantiation of this claim is somewhat sparse in the literature. Peach speaks to this
issue by considering the declining importance of “commercial” 12 loans among
commercial bank assets. By examining annual reports of the Comptroller of the
Currency, he finds that in 1920 commercial loans consisted of almost 60% of the total
earning assets of nationally chartered commercial banks, while by 1925 this figure
declined to about 45% and by 1930 it had stood near 35%. (Peach 1941, 23-24) An
attempt to illustrate the degree to which securities issues vied with commercial bank
loans as a means of productive capital firms accessing money capital is made in Figure
11. Ideally, a comparison of the dollar volume of securities issued by productive
capitalist finns with the dollar volume of loans advanced to productive capitalist firms
would illustrate the relative importance of loans versus securities issuance as sources of
money capital. The former category, securities issued by productive capitalist firms, is
approximated in Figure 10. 13 Flowever, assessing the dollar volume of commercial bank
loans to productive capitalist firms over this period is highly problematic. Thus we will
refer only to loans advanced by Federal Reserve member banks for purposes unconnected
with dealings in securities. 14 Figure 1
1
provides the comparison between the dollar
I have not been able to get clarification as to the definition of a “commercial “ loan in statistics prepared
by the Comptroller of the Currency during the period.
It consists of all corporate securities issued, thus it will include some securities issued by unproductive
capitalist firms.
The first difficulty is that data provided by the Federal Reserve does not include commercial bank loans
by banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve system during this period, and thereby
underestimates the amount of loans made by all American commercial banks. Secondly, the attempt to
assess the percentage of total loans made to productive capitalist firms is impossible. Information on the
total amount of commercial bank loans is available, but this includes both loans made to productive and
unproductive capitalist firms, to other entities, and loans made related to securities markets. The best
approximation of loans made to productive capitalist firms is derived by taking the total loans made and
subtracting loans connected to securities markets. The definition of loans made “on securities” also varies
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volume of security issues relative to the dollar volume of loans made by Federal Reserve
member banks for purposes other than dealing in securities. As the dollar amount of
securities issuance increased relative to the non-securities related loans made, this
represents an increased reliance on securities markets and a decreased reliance on
commercial banks as a source of funding.
Securities
1f0rp0rate Securities Issued vs. Commercial Bank Loans Unconnected to
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics 487, 132-163.
Bank Loans Unconnected to
Securites
“
“ Corporate Securities Issued
over the time during which this data was collected by the Federal Reserve (loans made “on securities are
defined as loans on stocks and bonds” between 1919 and 1928, defined as “loans to [securities] brokers
and dealers plus “[securities] loans to others” from 1929 to 1937 and defined as “loans for purchasing or
carrying securities “ until 1941). By presenting loans that were not categorized as being connected to
securities market activities, this figure is an overestimate of the loans actually made to productive capitalist
firms, since it will include non-class loans made to entities other than productive capitalist firms.
This figure is prepared using yearly totals for corporate security issuance (487) and loans on the books of
Federal Reserve member banks in 101 leading cities as of year end. (132-163)
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To the extent that securities issuance was displacing commercial bank loans as a
preferred means of accessing money capital, this development represents an
intensification of subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms. Assuming that
debt capital provided by commercial banks is a close substitute to debt and equity capital
garnered by issuing securities, the flourishing securities markets provide an opportunity
for productive capital to pit commercial banks against investment banks as the avenues
through which the money capital was provided to the capitalist fundamental class
process. This intensified subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms exerts
downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure access to money
capital generally, and in particular it squeezes the interest rate that commercial banks can
command for their subsumed class loans to productive capitalist firms.
Commercial Bank Expansion Into Diversified Financial Capitalist Firms
In The Late 1920s
The changing context of subsumed class struggles among financial capitalist in the
1920s exerted considerable pressure on commercial banks. The combination both
competition among commercial banks and competition with investment banks helped to
create subsumed class conditions that put pressure on commercial bank profitability.
While the assessment of commercial bank profitability is difficult given the available
data, Figure 12 illustrates this problem via the Return on Assets of Federal Reserve
member banks between 1919-1929.
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Figure 12: Return on Assets of Federal Reserve Member Banks, 1919-1929
^ource: Banking and Monetary Statistics 263-4.
One of the ways that commercial banks responded to this pressure was by creating
diveisified financial capitalist firms that entered into investment banking activities. The
creation of diversified financial capitalist firms responded to both the pressures of
overbanking and the intensified subsumed class struggle between commercial and
investment banks. In the context of an accelerating boom in the stock market, financial
capitalist activity connected with securities markets was particularly lucrative. Thus
commercial banks could respond to the pressures of overbanking by forming diversified
financial capitalist firms that supplemented their profitability with investment banking
revenues. Moreover, commercial banks that were being squeezed out of the provision of
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money capital by securities issuance had an opportunity to respond to this subsumed class
struggle by entering the terrain of their financial capitalist rivals:
Jncoura^ed'them to seTd
"lreatened ,he eanlinS P0WCT of commercial banks ande g e k other opportunities for profit. An expansion of investmentbanking functions to offset the reduction in loan revenues was a course chosen bymore and more large urban institutions. (Perkins 1971, 493)
Commercial banks had previously attempted to expand into securities
underwriting via their bond departments, but these attempts were curtailed by the
regulator of nationally chartered commercial banks, the Comptroller of the Currency.
(Carosso 1970, 97)
1(1
To circumvent these restrictions, commercial banks attempted to
organize securities affiliates, however the growth of these security affiliates was
constrained because of disputes about their legality and anti-trust concerns. By the mid
1920s many state jurisdictions were becoming increasingly permissive in allowing state-
charteied commercial banks to migrate into investment banking activities, but these
activities were still prohibited for nationally chartered commercial banks. By 1927, large
commercial banks successfully lobbied for the passage of the McFadden Act, which
enabled nationally chartered banks to fully engage in securities underwriting via the
creation of securities affiliates. The passage of the McFadden Act marked the full-scale
regulatory embrace of diversified financial capitalist firms that blended commercial and
investment banking. A surge of mergers among commercial banks and free-standing
16
Kaufman and Mote claim, contra many authorities in the field, that the Comptroller of the Currency
issued no formal ruling in 1902 specifically prohibiting nationally chartered commercial banks from
dealing in securities. However, they claim that nationally chartered commercial banks could only engage in
investment banking activities via the “incidental powers provision” of the National Bank act, while state
chartered commercial banks often had explicit authorization to engage in investment banking. Thus the
more permissive regulatory climate enjoyed by state chartered commercial banks enhanced their ability to
engage in investment banking activities, and the Mcfadden act was demanded to equalize the status of
national and state commercial banks in this respect. (Kaufman and Mote 1992)
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investment banks followed, and by 1 929 nearly every large urban commercial bank had
one or more securities affiliates. (Carosso 1970, 278) These new securities affiliates
quickly grew to a formidable presence in the investment banking field. Peach illustrates
this among nationally chartered commercial banks with respect to their mushrooming
share of bond underwriting. He reports that commercial bank- related underwriters 17
issued 22% of all new bonds in 1927, while by 1929, commercial bank-related
underwriters had 45.5% of the share of total bond issues. (109)
These diversified financial capitalist firms, or “department store” banks as the
business press of the day called them(Carosso 1970, 276) 18
,
have the potential to reshape
subsumed class conditions that were detrimental for commercial banks. If diversified
financial capitalist firms could diminish competition among financial capitalist firms, this
would attenuate the subsumed class struggle among financial capitalists that was
injurious to commercial bank profitability. To the extent that this is possible, diversified
financial capitalist firms would reshape the subsumed class struggle between productive
and financial capital, since the ability of productive capital to benefit from competition
among financial capitalist firms would be diminished. Thus in a manner reminiscent of
finance capital, diversified financial capitalist firms offered the possibility that financial
capital might gain the ascendancy over productive capital.
Peach s actual terminology is “all national bank affiliates, commercial banks and trust companies”.
1
8
Department store" banks earned this nick-name in reference to their ability to meet all of its customers’
needs. The term “department store banking “ was mimicked in the 1990s, when advocates of a return to the
blending of commercial banking and investment banking claimed that financial capitalist firms would
provide a “financial supermarket” with the purported advantages of “one stop shopping”.
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Diversified financial capitalist firms became fully legal in 1927, but their
evolution was cut short by the devastating stock market crash in 1929. Thus it would be
somewhat premature to conclude that the emergence of department store financial
enterprises constitutes an unambiguous return blending of productive and financial
capital reminiscent of the possibilities suggested in Hilferding’s finance capital. The
overdetermined context in which commercial banks created these diversified financial
capitalist firms differed enormously from the context analyzed by Hilferding. For
example, the possibility of relying on retained earnings, and the spectacular increase in
stock market prices (which makes the acquisition of additional equity capital relatively
easy), are factors which mitigated against the domination of productive capital by
financial capital. However, to the extent that the organizational form of the diversified
financial capitalist firm creates the possibility of maneuvering into a position of
dominance vis a vis productive capital, this organizational form is an anathema to the
Keynesian agenda for the servitude of financial capital.
As commercial banks became more attuned to stock market dynamics via their
securities affiliates, this in turn overdetermined the risk profile of commercial bank
lending. In the context of a stock market boom, there were many opportunities to engage
in lending of dubious merits. Since commercial bank profitability had been experiencing
pressure, the migration towards increased risk in lending portfolios is one way to enhance
commercial bank profitability, particularly since a crowded commercial bank market and
the relatively easy availability of money capital via securities issuance in the late 1920s
produced intensified competition for more conservative lending opportunities. Moreover,
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the organizational form of the diversified financial capitalist firm facilitated the
opportunities for commercial banks to incur greater risks in their lending portfolios. For
example, commercial banks could use their lending prowess to assist the clients of their
investment banking affiliates to borrow money to fund their securities purchases. 19 Figure
1 3 illustrates the degree to which commercial bank lending portfolios became
increasingly oriented to securities-related lending as the 1920s wore on. When the stock
market crashed, these loans were highly compromised, particularly in situations in which
securities themselves had been presented as collateral for the initial loan. Thus the risks
that commercial banks had assumed during the late 1920s increased the vulnerability of
the commercial banking system to widespread banking failures.
19
Even commercial banks that had no securities affiliates were not immune from involvement in lending
related to the securities markets. Funds from smaller banks could often earn a higher interest rate when
funneled to New York and lent on the call market than they could earn by making loans locally. This
development was viewed in retrospect as pathological by New Deal financial reformers who regarded this
behavior on the part of regional commercial banks was draining money capital from productive capitalist
firms around the country.
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Figure 13: Commercial Bank Loans Made On Securities
Commercial Bank Loans20
Source; Banking and Monetary Statistics 132-163.
As A Percentage Of Total
The Commercial Banking Crisis In The Early 1930s
The 1929 stock market crash and the persistence of the subsequent economic
stagnation proved disastrous for commercial banks. Given that the loan portfolios of
commercial banks were increasingly affected by the fortunes of the stock market, the
precipitous drops in securities prices had important implications for commercial banking.
Defaults on loans (especially those connected with securities), together with the
devaluation of the collateral backing those loans (often the securities themselves),
contributed to an acute crisis in commercial banking. Moreover, the great depression that
All data from this source pertains to banks that are Federal Reserve System members.
Ill
followed the stock market crash intensified the problems faced by commercial banks.
Defaults on loans unconnected to securities rose as general economic stagnation
continued, and demand for new loans was slack, thus further preventing commercial
banks from earning their way out of their difficulties. These disastrous circumstances
culminated in an acute profitability crisis for commercial banks. While the Return on
Assets hovered between
.99% and 1 . 1 9 % throughout the 1 920s, it had dipped to -1 .07%
by 1933 (see Figure 14).
Figure 14. Return on Assets of Federal Reserve Member Banks 1929-39
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics
. 263-4.
The crisis among commercial banks culminated in general breakdown in the process
of financial intermediation, which in turn intensified the economic depression. A
downward spiral was generated as depositor nervousness provoked bank runs, which in
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tun, produced bank failures, which further undermined depositor confidence. State and
nationally chartered commercial banks in operation dropped from 29,258 in 1929 to
1 5,021 by 1 934. As bank failures destroyed deposits21
,
this depressed the money supply,
thus further exacerbating the economic downturn. In addition, the instability of the
banking sector compromised transactions the economy, which further inflamed depositor
panic. This process culminated in the decline in the deposit base of commercial banks
until the passage of the New Deal financial reforms in 1933 (see Figure 15). In the midst
of this cascading crisis in financial intermediation, surviving commercial banks
increasingly began to hold excess reserves as protection against bank runs. This in turn
further compromised the ability of commercial banks to act as a transmission mechanism
for monetary policy. Despite attempts on the part of the Federal Reserve to increase the
high powered money available in the banking system, the increased holdings of excess
reserves had devastating impacts on the money multiplier. 22
About 7 billion in deposits were lost due to bank failures in the five year prior to the passage of the
Glass-Steagall Act. (Compton 1987, 11)
In the event that commercial banks hold excess reserves, the money multiplier is compromised, and
additional high powered money provided by the Federal Reserve has reduced impact on the money supply,
d’ Arista notes the prevalence of this problem in 1932. (d’ Arista 1993, 163) Friedman and Schwartz argue
that from August ot 1929 to March ot 1933, the change in High powered-money should have produced a
rise in the stock of money of 17.5%. However, as the widely used formula for the money multiplier (see
below) illustrates, a rise in the currency deposit ratio (reflecting withdrawals of currency from bank
accounts) and a rise in the excess reserve to deposit ratio (reflecting increased commercial bank holding of
excess reserves during a time of banking panics) produced a drop in the money stock of 35% despite the
increase in high powered-money. (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 332-333)
money multiplier = [1+ c/d]/ [rr + er/d + c/d]
where c/d is currency deposit ratio, rr is the required reserve ratio and er/d is the excess
reserve deposit ratio
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UreS 0f Federal Reserve Member Commercial Banks As A Percentage OfTotal Federal Reserve Member Commercial Banks, 1919-1933
Source: Banking Studies 418-419.
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Figure 16: Bank Deposits, Federal Reserve Member Banks 1920-1941(deposits measured at year-end call date)
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics 72-75.
As this situation spiraled downward, the perverse implications of this crisis in
commercial bank profitability mitigated against the use of expansionary monetary policy
for other reasons. Before the Banking Act of 1933, commercial banks paid interest on
demand deposits. This represented a serious burden to commercial banks at a time when
substantial loan losses and a dearth of new lending opportunities made it difficult to earn
revenues to pay interest to depositors. In response to this dilemma, and to enhance their
liquidity in the event of banking panics, banks had increasingly shifted into holding short-
term government securities. By 1932, “investments” (mostly in government securities)
comprised 50% of bank earning portfolios among members of the Federal Reserve
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System. (Epstein and Ferguson 1984, 969) The interest paid on these securities
represented a non-class revenue that enabled commercial banks to pay the interest owing
on their demand deposits. However, this situation created an important obstacle to
expansionary monetary policy. According to Epstein and Ferguson, the Federal Reserve
briefly experimented with open market operations to increase the money supply, hut the
unintended result of this policy was to further squeeze bank profits by diminishing banks’
earnings on their government securities. 23 Alarmed at this additional burden to their
profits, commercial banks succeeded in pressuring the Federal Reserve to abandon
expansionary monetary policy. Epstein and Ferguson argue that Keynes was aware of the
desperate reliance of commercial banks on their earnings from government securities, and
its perverse implications for monetary policy. They claim that it is for this reason that
Keynes declared that ”... in the United States the fear of the [Federal Reserve System]
Member Banks lest they should be unable to cover their expenses is an obstacle to the
adoption of a wholehearted cheap money policy. ”(in Epstein and Ferguson 1984, 95 7)
24
By early 1933 the commercial banking system was undeniably in profound disarray.
Runs on commercial banks reached such epidemic proportions that it has been estimated
that close to 10% of the nation’s deposits were being withdrawn per week. (Klebaner
23
Epstein and Ferguson state that rates on short term Treasury notes dropped from 3.4% in 1929 to 0.34 %.
in 1932. (1984, 970) They claim that, as interest rates fell, commercial banks were unable to realize capital
gains from these government securities because of the shortness of the banks’ portfolios, (ibid.)
Epstein and Ferguson conclude with a remark on the dilemma faced by the Federal Reserves because it
must insure that the agents of monetary policy, commercial banks, must be profitable to operate in their
capacity as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy: “As Keynes alone seems to have recognized,
the capitalist organization of finance implies that interest rates may fail to drop low enough to revive and
economy because bank earnings might not permit it in an acute Depression. Moreover
,
contemporary
students of money and banking have not reconciled a fundamental problem of the current system of bank
regulation: that the Federal Reserve system is charged with performing two often incompatible tasks - that
of advancing the interests of specific industry while simultaneously overseeing the protection of other
business and the public at a large”. (1984, 982-983)
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1974, 133) The unsustainability of this situation was made explicit when the states of
New York and Illinois suspended banking operations on the eve of Roosevelt's
inauguration on Saturday March 4, 1933. In anticipation of the domino effect that this
announcement would have on commercial banking nationwide, Roosevelt declared a
national bank holiday on March 5 until March 9, which was subsequently extended
through March 13. Faced with this virtual cessation of financial intermediation, dramatic
banking reform became an urgent priority of the incoming Roosevelt administration.
—
e Emerging Critique Of Di versified Financial Capitalist Finns In The Early 1 930s
In view of the virtual collapse of the commercial banking system, the Roosevelt
administration was obliged to take immediate action to stabilize commercial banking, and
to devise a regulatory framework intended to prevent the recurrence of such calamities in
the future. In the midst of this debate concerning how best to address the devastation of
commercial banking, the diversified financial capitalist firm came under intense scrutiny.
Senator Carter Glass, a recognized authority in financial matters owing to his role in the
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, argued that the blending of commercial
and investment banking within a single financial capital firm promoted speculative
activity on the part of commercial banks, which in turn undermined the solvency of the
commercial banking system. Glass had been arguing since the late 1920s that the
investment banking concerns had contaminated the banking system with “stock
gamblers" who diverted commercial banking away from the “legitimate needs of
business”. (Perkins 1971, 499) In order to re-orient financial intermediation to the support
of economic growth rather than speculation, Glass became a leading spokesperson calling
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for the abolition of diversified financial capitalist firms as a central component of the
repair of American finance.
Glass and other critics of diversified financial capitalist firms often focused their
critique of diversified financial capitalist firms on the conflicts of interest inherent in
blending commercial and investment banking within a single firm. They charged that
these conflicts of interest created incentives for commercial banks to make questionable
loans to enhance the price of securities with which they (or their securities affiliates) were
involved. This might take the form of advancing dubious loans to productive capitalist
firms in an attempt to attract underwriting business. In the context of an euphoric stock
market, productive capitalist firms whose public offerings of stock might not otherwise
be attractive to prospective shareholders were encouraged to bring issues of their
securities to market. In these situations, an infusion of debt capital is often helpful to
enhance the appearance of productive capitalist firms prior to the execution of their
public offering. Despite the doubtful merits of these initial loans, it was hoped that the
lucrative revenues ensuing from securities underwriting (and other investment banking
functions) would justify the additional risk taken in the commercial banking arm’s loan
portfolio.
These conflicts of interest between commercial and investment banking had
further implications which also undermined commercial bank solvency. For example, it
emerged that investment advice given to customers of these department store financial
enterprises was highly suspect. Customers were sometimes persuaded to purchase highly
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questionable securities without adequate disclosure of the financial enterprise’s
relationship to the securities in question (as was the case in some of the debacles
involvmg the National City Company). If the commercial banking arm of the financial
enterprise advanced loans to facilitate the purchase of these securities, this contributed to
the further deterioration of the quality of the commercial bank’s loan portfolio.
Furthermore, as stock market difficulties devastated the securities affiliates, commercial
banks were often compelled to make questionable loans in an attempt to rescue their
affiliates. Critics of the blending of commercial and investment banking claimed that
these conflicts of interest culminated in the increasing riskiness of loan portfolios which
increased the vulnerability of the commercial banking system to bank failures.
Condemnation of the blending of commercial and investment banking was
intensified by the growing public awareness of the notorious activities that had occurred
in diversified financial capitalist firms. One of the most sensational early banking
failures, that of the Bank of the United States in December 1930, was attributed to the
nefarious activities which were largely carried on through the bank’s securities affiliates.
(Perkins 1971, 496-497) The Gray-Pecora hearings (1932-1934) exposed the duplicitous
conduct prevalent in even the largest and most prestigious financial enterprises thanks, in
part, to the opportunities created by the combination of commercial and investment
banking. For example, National City Bank (the world's second largest bank at the time
and predecessor of today’s Citigroup) and its securities affiliate, National City Company
(the US’s largest investment bank in the late 1920s) stood publicly accused of all sorts of
dubious and possible illegal practices stemming from their diversified financial capitalist
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activity. 25 At the conclusion of the hearings, one famous columnist of the period
declared that “ The only thing that some of our great financial institutions overlooked
during the years of boom was the installation of a roulette-wheel for the convenience of
depositors.”, (in Carosso 1970, 330)
Critiques Of Speculation And The New Dea l Coalition For Financial Reform
The Roosevelt administration came to power when it was politically feasible to
act on this growing critique of financial capital to implement an ambitious program of
financial refonns. Diversified financial capitalist firms, tainted by their association with
the reviled money-trust, became emblematic of the most recent examples of the abuses of
financiers. Under these circumstances, the New Deal could bring together a
heterogeneous group to support New Deal financial reform, in part because of their
common desire to reap political advantages by championing the growing public
animosity towards financiers. An explicit commitment to the principles of Keynesianism
was not required in order to support New Deal financial refonns, since a vilification of
speculation would suffice to secure support for the early Banking Acts passed by the
Roosevelt administration. Thus proponents ofNew Deal financial refonns included those
25
For example, National City Company rescued the parent bank from the consequences of its disastrous
Cuban Sugar loans by selling stock in the failing sugar company to investors who were not apprised of the
dubious quality of these stocks. The proceeds of this public offering allowed National City Bank to avoid a
large loan loss (Pecora 1939, 122), but left stock-holders with next to nothing. Its questionable securities
underwriting included bonds issued by borrowers that were earlier described by bank officials as “lax,
negligent and entirely uninformed about the responsibilities of a long-term borrower”(Carosso 1970, 330),
National City was also suspected of manipulating copper prices to protect itself from losses on the large
amount of Anaconda Copper Company stock it held. (Kotz 1978, 51)
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who espoused Keynesianism as this body of theory was evolving, and those with little
commitment to (or perhaps even awareness of) Keynesian princtples who nevertheless
found their particular agendas provisionally coinciding with the Keynesian goals. 26
Roosevelt offered himself as the public champion of this denunciation of the
speculative excess of finance, claiming in his inaugural address that the ‘'unscrupulous
money-changers" have "fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization” (in
Kennedy 1973, 153), and now stood “’indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by
the hearts and minds of men’”, (in Carosso 1970, 335) Roosevelt explicitly linked the
crisis affecting commercial banking with the excessive speculation by bankers in the
1920s in his “fireside chat” of March 12, 1933.
We had a bad banking situation. Some of our bankers had shown
themselves either incompetent or dishonest in their handling of the people’s funds.
They had used the money entrusted to them in speculations and unwise loans. This
was, of course, not true in the vast majority of our banks, but it was true in enough
of them to shock the people for a time into sense of insecurity and to put them into
a frame of mind where they did not differentiate, but seemed to assume that the acts
ot a comparative tew had tainted them all. It was the government’s job to straighten
out this situation and do it as quickly as possible, (in Krooss 1969, 2711)
Roosevelt s anti-finance rhetoric also garnered the support of some progressives
who had longstanding animosity towards financial capital. For example, the Socialist
Party was publicly demanding the outright nationalization of American banking”27
,
and
was thus heartened when rumors abounded that the nationalization of banks was a
Carter Glass, for example, dissented from Keynesian theory in many respects, to the extent that he turned
down Roosevelt’s offer of the position of Secretary of the Treasury, in part because of Glass’s concerns
about the inflationary implications of unbalanced government budgets. (See Burns 1974, 102-104)
~ 7 Norman Thomas, in the New York Times, 20 August, 1933. (quoted in Kennedy 1973, 168)
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possibility being considered by the Roosevelt administration. 28 Despite the possibility
that the nationalization threat may have been calculated to persuade the banking titans to
comply with Roosevelt's reforms as the lesser of two evils, officials of considerable
credibility were making dramatic statements that openly promoted the possibility of
nationalization. Albert Agnew, General Counsel for the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, warned ominously from the pages of a banking periodical. “’Either the
bankers of this country will realize that they are guardians of the moneys committed to
their charge, and will conduct themselves accordingly, or banking will cease to be a
private enterprise and will become a purely government function. ’’’(in Burns 1974, 73)
The anti-finance sentiment of the early 1930s created opportunities for the
Roosevelt administration to intervene in the re-organization of the financial sector in
ways that might have been considered far too invasive in the absence of public animosity
towards finance. At the same time, this vilification of finance (and the subsequent
redemption of finance thanks to the remedial efforts ofNew Deal financial reforms)
served another political agenda. The American public was provided with the cathartic
benefits of having a villain to revile. By explicitly or implicitly attributing the economic
ills of the 1930s to the speculative proclivities of diversified financial capitalist firms, and
of unrestrained financial capital more generally, productive capital was exculpated from
responsibility for these economic hardships. Thus New Deal reform could exonerate the
capitalist class process from any responsibility for the economic misery of the great
According to Rexford Tugwell’s biography, brain-trusters had briefly considered “[a] new banking
system that would take out of private hands the creation of a nations’ vital medium of exchange.” (in Burns
1974, 112)
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depression by catalyzing publ.c anger towards the suspicion of financial capital. The New
Deal could claim to herald the dawn of a better capitalism, provided that finance was
constrained to perform its rightful role. Capitalist exploitation per se was never the
subject of debate, the New Deal sought only to secure the conditions for capitalist
exploitation to proceed.
While it is not surprising that the Roosevelt administration failed to scrutinize the
capitalist class process in its attempt to deal with the economic calamity of the great
depression, it is another matter that leftists also failed to register the opposition to an
exploitative economic system prominently among their demands. By focussing on
questions of private ownership of financial capitalist firms, the concentration of financial
power, or the possibilities of the centralized planning of credit allocation, leftists were
able to occupy the left extremes of a spectrum of public debate concerning these issues.
Despite winning some concessions to their demands in these debates, leftists were
nevertheless engaged in a debate whose terms precluded the critique of exploitation per
se. Demands for class transformation were not portrayed as a legitimate part of the public
debate, either by the spokespeople of the New Deal or by the leftists who otherwise
regarded themselves as critics of the prevailing economic system.
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CHAPTER 5
the contradictory imperatives of new deal financial reforms
The Contradictory Imperatives ofNew Deal Financial Reform
Faced with the imminent collapse of the commercial banking system, and the general
economic devastation of the great depression, New Dealers were obliged to wrestle with
contradictory imperatives in order to reorganize American finance to secure the
conditions of existence for the Keynesian pursuit of economic growth and stability. On
the one hand, the commercial banks urgently required supports to their profitability in
order to alleviate the banking failures that threatened the conduct of domestic financial
intermediation. On the other hand, the Keynesian accumulation agenda required that
money capital should flow to productive capitalist firms in return for a low subsumed
class payment. This accumulation agenda, summarized as the idea that financial capital
should act as servant to productive capital, was potentially in conflict with the necessity
of enhancing the profitability of commercial banks. Thus New Deal financial reformers
were confronted with the urgent necessity of securing two of the conditions of existence
for stable and vigorous accumulation, namely stable financial intermediation and cheap
money capital, which were potentially in diametric opposition to one another.
This contradiction between the Keynesian accumulation agenda and the necessity
of promoting commercial bank profitability is a specific instance of the master/servant
contradiction discussed in chapter two. In chapter two, the master/servant contradiction
implicit in the Keynesian agenda referred to the possibility that financial capital, when
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obliged to provide money capital in return for low subsumed class payments, might rebel
from this subsumed class role by finding altemafives uses for the funds a. their disposal.
In the context of the current chapter, the master/servant contradiction is overdetermined
by the devastating banking conditions during the great depression. The danger of the
collapse of the commercial banking system meant that the restoration of commercial bank
profitability was a condition of existence for the continuation of financial intermediation
more generally. In this sense, this situation represents an extreme manifestation of the
master/servant contradiction. Because of the possibility that commercial banks might
cease to perform their subsumed class responsibilities entirely, financial capital (in this
case commercial banks) could not act as servant to productive capital unless measures
were taken to attend to the welfare of the servant. New Deal financial reforms had to
contend with the possibility that the domination of the master by the servant would make
the servant relationship unsustainable, and thereby make the master relationship
unsustainable as well.
Under these circumstances, New Deal financial reforms were animated by the
contradictory the necessity of both enhancing commercial bank profitability (to safeguard
the stability of the commercial banking system) and constraining commercial bank
profitability (as a consequence of securing the conditions of existences of cheap money
capital). This chapter argues that the Glass-Steagall Act, in combination with certain
other regulatory provisions in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, attempted to manage
these contradictory imperatives that animated the New Deal financial reform agenda. By
re-organizing the class character of financial capitalist firms in the context of a new set of
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commercial banking regulations, financial reformers attempted to address both the
imperative of commercial bank profitability and the imperative of the availability of
cheap money capital to support accumulation.
This chapter provides a Marxian class analysis of the ways in which selected
provisions of this New Deal financial legislation addressed this complex financial reform
agenda. In doing so we highlight how these measures reshaped competition among
financial capitalist films. In some respects these reforms addressed competition among
financial capitalists in the second moment of financial intermediation, thus these reforms
were interventions that directly affected subsumed class struggle among financial
capitalists. In other respects, these reforms reshaped competition among financial
capitalists in the first moment of financial intermediation. In this case, these interventions
were not directly addressing subsumed class struggle among financial capitalists, but
were overdeterminants of the conditions of existence of subsumed class struggle amons
financial capitalists. The New Deal financial reforms constituted a complex mixture of
regulatory provisions that addressed both moments of financial intermediation in the
attempt to manage the contradictory imperatives involved in securing the conditions of
existence for both commercial bank profitability and the availability of cheap money
capital.
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The Banking Act of June 16, 1933 constituted the first major initiative of the
Roosevelt administration to reform the conduct of financial capitalist activity in the
United States. 1 One of the Banking Act's most prominent provisions was what has come
to be referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act. 2 The Glass-Steagall Act is not an act perse,
but certain subsections of the Banking Act of 1 933. Section 20 of the Act required
commercial banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System to divest themselves of their
securities affiliates within one year. 3 This provision, in combination with the other Glass-
Steagall sections
4
,
effectively ended the combination of commercial and investment
banking within a financial capitalist firm in the United States. 3 Glass-Steagall forced the
prompt dismantling of prominent diversified financial capitalist firms, such as JP
The Banking Act of 1933 was preceded by the Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933 (which
proclaimed the National Banking Holiday), however that act was motivated to contain the banking crisis
rather than to institute structural reforms.
The Glass-Steagall Act discussed below should not be confused by the earlier Glass-Steagall Act of
February 1932, which instituted some amendments to the Federal Reserve Act concerning rediscounting
practices at Federal Reserve banks.
{n}o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner... with any corporation, association, business trust,
or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting
,
public sale, or
distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or
other securities.’” (in Kross 1969, 2760)
Section 1 6 prohibited commercial banks from purchasing equities and underwriting securities on their
own behalf (with the exception ofUS Treasuries and general obligations of states and political
subdivisions), section 21 prohibited investment banks from accepting deposits, and section 32 prohibited
interlocking directorates between commercial banks and investment banks.
Glass advocated for the separation of commercial and investment banking, while Steagall supported
deposit insurance. The compromise between these agendas allowed both issues to be dealt within the
Banking Act of 1933. However the appellation “Glass-Steagall Act” for the sections of the Act that
separated commercial and investment banking is ironic in that the deposit insurance issues pressed by
Steagall are actually dealt with elsewhere in the Act.
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Morgan's
,
that were emblematic of the evils of finance in popular culture. Fortuitously,
th.s attack on the epitome of financial power enabled the Roosevelt administration to
claim the moral high-ground in the battle against the evils of financial speculation and the
abuses of financial capital more generally. Thus Glass Steagal conferred credibility upon
New Dealers ant,
-finance rhetoric, which proved politically convenient given that, as will
be argued below, New Deal financial reforms were also simultaneously implementing
measures to enhance the profitability of financial capital.
The preamble of the Banking Act of 1933 describes the Act as “[a]n act to
provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank
control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other
purposes
.
(in Kross 1969, 2758) By removing investment banking activities from firms
that engaged in commercial banking, the architects of this financial reform intended to
shield commercial bankers from the speculative opportunities that arise from dealings in
securities. In this way, the Act attempted to protect the deposit base of the economy from
involvement in the speculative pursuit of short-term capital gains on securities markets.
Provisions were also made to punish commercial banks that directed bank credit toward
the speculative carrying of or trading in securities, real estate, or commodities, or for
any other purpose inconsistent with the maintenance of sound credit conditions.’” (in
J.P
.
Morgan’s financial empire was carved into two separate companies: Morgan Stanley pursued
investment banking while J.P. Morgan & Company engaged in commercial banking.
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Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 443) ’ O'Conner, the comptroller of the currency from
1933-1938, indicated that the intent of the Act was that banks were henceforth prevented
from "acting as a medium or agent for non-banking corporations, firms or individuals in
making loans to brokers on the security of stock, bonds and other investments.”
(O’Conner 1938, 22)
From a class analytic point of view, the Glass-Steagall Act mitigated against
domination of productive capital by financial capital in a maimer reminiscent of
Hilferding’s finance capital. By prohibiting the blending of banking and non-banking
financial capitalist activity within a single finn, Glass-Steagall limited the opportunity to
manage subsumed class struggle among financial capitalists by creating large financial
capitalist firms that could dominate the provision of money capital. Commercial banks
had the advantage of having access to the deposit base, but they were prohibited from
en§aging in the provision of equity capital. Investment banks could engage in the
provision of both debt and equity capital, but they were denied access to the deposit base.
To the extent that Glass-Steagall'
s prohibition of diversified financial capitalist firms
constrained the ability of financial capitalist firms to control access to both varieties of
money capital, the Act was supportive of intensified subsumed class struggle among
financial capitalist firms in the second moment of financial intermediation.
Friedman and Schwartz point out that banks judged to be advancing credit for inappropriate purposes
could be suspended from access to the credit facilities of the Federal Reserve, and the amount of loans
secured by stock or bond collateral were to be subject to a quota imposed in each Federal Reserve district.
129
In addition to prohibiting diversified financial capitalist firms, the Glass-Steagall Act
(together with amendments to sections 20 and 21 of the Federal Reserve Act) also
attempted to prevent the establishment of diversified capitalist firms that blend
commercial banking with productive capitalist and merchant capitalist activities. By
constraining the securities that a commercial bank was entitled to hold, commercial banks
could not buy equities in an effort to control productive capitalist or merchant capitalist
firms (Kramer 2000, 6-17). This limited the fonnation of diversified capitalist firms, but
this restriction was evaded as commercial banks formed holding companies in order to
control both bank and non-bank subsidianes. In time this loophole was closed with the
passage of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956. The BHCA was explicitly
justified as a measure “to maintain the traditional separation between banking and
[commerce] in order to prevent abuses of allocation of credit.” (in Hayes 1987, 49) It
clearly prohibited bank holding companies from acquiring “direct or indirect ownership
or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank”. (Krainer 2000. 1 7)
Once this loophole in the Glass-Steagall provisions was closed, commercial banks were
prevented from forming holding companies in order to establish diversified capitalist
firm.
8
Non-bank financial capitalist firms and productive capitalist firm could acquire up to 25% of voting
shares in a bank’s outstanding equity capital. However, any stake in excess of this threshold obliged the
acquiring firm to become a bank holding company. (Krainer 2000, 17)
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Enhancing Commercial Bank Profitability
MoneyfW .i-
A_Retum To Th e Two Moments Of Financial Intermedia™
Whatever the ments of the Glass-Steagall regulations concerning the class
character of firms in promoting a situation in which financial capital would act as servant
to productive capital, the New Deal’s Keynesian aspirations of promoting economic
growth and stability were unattainable so long as the commercial banking system was in
spectacular disarray. Unless commercial banking became profitable, instability in the
commercial banking system would continue to disrupt the process of financial
intermediation and thereby jeopardize the recovery of aggregate demand. Yet in some
respects the Glass-Steagall Act further exacerbated commercial bank profitability
problems. Any strategy to enhance commercial bank profitability via the combination of
commercial banking with non-banking revenue generating activities firm was now
forbidden, thus commercial banks were forced to rely solely on revenues from
commercial banking at a time when commercial banking was in crisis.
Thus while the Glass-Steagall Act promoted a re-organization of finance in
pursuit of one of the conditions of existence of stable and vigorous accumulation (cheap
money capital), it potentially detracted from a further condition of existence of stable and
vigorous accumulation, namely the profitability of commercial banking. This presented
the architects ofNew Deal financial reform with a dilemma. Any measures to enhance
the profitability of the commercial banking system had to be carefully designed, for these
measures would defeat the larger logic of the Keynesian agenda if commercial bank
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profitability was restored by making access to money capital more costly. Confronted by
the contradictory imperatives of the Keynesian financial reform agenda. New Deal
financial reforms sought to design regulatory interventions that would enhance bank
profitability while attempting to avoid exerting upward pressure on the subsumed class
payment required to secure money capital.
To discern how New Deal financial reformers attempted to perform this
complicated feat, we must return to the distinction between the first and second moments
of financial intermediation. We have argued thus far that the Keynesian economic agenda
sought low subsumed class payments for access to money capital, thus potentially putting
downward pressure on commercial bank profitability in the second moment of financial
intermediation. However, commercial bank profitability is also affected by the first
moment of financial intermediation. If, in the first moment of financial intermediation,
commercial banks are able to access funds more cheaply, or if they have access to more
funds, this enhances their potential profitability
.
9
By enhancing commercial bank
profitability in the first moment of financial intermediation, commercial banks could be
compensated for the detrimental pressure on commercial bank profitability that these
same New Deal reforms imposed on the second moment of financial intermediation.
v
If funds are secured more cheaply in the first moment of financial intermediation, this enhances
commercial bank profitability by enhancing the “spread”. The spread, in mainstream banking parlance, is
the difference between the interest rates paid to lenders and the interest rates paid by lenders to secure
funds. The New Deal financial regulation discussed below both increase the spread, and enhance the
volume of funds intermediated by commercial banks. Both of these actions enhance commercial bank
profitability.
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In this manner. New Deal financial reforms sought to manage the inherent
contradictions of the Keynesian financial reform agenda. New Deal financial reforms
acted to constrain the profitability of commercial banks (and financial capital in general)
by intensifying subsumed class struggle among financial capitalists. Yet this potentially
profit-constraining intervention in the second moment of financial intermediation was
accompanied with measures that were intended to support the profitability of commercial
banks tn the first moment of financial intennediation. In this way, the profitability of
commercial banks might be secured while moderating the deleterious effects of increased
commercial bank profitability on the Keynesian agenda of promoting accumulation via
the availability of cheap money capital. In attempting to both constrain and enhance the
profitability of commercial banks. New Deal financial reforms sought to sustain a
delicate balance. If commercial banks were not sufficiently profitable, the continuing
crisis in financial intermediation would compromise the Keynesian agenda. Yet, as we
shall discuss in chapter six, if commercial banks were to become too profitable, the
Keynesian agenda would also be comprised.
New Deal Supports To Commercial Bank Profitability
In The First Moment Of Financial Intennediation
In order to support commercial bank profitability in the first moment of financial
intermediation, the Glass-Steagall Act was implemented alongside other New Deal
financial reforms. The creation of deposit insurance and interest rate controls were
incorporated into the Banking Act of 1933, and these measures were later supplemented
by the termination of free banking in the Banking Act of 1935. Taken as a group, these
133
measures enhanced commercial bank profitability by assisting commercial banks in
attracting funds in the first moment of financial intermediation, and by creating
conditions that enabled commercial banks to reduce the costs of attracting these funds.
To end the paralyzing waves of bank failures in the commercial banking system.
Henry Steagall and others incorporated a national system of deposit insurance in the
Banking Act of 1933. A new federal agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), was established to insure deposits (initially up to a maximum of $5,000) in the
event of bank failure. While the initial funds for the FDIC were provided by the United
States Treasury and the twelve Federal Reserve Banks, commercial banks would
henceforth pay premiums to the FDIC in return for deposit insurance. This constituted a
new Y expense for commercial banks, and thus deposit insurance was initially (and
briefly) opposed by many commercial banks, particularly the large urban commercial
banks, who complained that the burden of premiums was a further detriment to
commercial bank profitability. 1 " However commercial bankers were quickly convinced of
the merits of deposit insurance as public confidence in banks increased. After the
prolonged calamity of bank failures in the early 1930s, bank failures moderated
diamatically after the introduction of deposit insurance. The relatively modest rates of
bank failures since the creation of deposit insurance are a stark contrast to the high rates
of bank failures that had characterized American banking prior to the FDIC.
The initial opposition of large commercial banks to deposit insurance may be a reflection of the fact that
bank failures were particularly acute in rural areas, while large urban banks perceived themselves as better
able to weather the banking crisis or saw themselves as “too big to fail” and therefore more likely to be
given support by the Federal Reserve. (O’Conner 1938, 24)
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Figure 17: Numbers of FDIC-Member Commercial Bank Failures(measured at year end)
Source: Historical Statistics on Ranking CB02.
Deposit insurance gave commercial banks a competitive advantage over other
financial capitalist firms, in that explicit government protection was only enjoyed by
savings held in the form of deposits. In the context of the great depression, in which a
traumatized public placed considerable value on the security of their savings, deposit
insurance conferred a monopsonistic advantage on commercial banks vis a vis other
financial capitalist firms. This helped to reverse the precipitous decline in deposits in
commercial banks that had destabilized the commercial banking system prior to the
passage of the Banking Act of 1933. Deposits recovered from their low point of $27
billion in 1933 to surpass $49 billion by 1939 (see Figure 16, chapter 4). As deposits
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flowed back into the commercial banking system, tins enhanced the profitability of
commercial banks, provided of course that those deposits would be employed to earn
income either through advancing loans or purchasing government securities.
Alongside deposit insurance, the Banking Act of 1933 placed interest rate controls
on deposits to enhance commercial bank profitability in the first moment of financial
intermediation. Regulation Q set maximum interest rates that could be paid on savings
deposits 11
,
and the previously common practice of paying interest on checkable deposits
was prohibited. From a class analytic perspective, interest rate controls decreased the Y
expenses required to attract a given amount of deposits, thereby enhancing commercial
bank profitability. The coup de maitre of this subsidy to commercial bank profitability
was its justification as a deterrent to speculation. Many New Dealers were convinced that
excessive competition in the first moment of financial intermediation had been
responsible for bidding up the costs of funds for commercial banks in the first moment of
financial intermediation. In public debate at the time of the Banking Act’s passage, it was
widely claimed the high costs of securing loanable funds had induced banks to make
highly risky loans connected with securities markets in order to earn sufficient returns to
co\ er their costs of funds (see Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 443). By controlling the cost
of securing loanable funds, Senator Glass argued that interest rate controls on deposits
Strictly speaking
,
Regulation Q was implemented by the Federal Reserve. The Banking Act of 1933
empowered the Federal Reserve to implement Regulation Q by giving it the authority to impose interest
rate ceilings on time and savings deposits at member banks. In the 1935 Banking Act, authority to extend
Regulation Q ceilings, and the prohibition on the payment of interest on demand deposits, was extended to
all federally insured banks. (Mason 1997, 26-7)
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would ‘“put a stop to the competition between banks in payment of interest, which
frequently induces] banks to pay excessive interest on time deposits and has many times
over again brought banks into serious trouble.’” (in Vietor 1987. 20)
In the context of the great depression, deposit insurance and interest rate controls
worked together to support commercial bank profitability. The interest income forgone
by depositors under the regime ofNew Deal interest rate controls represents an implicit
subsidy to commercial banks. Yet despite the ability of non-bank financial capitalists to
pay unregulated rates of return, holding savings in deposit fonn was attractive because of
the security conferred by deposit insurance. Given the public’s distrust of corporate
equities and bonds as vehicles to store savings during the great depression, the
government backing of deposit insurance made possible a situation in which depositors
willingly provided this implicit subsidy to enhance the profitability of commercial banks.
This subsidy to commercial banks was most dramatic in the case of demand deposits.
Commercial banks were virtually the only type of financial capitalist firm that could offer
checking privileges, while savings held at other financial capitalist firms were much less
accessible for the purpose of executing transactions. Thus depositors -such as productive
capitalist firms- who required checking privileges were compelled to hold their savings in
interest-free in checking accounts. Ironically, a productive capitalist firm in this
situation would be subsidizing bank profitability in the first moment of financial
Household depositors did have access to some other institutional savings venues (savings and loans
associations, credit unions etc.) that offered some checking privileges. However capitalist enterprises were
largely confined to using the services of commercial banks if they wanted checking privileges, which at the
time were indispensable for paying employees and managing accounts payable and receivable.
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intermediation as a condition of ex.stence for the New Deal agenda to compel financial
capital to act as servant to productive capfial in the second moment of financial
intermediation.
The synergistic effects of both deposit insurance and interest rate controls
supported commercial bank profitability both because of the greater availability of funds
m the first moment of financial intermediation, and because of diminished cost of
securing each dollar of deposits. Commercial banks paid as much as 2 cents of interest
for every dollar in deposits pnor to 1929, while by the late 1930s banks paid under one
half of one cent interest per dollar of deposits (see Figure 18). This dramatic downward
pressure in the Y expenses associated with attracting deposits provided substantial
support to commercial bank profitability. Remarkably, while deposits grew 81% by the
end of the 1930s from their low point in 1933, the total interest paid by commercial banks
on deposits declined dramatically (see Figure 19).
138
S s Per Dollar 0f Deposits Attracted
(deposits measured at year-end call date)
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics
. 72-75, 262-265
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9: T°tal In‘ereSt Pa 'd °n Dep0SitS At Federal Reserve Member Banks(Deposits measured at year-end call date)
Source: Bankin g and Monetary Statistics
. 72-75, 262-265.
With the advent of government sponsored deposit insurance, the moral hazard
dilemma implicit in the state/commercial bank relationship was intensified. Bank failures
now represented an enormous liability for the state, in that the obligation to make good
on all insurable depositor losses may dwarf premiums paid by commercial banks. Thus
deposit insurance intensified the degree to which the state was concerned to promote the
welfare of commercial banks, since the state faced the additional consideration of its
potential liability in the event of widespread crisis in commercial banking. This link
between the health of the deposit insurance fund and the profitability of commercial
banks as a condition of existence of commercial bank stability and was acutely
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understood by FDIC representatives. As a recent FDIC review of the history of deposit
insurance has summarized:
For its part the FDIC was faced with a dilemma [during 1934], Although the bankss FD^ rddbprecipir'f and the capitai rehabii“-C and the IC had een modestly successful, the banking system was not
s rong and the prospects for bank earnings were not bright. Additionally the fearsand uncertainties regarding bank failures had not been dispelled by 1934 andindeed would not recede for more than two decades. The FDIC was thus faced withthe problems of protecting the earnings of insured banks until capital and reserve
positions could be rebuilt while, conserving what was by historical standards a
modest deposit insurance fund. (FDIC 1998. 36)
To further support commercial bank profitability in the first moment of financial
intermediation, New Deal financial reformers turned their attention to the problem of
overbanking. Brain-trust member Adolph Berle, in his address to the New York Bankers
association shortly after the passage of the Banking Act of 1933, explained the dilemmas
posed by excessive commercial bank competition in the first moment of financial
intermediation as follows:
Is there any sense in having the First Trust Company on one side of the street
competing with the Second State Bank on the other to draw deposits from one unit
to make its own unit larger?
There can be only one result. The net pool is not enlarged. That can be done
only by credit or by the slow growth of population and the growth of production, in
the particular community which you serve. Competition between the two banks can
only end in weakening one at the expense of the other, to the advantage of neither
(1933,8)
To address the implications of competition to attract deposits, the FDIC became an
important source of pressure to eliminate ‘‘unfettered" competition in commercial
banking, and instead sought to create conditions of “rightful competition” in commercial
banking (FDIC 1998, 33). This culminated in the elimination of free banking in the
Banking Act of 1935. The Act gave chartering bodies a degree of discretion over entry
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into commercial banking, and one of the critena that had to be met before a new
commercial bank could be chartered included regulatory consideration of the “future
earnings prospects” of the bank. 13 This legal obligation imposed on banking regulators by
the Act stood as an explicit official acknowledgement that the profitability of commercial
banks was a consideration that should guide banking regulators. Pleased with the
restraints to competition implied by the Act, the FDIC hailed the 1935 Act as an aid to
“prevent the recurrence of the evil which is to be greatly feared ... the return of the
overbanked condition of the twenties.’” (in Klebaner 1990, 162 )
As a result of both the elimination of free banking, and the general crisis afflicting
commercial banking in the 1930s, the numbers of commercial banks in operation in the
United States was dramatically reduced. At its highpoint in 1921, there had been 29,417
state and nationally chartered commercial banks in the United States, and by 1929 this
figure stood at 24,258. (Members of the Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 1941, 419). The bank failures of the 1930s, together with the new
restrictiveness in permitting entry into commercial banking following the passage of the
Banking Act of 1935, reduced the number of FDIC- insured commercial banks in
operation to 13,538 in 1939. Klebaner claims that by 1940 there was an average
population per commercial bank rose to 7,400, nearly double that of 1920. (Klebaner,
1974, 158) The number of commercial banks in operation have never grown substantially
beyond this level, (although a small increase in numbers of commercial banks occurred
13
Officials were directed in the Act to consider the financial history and condition of the bank, the
adequacy of its capital structure, it future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the
convenience and needs of the community to be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are
consistent with the purposes of this section'”, (in Hammond 1941, 60- 61)
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briefly in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Klebaner credits lack of growth in numbers of
commercial banks to regulatory restrictiveness in granting entry into commercial
banking. In support of this claim he cites an unnamed report of the Controller of the
Currency claiming that 1 936 marked a quarter century swing to ‘'the extreme of unduly
restricted approval of new bank charters (Klebaner 1974, 158)
Figure 20 Numbers of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks, 1934-2001
Source: EPIC, Historical Statistics on Banking
. Table CB02.
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The Multiple and Divergent Competitive F.ffr.rtc
OfNew Deal Financial Reform
The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 had multiple and often divergent effects on
both commercial bank profitability and competition. On the one hand, the Glass-Steagall
undermined commercial bank profitability, since it enhanced competition among
financial capitalist firms in the sense that it prevented commercial banks from dominating
access to both debt and equity capital via the creation of diversified financial capitalist
firms. This enhanced competition is understood in class analytic terms as an
intensification of subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms. Yet on the
other hand, New Deal interest rate controls, FDIC protection and the erection of barriers
to entry around commercial banking, enhanced the profitability of commercial banks by
deterring competition in the first moment of financial intennediation. These deterrents to
competition did not necessarily imply a moderating influence on the subsumed class
struggle among financial capitalist firms generally. Despite the privileges granted to
commercial banks, they still had to contend with other financial capitalist firms
(insurance companies, pension funds, investment banks etc.) that provided debt and/or
equity capital to productive capitalist firms. So long as subsumed class struggle was
vigorous in the second moment of financial intermediation, Keynesian financial
reformers were able to enhance the profitability of commercial banks in the first moment
of financial intennediation without necessarily subverting their agenda for low subsumed
class payments for access to money capital. 14
14 Of course, this is not to say that restrictions on competition in the first moment of financial
intermediation had no effect on subsumed class struggle in the second moment of financial intermediation.
Subsumed class struggle in credit and equity markets are shaped by a host of factors including competitive
conditions in the first moment of financial intermediation, as well as the banking regulations of the various
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This approach to managing competition among financial capitalist firms became the
hallmark of the organization of finance in the Keynesian welfare state. In this so-called
cartelization of finance”, financial capitalist firms were classified according to the
particular method through which they gathered funds in the first moment of financial
intermediation. Financial capitalist firms of one category were largely prohibited from
entering activities classified in another regulatory category. Commercial banks,
investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds and so on were all separately
regulated and confined to gathering of savings in the manner characteristic of their
particular regulatory classification. This financial regulatory framework characteristic of
Keynesian welfare state capitalism inhibited financial enterprises of different functional
classifications from competing with each other over access to savings. This restricted
competition across regulatory categories, but did not preclude competition within
regulatoiy categories. Moreover, all of these types of financial capitalist firms continued
to compete with each other in the second moment of financial intermediation, thus
preserving the benefits of subsumed class struggle among financial capitalist firms in
terms of its downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure money
capital.
state jurisdictions, the existence, diversity and regulation of non-bank financial capitalist firms in each
jurisdiction, as well as the numerous other factors. Thus it is possible that in some areas and at some times
restrictions competitive activities related to accessing savings may have translated into upward pressure on
the subsumed class payment required to secure money capital. The point here is that, with sufficient
subsumed class struggle in the second moment of financial intermediation, the regulatory moderation of
competition in the first moment of financial intermediation need not have subverted the Keynesian agenda
for low subsumed class payment required to access money capital.
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This interpretation of the New Deal financial reform as embodying both pro- and
anti
-competitive impulses is at odds with much mainstream financial literature from the
1970s and beyond. Following the publication of Friedman and Schwartz’s influential A
Monetary History of the United States in 1963, mainstream economics began to embrace
the argument that banking failures during the depression were attributable to faulty
government intervention rather than reproachable conduct on the part of financial
capitalists. Since this literature largely absolved financial capitalists from a significant
role m provoking the financial crises in the 1930s, it regarded New Deal financial
regulation as an unnecessary and distortive impediment to the efficiency of financial
markets. From this perspective, New Deal financial reforms were equated with the
restraint of competition among financial intermediaries by authors such as Angermueller
(1987) and Bentson (1990). As this anti-Keynesian critique gained momentum during the
1970s and 1980s, it formed the intellectual backdrop for the advocacy of financial de-
regulation in the 1970 and 1980s.
Nor would this class analytic perspective endorse a depiction of the Glass-
Steagall Act as a uniformly pro-competitive intervention. This interpretation has some
currency among critics of large financial conglomerates, who often extol the separation
of commercial and investment banking as a prerequisite to the establishment of genuinely
competitive conditions among financial capitalists. This perspective may again grow in
popularity in light of the frenzy of mergers and acquisitions among financial capitalist
since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. This ushered in a phase of even greater
concentration among financial capitalist firms coinciding with the final phases of a stock
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market boom and subsequent bust. Critics of the
business practices of these diversified financial
speculative excesses and dubious
capitalist firms again look to the
competition among financial capitalist firms that ts conducive to economtc growth.
Thus a class analytic perspective views New Deal financial refonns as having
multiple, divergent and ultimately unanticipated effects on competition among financial
capitalist firms. This dtssertation seeks to avoid totalizing New Deal financial reform as
ether pro or anti-competitive, bu, rather sees this regulatory structure as necessarily both
pro and anti-competitive. The illustration of the contradictory unity of these tensions
relies on the distinction between the two moments of financial intermediation. The pro-
competitive dimension of these refonns, namely the intensification of subsumed class
struggle among providers of debt and equity capital, was necessarily combined with anti-
competitive measures as New Deal financial reformers attempted to grapple with urgent
necessity of restoring and maintaining financial capitalist profitability. Neither pole of
this dialectic can be forsaken. Both the affirmation and negation of competition form the
unity in contradiction which constitutes New Deal financial reforms.
New Deal Financial Reforms And The Advent OfPax Fmnnr
New Deal financial reforms did not prove to be a panacea either for commercial
banking profitability or for recovery from the great depression. Commercial bank failures
were abated, deposits recovered and commercial banking interest expenses declined,
however these developments were not sufficient to create propitious conditions for
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commercial bank profitability. While commercial bank profitability recovered
dramatically in the early years of the New Deal financial reforms, the later 1930s were
characterized disappointing commercial bank profits (see Figure 14, chapter 4).
Commercial bank profitability during the 1930s was overdetermined by the difficult
economic climate (as well as such factors as the effects of monetary policy), and in turn
the commercial bank responses to their difficult profitability situation in turn
overdetermined economic growth. Despite the increased stability in the commercial
banking system following the passage ofNew Deal financial reforms, commercial banks
were slow to resume their subsumed class role as providers of money capital to the
capitalist fundamental class process. By December 30 of 1939, total loans of banks that
were members of the Federal Reserve System stood at $13,962 million, well off their
height of $26,165 million on October 4 of 1929.(Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 1943, 72-74) 1 " Moreover, commercial banks continued to hold excess
reserves, which many critics viewed as an indication of the inefficacy of commercial
banks in acting in their subsumed class role to promote accumulation, as well as an
indication that they were an unreliable channel for the transmission of monetary policy.
In part because commercial banks were hesitant to resume their subsumed class role
in lending to the capitalist fundamental class process, the government directed the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to step into the breach. RFC had been created
in 1932 during the Hoover administration in response to the crisis in commercial banking.
The RFC had authority to borrow from the Treasury, and pursued a mandate “to extend
15
If we remove loans made on securities from this total, the total non-securities related lending was
$16,171 On October 4, 1929 while by December 30, 1939 it was $1 1,980.
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aid to agriculture, industry and commerce through the medium of direct loans to banks,
trust companies and other financial institutions.” (U.S. House of Representatives 1969.
22118) RFC authorized about $3.9 billion in loans to banks and trust companies over its
lifespan, and three fourths of this assistance was disbursed in the first 2.5 years of its
existence. The role of the RFC was expanded when the Emergency Banking Act of 1933
authorized the RFC to invest directly in the preferred stock of commercial banks, thus
staving off insolvency for many banks teetering on the precipice of failure. Thus the RFC
constitutes another aid to commercial bank profitability, but it has not been incorporated
into the above discussion ofNew Deal reforms because it was intended as emergence
assistance rather than a component of the long-term regulatory infrastructure. Despite the
funds made available to commercial banks via RFC, this was did not produce large
infusions of money capital to promote accumulation, and by 1935 the RFC began to
change its role. After 1935, RFC loans to financial institution diminished and they began
to advance loans directly to “business enterprise and public agencies”(ibid.,22120) 16
,
and
after 1938 the RFC was empowered to purchase securities and obligations from any
business enterprise. In this maimer, the RFC provided $5.1 billion in loans to business
enterprises, with an additional billion in loans to railroads, (ibid., 22120) However, once
the post-war economic recovery began
,
the RFC was increasingly viewed as a
competitor to private financial capitalist firms. Under aggressive lobbying by the
RFC was empowered to make longer term loans then were typical of commercial banks at the time, and
this practices was later adopted by commercial banks. Term loans (with a maturity of more than one year)
were negligible in 1933, but reached 2.2 billion by the end of 1940. (Klebaner 1974, 147) Thus RFC is
credited with lengthening the term of business loans in commercial banking, which increased the ability of
productive capitalist firms to use bank loans to fund accumulation.
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commercial banking sector, legislators embraced the principal that “the RFC must not
compete with private sources of credit”(ibid„ 221 1 9), and the RFC was liquidated in
1953. 17
From an overdetermmist point of view, it is not perplexing that the New Deal
financial reforms did not in themselves remedy the great depression. The great depression
was the product of a variety of interacting factors in addition to the crisis in commercial
banking, such as the generally depressed demand conditions, international instability in
both trade and financial conditions, dilemmas in the conduct of monetary policy and so
on. Thus interventions to address the situation confronting commercial banking did not
automatically overcome these multiple overdeterminants of persistent economic
depression. However successful the New Deal restructuring of financial capitalist activity
might be, if the economic situation is such that the demand for loans is not forthcoming,
then accumulation will not proceed. The purpose of this dissertation is not to adjudicate
whether the New Deal financial reforms “solved” the great depression; on the contrary
such an inquiry would run counter the overdetermmist theory of causality. We look only
to the ways in which the New Deal financial reforms were consistent with the Keynesian
vision for economic growth. Thus our attention primarily turns to the post-war period to
investigate the New Deal financial refonns during the heyday of Keynesian welfare state
capitalism.
Although the Small Business Administration, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) were created to continue some of its
activities.
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Followmg the war and the adjustment to a peace-time economy under radically
transformed international conditions, the US economy enjoyed a prolonged period of
economic growth and stability under the auspices of the Keynesian welfare state. This
period from the early 1950s to approximately the mid-1970s is often referred to as the
“golden age" of Keynesian welfare state capitalism. The New Deal financial regulatory
framework is often regarded as an important support of this Keynesian golden age. Bank
failures became uncommon, and credit was forthcoming from the commercial banking
system at relatively low real interest rates. 18 At the same time, commercial bank
profitability, measured by Return on Assets, exhibited an upward trend through the early
years of Keynesian welfare state capitalism (see Figure 21 19). Thus despite the constraints
imposed by New Deal financial refonn, financial capital acquiesced to the regulatory
framework created during the New Deal.
Although the reform legislation of the 1930s had divided up the financing terrain in
what some thought was an arbitrary manner, the major financial intermediaries
largely acceded to the legislation; it appeared to offer both an umbrella of
protection against the well-remembered wrath of the public after the profligate
1920s and an effective barrier to unwelcome competition. With each group’s
designated business territory in the financing landscape growing comfortably, there
The association of the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism and a regime of low real interest
should not be taken as a claim that the New Deal financial reforms cause low real interest rates. As Crotty
(2000) points out, a variety of international and domestic conditions converged to produce low real interest
rates prior to the mid 1970s.
19
While the argument below proceeds in reference to the return on assets of FDIC-member commercial
banks portrayed in Figure 21, it should be noted that a the return on equity behaves somewhat differently
during the 1965-1980 than does return on assets. While the return on assets largely stagnated during this
period, the return on equity climbed from 10.1% in 1965 to 13% by 1980, and then declined roughly in step
with return on assets thereafter. Thus those who regard the return on equity as a more important indication
of profitability that return on assets may argue that the pressure on commercial banks was less acute in this
time period. Since both ratios have the same numerator, the difference in the performance of these ratios is
the result of difference in the valuation of assets and equity in this time period. Rather than entering into a
discussion of the vagaries of the valuation of these various denominators, the argument is presented from
the perspective of return on assets. However, the caveat is made that the return on equity, as well as other
indicators of profitability, may at times provide conflicting indications of commercial bank profitability.
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*as Hlfk mcemiTC to encroach on the territory of the other financial intermediariesand thereby disturb the unspoken "paxfmancus” that appeared to be servin<>
‘ '
everybody reasonably well. (Hayes 1987. 3)
*
Figure 2 P Return °n Assets 1933-1999, FDIC-Member Commercial Banks
Sources. HSOB
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For close to three decades following the war, this L'paxfinancus ” persisted, and
the financial regulatory framework created during the New Deal survived with little
modification. However, as we shall discuss in the following chapter, the ability of the
New Deal financial reform in terms of managing the potentially divergent imperatives of
supporting both the conditions of existence for accumulation and commercial bank
profitability did not persist indefinitely. The tensions inherent in managing the
contradictory imperatives ofNew Deal financial reform ultimately contributed to
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remainder of the dissertation argues that the inherent contradictions animating this
balancing act ultimately subverted the New Deal financial reforms.
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CHAPTER 6
RISE OF BELLUM FINANCUS
AND THE CRISIS OF NEW DEAL FINANCIAL REFORM
From Pax Financus To Bellum Financus : The Contradictions OfNew rvsl
Financial Reform And The Transformation OfUS Financial Capital
After a long “golden age” of economic growth and stability, Keynesian welfare
state capitalism faced intensifying crises during the 1970s and 1980s. As these crises
ramified, the Keynesian welfare state was largely abandoned as the preferred avenue
through which to promote the continued wellbeing of the capitalist fundamental class
process. While Keynesian welfare state capitalism was unraveling, the New Deal
financial reforms that had helped to secure the conditions of existence of Keynesian
welfare state capitalism were also under attack. Despite the lauded success of the New
Deal financial regulatory framework in sustaining the paxfinancus that characterized the
early golden age of the Keynesian welfare state, during the 1970s and 1980s this
framework was manifesting ominous signs of strain. Ultimately the relative stability of
paxfinancus gave way to a bellum financus
,
in which financial capitalist firms of various
types engaged in vigorous competitive struggles that ultimately undermined the viability
of the New Deal financial reforms.
This disintegration of the Keynesian financial regulatory framework during the
denouement of Keynesian welfare state capitalism is analyzed in this chapter as an
overdetermined consequence of the contradictions that animated New Deal financial
reform. Thus far the dissertation has made the case that New Deal financial regulations
154
were obliged to balance two potentially divergent imperatives, namely the promotion of
both low subsumed class payments for access to money capital and commercial bank
profitability. Chapter five argued that New Deal financial reform attempted to deal with
these two contradictory imperatives by instituting the so-called
“compartmentalization”
of finance. This compartmentalization of finance in some respects promoted and in some
respects impeded competitive struggles among financial capitalist finns. Chapter six
presents the case that the contradictions inherent in financial compartmentalization
ultimately undermined this delicate balance between the pro and anti-competitive
impulses of New Deal financial reform.
As is the case when the positive moment of the dialectic provokes its negation,
the compartmentalization of finance was undermined by its own success. Amidst the
relative tranquility oipaxfinancus, incentives began to emerge to subvert the
compartmentalization of finance. These opportunities unleashed new competitive
struggles among financial capitalist firms that produced severe and unsustainable strain
on the New Deal financial regulatory framework. As paxfinancus degenerated into
bellumfinancus, many prominent aspects of the New Deal financial regulatory
framework became a casualty of this intensified struggle among financial capitalist firms.
As has been the case throughout the dissertation, the intensifying struggles among
financial capitalist firms and the ensuing demise of the New Deal financial regulatory
framework will be viewed from the vantage point of commercial banks. In particular, we
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will focus on the changing compel,live struggles between commercial banks and their
non-bank financial capitalist competitors, and the implications of these struggles on
commercial bank profitability.
Ihe Inherent Contradictions OfNew Deal Financial Reform.
And The Provocation Of Bellum Finmiru ?
The analysis of the ways in which the New Deal compartmentalization of finance
provoked its own negation relies, in part, on the recognition that the
compartmentalization of financial capital necessarily bestows an uneven assortment of
advantages and disadvantages on the various types of financial capitalist firms. If
financial capitalist firms in one compartment discern competitive advantages enjoyed by
financial capitalist firms of a different regulatory category, the incentive exists for the
relatively underprivileged financial capitalist firms to undermine those regulatory
advantages. By the same token, any regulatory requirements that burdened a given
category of financial capitalist firms vis ci vis other financial capitalist firms produce
incentive for the disadvantaged financial capitalist firms to attempt to evade or eliminate
these restrictions. This uneven landscape of both regulatory strictures and perquisites
creates the possibility for internecine struggle among financial capitalist firms as they
attempt to manipulate, evade or expand upon the pastiche of competitive advantages or
disadvantages created by the regulatory framework that supports financial
compartmentalization.
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Commercial banks were in many ways a privileged beneficiary of financial
compartmentalization. Barriers to entry shielded commercial banking from competition
from other financial capitalist firms, while interest rate controls reduced the costs
associated with attracting deposits. Deposit insurance and lender of last resort support
insulated commercial banks from crisis. Thanks to these advantages, as well as the
exclusive and virtually free 1 access to the payments system that enabled commercial
banks to execute transactions, bank deposits were the instrument of choice with which the
public stored their savings. This reliable access to large and inexpensive volumes of
funds in the first moment of financial intermediation provided propitious conditions for
the expansion of value in the second moment of financial intermediation. Thus the New
Deal regulatory framework was largely credited as having contributed to a historically
unprecedented era of stable and profitable American banking.
Ultimately, the profitability of commercial banking that was a cornerstone ofNew
Deal financial reform also provoked the subversion of these financial reforms. Financial
capitalists largely acquiesced to New Deal financial reforms during the tumultuous times
of the great depression and the Second World War, but tensions built as the long period
of relatively stable post-war prosperity continued. The New Deal supports to commercial
bank profitability contributed to a growing perception that commercial banking was
excessively coddled by regulatory privileges
.
2
Until 1980 all costs associated with the operation of the payments system were borne by the Federal
Reserve.
" Within financial circles commercial banking came to be referred to as a “3-6-3” occupation, referring to
the reputation of bank executives for borrowing money from depositors at 3 percent, lending at 6 percent,
and arriving at the golf course by 3 in the afternoon.
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Most banks were [stodgy]. They didn't make risky loans, and the ‘Wad”etween their cost of funds and the interest rates they could charge their borrowerswas relatively stable at three to four percentage points, leaving a satisfactory profitmargin of the bank after the deduction of “G&A” (general and administrative)
expenses and loan losses. That was, after all, the purpose of restricting entry by
making charters hard to get, and limiting the interest rates bank could pay their
depositors: the government wanted the bank to be stable and profitable.
...onbalance banking was a steady, routine business from the Roosevelt rescue in the
depression to ... 1968. (Mayer 1997. 16)
Ironically, to the extent that regulatory advantages enhanced the profitability of
commercial banks, these same advantages created incentives for non-bank financial
capitalist firms to find ways to compete away these enhanced commercial bank profits.
Thus the success of New Deal financial reforms in enhancing the profitability of
commercial banks set in motion competitive responses on the part of non-bank financial
capitalist firms that would serve to undermine these reforms.
As the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism matured, a number of
uniquely overdetermining circumstances inflamed the competitive struggles among
financial capitalists, which in turn ultimately undermined New Deal financial
compartmentalization. One overdeterminant will be given particular attention, namely the
acceleration of inflation during the latter part of the Keynesian welfare state era.
However, a variety of other factors also played important roles in transforming financial
capitalist activity, despite the fact that they are only given tangential analysis below. For
example, changing regulatory and judicial interventions both reacted to and further
provoked the transformation in financial capitalist activity. The evolution of computing
and communications technology facilitated the creation of sophisticated financial
instruments that transformed competitive struggles among financial capitalist firms. In
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general, many of the factors that contributed to the crisis of Keynesian welfare state
capitalism (changing dynamics of international competition among productive capitalist
firms and financial capitalist firms, the capacity of unionized workers to affect wages
rates etc.) also overdetermined financial capitalist activity by exerting a variety of
influences on the subsumed class struggle between productive and financial capital.
Strateg ies Of Non-Bank Financial Capitalist Firms
To Disrupt Financial Compartmentalization
As they sought to compete away the enhanced profitability of commercial banks,
non-bank financial capitalist firms were obliged to fashion their competitive strategies
according to the regulatory provisions that governed the various compartments of
financial capitalist activity. In general, the competitive strategies formulated by non-bank
financial capitalist firms attempted to mimic the convenience (especially the capacity to
write checks) and security (deposit insurance) that regulators had enabled commercial
banks to offer. Non-banks were not subjected to any restrictions on the rate of return that
they could offer savers, thus they could attract savings out of the commercial bank
system by paying more for them. The expense of offering higher rates of return to savers
could be defrayed to some extent because non-banks were exempted for some of the
regulatory responsibilities that constrained commercial banks. Non-banks were not
obligated by law to hold required reserves, thus a greater proportion of every dollar of
savings that non-banks attracted could be used to earn some form of income. Nor were
non-bank financial capitalist firms required to pay deposit insurance premiums, since
they did not enjoy the protection of deposit insurance. In addition, often non-bank
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financial capitalist firms had lower Y expenses in terms of non-interest costs because
they did not maintain an extensive network of branch offices. Commercial banks were
also subject to various regulations that impaired their competitive options. For example,
regulators imposed limits on the lending that a bank could provide to an individual
borrower, whereas non-bank financial capitalist firms faced no such restrictions. Non-
bank financial capitalist Finns were not bound by the legal prohibition on interstate
banking, thus they more able to expand their operations geographically while commercial
banks were confined within state lines.
In the early years of Keynesian welfare state capitalism, it was not viable for non-
bank financial capitalist firms to attract savings away from commercial banks by offering
rates of return in excess ofNew Deal interest rate controls, both because of the cost
burden it would impose on non-bank financial capitalist firms and because in the early
post-war days the Regulation Q cap was above the going rate paid on savings deposits.
However, the acceleration of inflation during the later period of Keynesian welfare state
capitalism changed this situation. In an inflationary context, New Deal interest rate
contiols became increasingly unattractive for depositors. Since non-banks were not
bound by interest rate controls in the first moment of financial intermediation, they could
outbid commercial banks for access to savings. Provided that other costs of non-bank
financial capitalist firms were lower than those of commercial banks, it became possible
for non-banks to pay more to attract savings and still enhance their profitability. Thanks
to intensified competition between commercial banks and non-banks in this inflationary
context, New Deal interest rate controls were transformed from the implicit subsidy to
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commercial banks to a competitive encumbrance. Over time commercial banks grew to
abhor Regulation Q in particular, and at their insistence it was phased out with the
passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA) in 1980.
Even if non-bank financial capitalist firms were able to pay rates of return that
were higher than the interest paid on deposits, the problem remained of how to offer
savers a vehicle for their savings that was a close substitute for deposits. This challenge
was particularly important in finding a substitute for checking accounts, since depositors
who needed the ability to execute transactions were severely penalized by holding their
savings in interest
-free checking accounts during a period of growing inflation. Thus
non-bank financial capitalist firms pursued a variety of financial innovations3 that
enabled them to offer savings vehicles that mimicked the convenience and security
provided by commercial bank depository accounts. By adapting the financial instruments
available to savers to make them a closer substitute for deposits, and in some cases by
winning for their regulatory compartment other advantages enjoyed by commercial
banks, non-bank financial capitalists were able to parlay their ability to offer higher rates
of return into a competitive assault on commercial banks in the first moment of financial
intermediation.
1
The term “financial innovation” refers to an adaptation of financial instruments or practices that enable
financial capitalists to seize profit-making opportunities by evading regulatory restrictions.
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As non-banks succeeded in eroding New Deal compartmentalization and attracting
the savings of the economy out of commercial banks, the profitability of commercial
banking was ultimately undermined. As Figure 20 in chapter 5 illustrates, the Return on
Assets of FDIC-member commercial banks hovered between .75% and .88% between
1960 and 1973, however by the early 1980s it hovered a little over .6%. Ironically, the
New Deal regulatory framework that was designed to support commercial bank
profitability was increasingly regarded as a debilitating impediment to the ability of
commercial banks to compete with their non-bank financial capitalist rivals. In many
important instances, regulators attempted to respond to these unintentional ramifications
of the New Deal regulatory structure, but their interventions often inadvertently hastened
adaptations in both commercial bank and non-bank competitive strategies that further
distorted and undermined New Deal regulatory principals. Confronted with these
difficulties, financial regulators in the 1980s and 1990s were persuaded that the welfare
of commercial banking, as well as the general prospects for economic growth and
stability, demanded the dismantling of several of the preeminent components ofNew
Deal financial compartmentalization, culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
in 1999.
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Ihe Competitive Strategies Of Nnn -Bank Financ-ial r-aPitalisi Firm.
To Lure Deposits Away From Commercial Banks
The following section has selected several examples to illustrate the strategies
followed by domestic 4 non-bank financial capitalist Finns to out-compete the banks in the
first moment of financial intermediation by undermining the various aspects ofNew Deal
regulatory privileges enjoyed by commercial banks. In some cases these strategies
involved finding an assurance of security that approximated deposit insurance, and in
some cases these strategies focused on providing the capacity to execute transactions in a
manner similar to checkable deposits. However, in all cases these strategies relied upon
paying a higher rate of return than could be earned on bank deposits. To illustrate the
progress of these non-bank financial capitalist firms in attracting savings out of the
commercial banking system, the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data is used to provide
a comparison of commercial bank deposits (checkable deposits plus small time and
savings deposits) versus the savings attracted by the non-bank competitors discussed
below.
4
Although international competition among financial capitalists is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it
should be noted that US commercial banks faced an international competitive threat in both the first and
second moments of financial intermediation by the development of Euromarkets. Initially, the Eurodollar
market was fueled because US dollars held abroad became more abundant as large and persistent US
balance of payments deficits characterized the decline of the Bretton Woods system in the 1960s. These US
dollars held abroad gave European banks the opportunity to take deposits and make loans in US dollars.
Non-US banks were exempt from Regulation Q, and from other US regulatory restrictions such as
American standards on required reserves and the payment of deposit insurance premiums. Thus non-US
banks had the possibility of paying more to attract deposits, while making up for this additional cost by
saving on other expenses incurred by US banks. As the Eurodollar market matured, it both attracted savings
away from US commercial banks and made loans to US borrowers. This practice became so widespread
that the phrase “round-tripping” evolved to connote funds originating in the US that were deposited in the
Eurodollar market and subsequently re-lent to US borrowers.
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In 1971 money market mutual funds (MMMF) were introduced to compete with
commercial bank deposits to attract savings. MMMFs, like other mutual funds, are
financial capitalist firms that sell shares publicly and use the proceeds to buy financial
assets. However MMMFs are a unique type of mutual fund in that they specialize in
buying money market assets, particularly US Treasuries (although as MMMFs have
evolved they may also hold commercial paper, bank certificates of deposits, banker’s
acceptances and repurchase agreements5). By operating as a mutual fund, MMMFs can
aggregate smaller amounts of money to buy financial assets that are denominated in
amounts too large to be practical for small savers. 6 MMMFs cannot offer explicit
government insurance for the savings they attract, however the default risk associated
with MMMFs depends on the default risk of the financial assets that the fund holds. Since
US Treasuries are regarded as having an extremely low default risk, a MMMF holding a
large percentage of US Treasuries is regarded as a good substitute for placing funds in an
insured deposit. Moreover, MMMFs competed with traditional bank checking accounts in
that they allowed shareholders to write checks (with some restrictions) against their
shares of the MMMF. MMMFs also enjoyed cost advantages over commercial banks.
Since MMMFs are not legally deposits, they are not subject to reserve requirements or
deposit insurance premiums.
As the variety of assets held in MMMFs increased, this often served to allow commercial banks access to
the funds intermediated by MMMFs
,
as when a MMMF purchases a bank certificate of deposit (see
chapter seven).
Prior to 1970, the minimum denomination of Treasury Bills was $1,000 which was within reach of
smaller savers. However, as Regulation Q ceilings became binding, it was noticed by government officials
(and the commercial bank officials that lobbied them) that savers were fleeing commercial banks to buy
Treasuries. In 1970, the minimum size of Treasury bills was increased to $10,000. This change in the
denomination of Treasuries was intended to support commercial banks in their quest to attract deposits, but
had the unintended effect of helping to stimulate the development ofMMMFs to compete with commercial
banks over access to savings. (Gart 1994, 82)
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By mimicking the functions of checking accounts, undercutting commercial banks
in terms of the cost of attracting funds, and paying unregulated rates of interest to savers,
MMMFs posed a significant competitive threat to commercial banks. In the late 1970s,
when nominal interest rates climbed considerably above the cap then set by Regulation
Q, MMMFs grew dramatically. In the 10 years between 1974 and 1984 the total value of
MMMF shares outstanding grew from $2.4 billion to $232.2 billion. As Figure 22
illustrates, MMMFs grew to control savings in the neighborhood of20% the size of
commercial bank deposits by the early 1980s. In addition, the MMMF created
opportunities for other non-bank financial capitalist firms to compete with commercial
banks. For example, in 1977 Merrill Lynch led the way for investment banks to utilize
the MMMF to develop Cash Management Accounts (CMA). Prior to 1977, dividend and
capital gains realized by investment bank customers were frequently deposited into a
saving or checking account in a commercial bank. Cash management accounts were
developed to allow investment banks to automatically invest these funds into a MMMF
on behalf of their customers. These CMAs later evolved to offer check-writing privileges,
credit cards and loans to investment bank clients.
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Pension funds were another type of non-bank financial capitalist firm that
encioached upon commercial banks capacity to attract deposits. Although they existed
for some time prior to the 1970s, pension funds became a serious competitor to
commercial banks when they surmounted their inability to offer a government-guarantee
of the security of funds placed in pension funds analogous to the guarantee offered by
deposit insurance. 7 Prior to this time, pension funds were a problematic vehicle for
workers' savings, since pension funds are often affiliated with and controlled by the
employer. In the 1950s and 1960s, relatively strict vesting requirements meant that
7
The growth of pension funds was also assisted by the capacity of unions to demand pension benefits
during the hey day of Keynesian welfare state capitalism, among other reasons.
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workers frequently were obliged to forfeit pension contributions made on their behalf,
and pension funds were often so under-funded or so heavily invested in the securities of
the employer that a profitability crises in the ftrm sponsoring the pension fund spelled
disaster tor workers' pensions. The scandalous termination of the Studebaker pension
plan in 1964s and other pension plan abuses prompted the United Auto Workers, as well
as other union and non-union advocates of pension reform, to push for the passage of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974.
ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), which
dramatically increased the attractiveness of holding savings in pension funds. The PBGC
afforded pension funds a security similar to that of deposit insurance, since the PBGC
guaranteed the security of pensions even if the employer went out of business and
pension fund assets were inadequate to meet obligations. In order to ensure that the
government would not be overwhelmed by enormous liabilities from failed pension
plans, ERISA held employers to higher standards in terms of funding and diversification
of pensions plans. 9 Both the increased perceived safety of pension plans, and the ERISA
funding requirements that obliged employers to make substantial ongoing contributions
to their pension funds, encouraged a great inflow of funds into pension funds. As Figure
x
Studebaker retirees and retirement eligible workers over sixty years of age received their full pensions
after Studebaker closed its doors. However, Studebaker workers under sixty years of age received a lump-
sum payment equivalent to about 15% of the value of their pension. All workers whose pensions had not
vested including all workers under age forty
—
got nothing. (Wooten 2001, 731) The outcry over the
situation faced by Studebaker workers compelled the United Autoworkers to push for legislative reform to
protect worker’s pension rights, which increased the pressure to pass ERISA in 1974.
} ERISSA also made the financing of pension plans more manageable by conferring tax benefits on
employer contributions to pension plans. In addition, the earnings generated within the plans are not taxed,
nor are employees taxed on any earnings until these earnings are removed from the plans (provided that the
earning are not placed in some other tax-favored vehicle such as an IRA).
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23 illustrates, prior to 1974, the total reserves held by pensions funds 10 amounted to
slightly more than 50% of the deposits of commercial banks. In the ten years following
the passage of ERISA, the total reserves of pension funds grew by 145%, until by 1984
savings held in pension funds have exceeded those held in deposits. By the mid 1990s
two dollars were held in pension funds for every dollar held in checking or savings
accounts.
10
Figure 23 refers to total reserves in both private pension funds and state and local government employees
pension funds.
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Figure 23: Pension Fund Total Reserves As Percentage of USBank Deposits
Source: Flow of Funds
. L. 1 1 0 L. 1 1 9 and L. 1 20.
Chartered Commercial
Pension plans in this era often took the form of the defined benefit plans, meaning
that eligible pensioners were guaranteed a stipulated pension benefit regardless of the
performance of the assets held in the pension fund. This resulted in the firm sponsoring
the pension fund bearing the risk that inadequately performing financial assets might not
generate sufficient funds to cover pension liabilities. Productive capitalist firms and other
employers offering pension plans sought ways of shifting this risk onto pension
recipients. Defined contribution plans, particularly 401(k) plans 1 ', became the method of
1
1
40 1 (k) plans take their name from the section of the Internal Revenue Code that authorized their tax
deferred status. Employees of “for profit employers” are eligible for 40
1 (k) plans, while public school, non-
profit organizations and state and local government employees all have similar defined contribution plans
authorized by other sections of the IRS code. (Kimpel 1997, 271)
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choice to accomplish this shifting of risk back to pensioners. Unlike defined benefit plans
in which retirees are paid a specified amount when they become eligible for pensions,
defined contribution plans stipulate what the employer must contribute toward the
pensions. The amount of the pension paid at the time of retirement will depend on the
performance of the assets in the pension plan. However, defined contribution plans are
not eligible for PBGC guarantee. Thus while these pension plans saved employers the
expense of both making good on under-performing pension assets and having to pay
premiums to the PBGC, these pension plans were less attractive in that they lacked a
governmental guarantee to protect the value of the savings held in the pension. To
compensate for this drawback in defined contribution plans, the federal government was
prevailed upon in 1982 to provide these plans with tax deferred status, (see Kimpel 1997,
256) While retirees were denied the security of government sponsored insurance on their
savings, this preferential tax treatment (which accelerated the growth of savings held in
defined contribution plans) made this burden more palatable.
Given that employees bear increased risk with defined contribution plans,
employees also were accorded increased capacity to direct the investment decisions of the
assets in their plans. This created a tremendous opportunity for mutual funds. Mutual
funds offer savers the opportunity to diversify even relatively modest savings portfolio,
and they are convenient to redeem. Savers could invest funds held in these defined
contribution plans into mutual funds in order to both enjoy both the tax deferred status of
the defined contribution plans and place their savings in a wide variety of financial
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instruments. While prior to 1970, mutual funds invested primarily in common stock, but
they have subsequently expanded into holding virtually every type of debt and equity
instrument.
Figure 24: Mutual Fund Shares Outstanding As Percentage Commercial Bank DepositsSource: Flow of Funds
. L.1 22 and T m F
As non-bank financial capitalist firms succeeded in both paying higher rates of return
than commercial banks, and offering savings vehicles that approximated the security and
accessibility of deposits, these competitive strategies began to have startling impact on
the ability of commercial banks to attract funds via deposits. This impact is illustrated in
Figure 25, which displays the percentage of the total financial assets of households, non-
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profit organizations and non-financial corporate business 12 that are held in various forms.
The category “deposits” displayed in this graph is an overstatement of deposits as we
have defined them in our class analysis of commercial banking. Ideally we would wish to
display checking and savings deposits, however the Flow of Funds categoric are such
that the line labeled “deposits" on Figure 22 unfortunately includes both currency and
time deposits (such as the certificates of deposit that will be discussed in chapter 8), as
well as our desired categories of checking and savings deposits. Despite the exaggeration
of the size of deposits in the Figure 25, it provides an indication of loss of commercial
banks’ hegemonic command over the first moment of financial intermediation.
12
Non-financial corporate business is used here as the best approximation of productive capitalist firms
offered within the flow of funds categories.
172
Percentage The Tot Yr
'^ ShareS A"d MuU,al Fllnd Shares As A
nSLwSSSbS ‘S °f 'H0USeh°'dS ’ -s And
Source: Flow of Funds
. B.100 and B.102.
Year
““
“ Deposits/TFA
MMMF/TFA
“ “ Pension Funds/TFA
MF/TFA
Be/luni Financus And Its Impact On The
Diversification Of Class Processes Within The Finn
The success of non-bank financial capitalist firms in their competitive struggles to
attract savings away from commercial banks in the first moment of financial
intermediation created conditions that transformed financial capitalist activity in the
United States. With more funds at their disposal, and the capacity to provide both loans
and purchase equities in the second moment of financial intermediation, non-bank
financial capitalists were in a position to transform subsumed class struggle among
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financial capitalists. In terms of the provision of loans, commercial banks were being
increasingly supplanted as the major provider of credit. This trend is illustrated in Figure
26, which displays the percentage of total credit market debt 13 provided by commercial
banks, MMMFs, pension funds and mutual funds over time. Until 1980, commercial
banks provided in excess of 25% of all credit market debt, while by the time of the
elimination of Glass-Steagall in 1999, commercial banks provided only 16% of credit
market debt. Unlike commercial banks, non-bank financial capitalist firms were not
restricted to the provision of loans in the second moment of financial intermediation. In
the later part of the 1990s, pension funds held over half of their total financial assets as
corporate equities, while for mutual funds this ratio was close to three quarters (Flow of
Funds
,
LI 19, L120 and L122).
13
Total credit market debt held by these various entities described in figure 26 excludes mutual fund
shares, which may affect the total of credit market debt indirectly provided..
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This displacement of commercial banks in both moments of Financial intermediation
was a dramatic departure from the assumptions about financial capitalist activity made by
the architects of the New Deal financial regulatory framework. New Deal financial
reform was predicated on non-banks having limited access to savings (since they were
prohibited from accepting deposits) but unimpeded ability to provide both debt and
equity capital, while commercial banks had access to deposits but were unable to be
involved in the provision of equity capital. Now non-banks had both increasing access to
the economy's savings in the first moment of financial intermediation, while maintaining
14
Total credit market assets of commercial banks include US government securities, municipal securities
corporate and foreign bonds as well as total loans. They exclude any holdings of corporate equities and
mutual funds.
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their ability to engage in both debt and equity capital provision in the second moment of
financial intermediation. This new situation produced a variety of strains on the New
Deal financial regulatory framework. Since non-bank financial capitalist firms are less
stringently regulated that commercial banks, the pool of savings that was intermediated
outside of the commercial banking system could be used in creative ways not foreseen by
the architects ofNew Deal financial refonns. Thus the new channels through which
savings were intermediated produced (and were further accelerated by) the introduction
of new financial innovations, which in turn further eroded the coherence ofNew Deal
financial reforms.
With a growing pool of savings at their disposal, non-bank financial capitalist firms
had the opportunity to challenge some of the competitive advantages that still remained
with commercial banks. The ability of non-banks to advance money capital via securities
purchases is in some ways less flexible than commercial bank lending, since banks could
lend to consumers and other entities that could not issue securities. Commercial banks
also had informational advantages over non-banks in assessing the future prospects of
firms in need of money capital. Over time, progress in computing and communications
technology substantially eroded this informational advantage. Non-banks increasingly
developed financial innovations that would both take advantage of this technological
progress, and that would enhance the flexibility of their activities in the second moment
of financial intermediation. As non-bank financial capitalist firms overcame these
disadvantages, a host of new financial developments was unleashed which further
undermined New Deal compartmentalization.
176
Instead of relying on the purchase of debt or equity securities in the second moment
of financial intermediation, non-bank financial capitalist firms have the option of
advancing money capital via the commercial paper market. Commercial paper is an
uncollateriahzed short-term debt that can be a good substitute for the short-term
borrowing from commercial banks by productive capitalist firms (and other issuers).
Provided that commercial paper has a maturity of less than ninety days, it is not legally
considered to be a security and is not subject to the many provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933. Because commercial paper does not have to be registered with the Securities
Exchange Commission as a public offering, it is not required to meet the disclosure
standards of other securities, and no regulatory body is charged with the surveillance of
trading practices in the commercial paper market, (d'Arista and Schlesinger 1993, 168)
However, the commercial paper market has historically been fraught with difficulty.
Given that commercial paper is not secured by any specific asset, and that commercial
paper markets lack many of the safeguards required in securities markets, the commercial
paper market has periodically been thrown into crisis. A default by a commercial paper
issuer can cause a panic analogous to a bank run that shuts down the supply of funds into
the commercial paper market. Since commercial paper is a short term instrument that
must be constantly rolled over, commercial paper issuers are obliged to collectively run
to other sources of funds if lenders flee the commercial paper market. This dynamic
frequently debilitated the commercial paper market prior to the 1970s, and made
commercial paper a problematic substitute for traditional securities both for suppliers of
money capital and for firms in need of money capital. 1 ^
15
The commercial paper market is most attractive to issuing firms with good credit ratings, since
perceptions of a borrower’s capacity to repay its loans assumes heightened importance given that
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Following a convulsion in the commercial paper market in 1970 16
,
this obstacle to
the stability of the commercial paper was surmounted, ironically with the assistance of
commercial banks (see chapter 8). Commercial banks were enticed to earn fee income by
providing lines of credit to support the issuers of commercial paper. In the event that
doubts arise concerning the capacity of the issuer to repay its commercial paper, the line
of credit can be activated so that the issuer can honor its debts. This contrived substitute
for lender of last resort support provided a backstop to deter panics in the commercial
paper market. With this support in place, the commercial paper market grew enormously
as mutual funds, pension funds and many others came forth as eager purchasers of
commercial paper. (Chapter 8 points out the irony that, as the commercial paper market
became an important source of funds, commercial banks themselves issued commercial
paper in order to gain access to the funds that were no longer flowing to the commercial
banking sector in the form of deposits.) While in 1970, only commercial paper
outstanding constituted only about 10% of the commercial bank loans outstanding, by the
late 1990s commercial paper outstanding constituted 40% of the commercial bank loans
outstanding.
commercial paper is not backed by collateral. Thus firms that access funds in the commercial paper market
are more sensitive to changes in how they are evaluated by credit ratings agencies, since a negative credit
rating can dry up their access to funds on this market. Thus while the commercial paper market enhances
the capacity of productive capitalist firms (and other firms) to access funds, it also adds new sources of
instability, since they are increasingly vulnerable to negative market perceptions that may plunge them into
a liquidity crisis.
16
In 1970, Penn Central Railroad defaulted on $83 million in commercial paper, which provoked a virtual
seizing up of the commercial paper market, even for solvent borrowers. (Hayes 1987, 87)
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Figure 27: Commercial Paper Outstanding As A Percentage Of Total Commercial BankLoans Outstanding, 1 970 -1999. om i b
Source Flow of Funds L.208 and L. 1 1 0.
As the commercial paper market provided a conduit for the savings intermediated
outside of commercial banks, new opportunities were created that further transformed
financial capitalist activity. The finance company was one type of non-bank financial
capitalist firm that seized on commercial paper to promote this transformation. Finance
companies (such as Household Finance Company) have long existed as a type of
financial capitalist Finn that acquires funds and makes loans, often to consumers. Once
the commercial paper market flourished in the 1970s, finance companies could sell
commercial paper (although they may also issue securities and other instruments), and
use the proceeds to make both subsumed class loans to productive capitalist firms and
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non-class loans to other types of firms, consumers and other entities. This freed finance
companies of dependence on commercial bank loans as a means of accessing funds for
subsequent re-lending. Finance companies are not highly regulated, and they do not have
to comply with the various soundness regulations, such as capital or liquidity
requirements, limits on loans to individual or related borrowers, or limits to loans to
parents or affiliates that affect commercial banks, (d’ Arista and Schlesinger 1997
.
489 )
Thus finance companies are virtually free to raise funds and hold assets in any manner
that they choose, and unlike commercial banks they are able to cross state lines.
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Figure 28: Total Financial Assets Of Finance Companies As A Percentage Of Totalinancial Assets Of US-Chartered Commercial Banks, 1970-1999
Source: Flow of Funds
. L.l 10 and L.128.
Year
The availability of funds on the commercial paper market (and later other
financial innovations such as securitization 17 ) provided opportunities that would
transform the class character of the firm. Productive capitalist firms and merchant
The process ot securitization converts a portfolio of illiquid loans into securities that are backed by those
loans. Thanks to the development of sophisticated computing technology, loans of a given risk profile are
gathered into a pool, and shares of the cash flow emanating from this pool of receivables are sold as
securities. The security sold as a result of this process is referred to as an asset-backed security (ABS). The
risks posed by the loans in the pool are typically defrayed by some form of third party insurance. ABS
provides some advantages over the commercial paper, in that short-term commercial paper must be
frequently rolled over, which may prove difficult if the parent company is experiencing difficulties. ABSs
are removed from the books of the issuer, thus freeing up funds to advance new loans. In addition, the
process of securitization has “proPertized” the right to services loans. Since the loans the underlie these
securities can be divorced from the company which originated them, the “servicing” of loans, meaning the
collection of payments and the distribution of revenues to the holders of the ABS now exists as an distinct
activity. Creators of ABS may earn income by selling the rights to service the ABS pool to a third party.
Thus potentially a commercial bank may earn fee income by gaining the right to service the securitized car
loans of a automotive finance company.
181
capitalist firms could access this pool of funds by developing finance company
subsidiaries, dubbed “captive" finance companies. 18 Thus prominent productive capitalist
firms, like General Electric and the North American automobile manufacturers, could
now both appropnate surplus value and earn subsumed class and/or non-class revenue by
engaging in money-lending financial capitalist activity. While the financial capitalist
activities of captive finance companies were initially closely connected to the surplus
value appropriating divisions of the parent diversified capitalist firm, captive finance
companies, such as those associated with General Electric, have flourished to the extent
that they are engaged in lending to entities that are not immediately connected with the
other activities of the other subsidiaries of the parent company.
While we have heretofore conceived of the relationship between productive and
financial capital as an amis length subsumed class relationship in which financial capital
supports productive capital by providing funds for accumulation, this transformation in
the class processes occurring within a diversified capitalist firm provides new ways in
which financial and productive capital may interact. Surplus value appropriation may be
supported to the extent that the financial capitalist subsidiary makes loans to facilitate the
purchase of the commodities produced by the productive capitalist division of the parent
company. 1
}
The capacity to combine financial and productive capitalist activity also
offers the opportunity to package productive capitalist and financial capitalist activities in
18 Many firms, such as General Electric, had finance companies that predate the development of the
commercial paper market, but they were much less important prior to the accessibility of funds that the
commercial paper market provided.
19 A captive “sales” finance company will advance these loans to consumers, while a “business” finance
company will engage in money-lending (via loans or more circuitously via such practices as factoring or
leasing equipment) to other productive and unproductive capitalist firms.
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ways that disgu.se the extent to whieh buyers are paying for the commodity purchased or
for the financing to purchase the commodity. Thus the parent company’s productive
capitalist division may be assisted in their competition in product markets if the finance
company can provide financing to consumers at rates that compensate for substandard
commodity price or quality. Alternatively, the advantages of diversified capitalist firms in
product markets may compel customers to accept financing on disadvantageous tenns. A
second way in which productive and financial capitalist activities may be combined
concerns the provision of funds to suppliers of raw materials or equipment required in
production. A diversified capitalist firm may provide money capital to suppliers of “c”
goods in return for pricing or other concessions on these commodities, or alternatively the
diversified financial capitalist firm may provide financing to suppliers in return for below
market subsumed class payments in exchange for, say, exclusive access to raw materials.
While Hilferding’s Finance Capital had foreseen the blending of productive and
financial capitalist activities under the dominance of financial capital, the development of
the diversified capitalist firm represents the blending of productive and financial
capitalist activities with no necessary relationship of dominance. While considerations
may be such that the financial capitalist activity of the diversified capitalist firm might be
carried on to promote profitability of the firm’s productive capitalist activities, conditions
may also develop to produce the opposite, namely a diversified capitalist firm that
operates such that revenues from financial capitalist activity dictates the behavior of
productive capitalist subsidiaries. The detailed class analysis of any diversified capitalist
firm will be required to judge whether, in any uniquely overdetermined context,
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productive capitalist or financial capitalist imperatives are in the ascendancy. Moreover,
as the overdetermined context unfolds, it is entirely possible that a diversified capitalist
firm will change its relative emphasis of its financial and productive capitalist activities
The organizational structure of the diversified capitalist finn also presents the
possibility that this firm will exhibit subsumed class struggle internal to the firm. In the
event that, for example, a finance subsidiary provides money capital to a productive
capitalist subsidiary of the same parent diversified capitalist finn, there may be conflicts
concerning the financial capitalist and productive capitalist agendas animating the
diversified capitalist firm. Even it this direct subsumed class relationship doesn’t exist
internal to the finn, it may be that the condition of existence for profitability in the
financial capitalist subsidiary of the diversified capitalist finn are at odds with the
condition of existence for profitability in the productive capitalist subsidiary. To the
extent that diversified capitalist firms become the predominant organizational form, this
adds new complexity to generalizations about “financial capital’’ and “productive
capital . Productive capital and financial capital must be understood as processes to
expand value rather categories under which capitalist finns can be neatly classified. The
name of a finn (with its productive of financial capitalist connotations) or even a cursory
assessment of where to gamers the majority of its revenues, may not suffice to justify the
categorization of such firms as productive or financial capitalist.
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The development of the diversified capitalist firm further destabilized the Glass-
Steagall regulatory framework. As financial capitalist activity migrated into diversified
capitalist firm and other organizational forms that were much less heavily regulated than
traditional financial capitalist firms, it became possible to subvert New Deal financial
compartmentalization in ways that were forbidden to financial capitalist firms that were
regulated explicitly according to the New Deal categories of financial capitalist activity.
For example the various financial subsidiaries of General Electric increasingly engaged
in money lending, the provision of insurance, and securities dealings that financial
capitalist firms regulated under New Deal financial compartmentalization were forbidden
to blend. This created further pressure for regulators to relax the regulatory barriers that
compartmentalized financial capitalist activity. However, the challenge remained to
incorporate commercial banking into diversified capitalist firms, or for that matter, into
diversified financial capitalist firms.
Commerci al Banks And The Diversification of Capitalist Firms
New Deal financial reforms and the Bank Holding Company Act were intended to
prevent the blending of commercial banking with other financial capitalist or productive
capitalist activity. By preventing the interconnections between commercial banking and
other capitalist activities in diversified firms, the commercial banking system was
shielded from the possibility that these interconnections might induce commercial
banking crises. For example, the separation of commercial banking from other capitalist
activities prevented the possibility that a commercial bank subsidiary of a diversified
capitalist firm might fail due to unwise loans made to productive capitalist or financial
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capitalist subsidiaries. This segregation of commercial banking away from other capitalist
activity was intended not only to enhance the stability of the commercial banking system
as a whole, but to contain the moral hazard dilemma inherent in commercial banking.
Both via lender of last resort support and via deposit insurance, the state is exposed to the
possibility of bailing out commercial banks in crisis. Thus the state is concerned to limit
the intensification of the moral hazard dilemma, lest it find itself playing an indirect role
of lender of last resort to all sorts of capitalist activities that have been positioned to
threaten the solvency of commercial banks. By shielding commercial banking from
participation in diversified financial capitalist firms or diversified capitalist firms, the
state sought to avoid the possibility that its responsibilities to maintain the stability of the
commercial banking sector might be imposed upon to handle difficulties that emanated
from beyond the commercial banking system.
However, the intensification of this moral hazard dilemma by blending non-
banking capitalist activities with commercial banking may be a powerful strategy to
enhance capitalist profitability. A capitalist firm that enjoys even the possibility of state
support in the event of crisis has a higher tolerance of risk, and thus can pursue strategies
with a higher risk/expected return tradeoff. Moreover, positioning capitalist activities
within a commercial bank, or sufficiently nearby that the moral hazard is intensified, can
have important cost savings. As Alan Greenspan reasoned in the late 1990s, the cost of
funds used to engage in any activity housed within a commercial banks is moderated
because of this implicit support of the state.
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In recognition of the importance of this
20
[I]f you have a new power and you can stick it in the bank, you will do so, because the cost of capital is
lower of the bank’. But the reason for the reduced costs, Greenspan insisted, was the implicit subsidy given
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safety net, many of the financial innovations discussed in this chapter were motivated to
mimic lender of last resort support or deposit insurance. However, this mimicry was
always imperfect. Any substitute for lender of last resort support, such as a line of credit,
is finite in the emergency funds it provides and is ultimately only as reliable as the
commercial bank that backs it. By contrast, the emergency assistance provided to
commercial banks extends to the full capacities of the Federal Reserve system, which is
the entity that creates money itself. Moreover, any source of crisis support devised by
non-bank financial capitalist firms comes at a price (as when a line of credit is purchased
for a fee), while commercial banks are eligible for lender of last resort support just by
virtue of being commercial banks.
Commercial banks thus have a powerful incentive to engage in other types of
capitalist activity in hopes of that their lender of last resort will translate into competitive
advantage in these non-banking pursuits. However, the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA) of 1956 (see chapter 5) was intended to prohibit just such an attempt by a
commercial bank to engage in diversified financial capitalist activities, or in the mixing
of productive and financial capitalist activity. In the 1960s, commercial banks attempted
to evade these restrictions on the blending of commercial banking with other capitalist
activities by attacking the definitions employed in the Act. While the BHCA defined a
bank holding company as a firm that controlled two or more banks, commercial banks
contended that if their holding companies controlled only one bank, that they should be
exempt from the constraints of the BHCA. The resulting “one-bank holding company”
banks by the world’s knowledge that the Fed and the FD1C stood behind the banks’ borrowing from their
depositors and even from the market.” (in Mayer 2002, 50)
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flourished until Congress acted to address this loophole that was creating opportunities
for commercial bank involvement in diversified capitalist firms. In 1970 the Holding
Company Act Amendments were passed which allowed bank holding companies to exist,
however their non-banking activities were to be “closely related to banking”.
While this legislation limited commercial bank's ability to initiate diversified
capitalist Anns, it had unintended consequences that assisted the formation of diversified
capitalist firms in other respects. The 1970 legislation defined a commercial bank as a
firm that 1 ) accepts demand deposits and 2) makes commercial loans. In an attempt to
subvert this prohibition on the blending of commercial banking with other capitalist
activities within a holding company structure, legal arguments were advanced to attack
this legislated definition of a bank. Lawyers successfully reasoned that a firm that makes
commercial loans without taking deposits, or takes deposits without making commercial
loans, is not legally a bank. Thus the “non-bank bank” was born. In 1980 Gulf and
Western's finance company subsidiary, Associates First Capital Corporation, acquired
Fidelity National Bank. The Comptroller of the Currency was persuaded that the resulting
firm need not be classified as a bank in the meaning of the BHCA so long as it was
divested of its commercial loan portfolio. The new non-bank bank was subject to the
same reserve requirements and examinations as regular banks, and remained eligible for
access to the payment system and for FDIC insurance, (see Vietor 1987, 49-50) Direct
access to the payments system proved to be an enormous competitive benefit for non-
bank banks, since it enabled them to support the credit card and consumer lending
activities of the parent corporation, or in the case of Merrill Lynch, it could execute its
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cash management account transactions. This offered substantial savings for the parent
company, because without access to the payments system transactions would have to be
cleared via a commercial bank for a fee. However, the parent firm was able to engage in
productive and merchant capitalist activities, as well other financial capitalist activities
such as corporate securities underwriting and insurance brokerage.
A battle ensued as the Federal Reserve moved to broaden the definition of a bank
(including a decision in 1984 to define the purchase of commercial paper as constituting a
commercial loan). In 1 986 the United States Supreme Court struck down the changes in
the definition of commercial banks that the Federal Reserve had imposed to address the
growth of non-bank banks, and within weeks almost a hundred applications to form non-
bank banks were filed. Insurance companies, mutual funds, brokerages and even
merchant capitalist firms such as Sears, K Mart and Montgomery Ward began to run non-
bank banks in competition with commercial banks.' 1 To contain this rapid transformation
of financial capitalist activity, and the blending of productive, merchant and financial
capitalist activity, the Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) was passed in 1987.
Although the CEBA is primarily remembered for its intervention in the unfolding
Savings and Loan crisis, the CEBA placed more stringent requirements on non-bank
banks. The CEBA obliged the companies affiliated with non-bank banks to face the same
regulations as bank holding companies. Although existing non-bank banks were
grandfathered, their asset growth was limited to 7 percent annually and the creation of
new non-bank banks was prohibited for one year. (Gart 1994, 88-9)
J Aswe shall see in chapter seven, even commercial banks sought to establish non-bank banks.
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Faced with both the subversion of both New Deal financial reforms and the
erosion of the principle of the separation of commerce and finance generally, CEBA was
compelled to confront the increasingly thorny issue of how to define a commercial bank
in the context of the dramatic transformation of financial capitalist activity. In an implicit
acknowledgement of the impossibility of achieving any definition which would relate
commercial banking to its role in financial intermediation, the CEBA abandoned the
attempt to define a commercial bank in terms of its financial capitalist activities. Instead,
the CEBA proclaimed that a bank is defined as a member of the FDIC. This definitional
change represents an admission that the metamorphosis in financial intermediation had
rendered conceptualizations of financial capitalist activity based on norms associated
with New Deal compartmentalization increasingly obsolete.
The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s New Deal compartmentalization was
becoming increasingly unsustainable. Commercial banks lobbied and fought legal battles
with a variety of regulators to expand their capacity to engage in multiple financial
capitalist activities. While a large number of state and federal legal and regulatory battles
facilitated this erosion ofNew Deal compartmentalization, only a few of the highlights
can be mentioned here. In 1986, the Federal Reserve Board, was prevailed upon to
reinterpret Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibited commercial banks from
being "engaged principally" in securities business. The Federal Reserve decided that
banks could have up to 5 percent of gross revenues from investment banking activities.
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Thereafter ensued numerous battles concerning the interpretation of the phrase “engaged
principally”, and over time the 5 percent limit was increased and the types of investment
banking activities that were permissible were broadened until by 1996, bank holding
companies are permitted to own investment bank affiliates with up to 25 percent of their
business in securities underwriting. In 1997 Banker's Trust became the first US bank to
purchase an investment bank, and in 199S the Travelers Citicorp merger was announced.
Since the Travelers Citicorp merger blended insurance, commercial banking and
investment banking, it was still in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act. The merger would
have required the divestiture of some lines of business in the new firms within 2 years,
however Congress succumbed to intense lobbying and the Glass-Steagall Act was
repealed in 1999.
With the passage of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the
“financial modernization act”), the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed. This legislation
created a new entity, referred to as a financial holding company (FHC), which could
combine commercial banking, investment banking, insurance provision and other
financial capitalist activities within one holding company structure. This facilitated a
round of mergers and acquisitions amongst large financial capitalist firms in which large
commercial banking could again be blended with investment banking, insurance
provision and a variety of other financial capitalist activities. Thus the landscape of
financial capitalist firms was again transformed in a manner reminiscent of the pre-New
Deal era, when in the context of a stock market bubble financial capitalist firms rushed to
blend a variety of financial capitalist activities.
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The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did maintain some obstacles to the financial
holding companies’ engaging in productive capitalist activity. While financial holding
companies are permitted to take a controlling interest in non-financial enterprises22
,
these
investments are not to be held indefinitely. 23 Moreover, the financial holding company is
not intended to “routinely manage or operate" any non-financial firm in which it invests,
(see Kroszner, 2000) In due course, these restrictions on creating diversified capitalist
firms are being challenged by financial holding companies. At the same time, other firms
such as Wal-Mart are making inroads into banking in certain states while escaping
Federal Reserve oversight since they are not structured as financial holding companies.
Evaluating New Deal Financial Reforms
In Light Of Their Keynesian Motivations
The dissertation has presented the case that the New Deal financial reforms were
motivated by a Keynesian agenda focussed on the joint objectives of reducing the
subsumed class payment required to secure money capital and stabilizing the commercial
banking system by enhancing commercial bank profitability. In particular, the argument
has been presented that financial compartmentalization one of the means by which these
joint objectives were pursued. Financial compartmentalization was analyzed as a means
to exert downward pressure on the subsumed class payment required to secure money
capital by enhancing subsumed class struggle in the second moment of financial
“ Subject to some restrictions, such as the requirement that total holdings cannot exceed $6 billion or 30%
of Tier 1 capital without Federal Reserve approval.
23
The Act stipulates only that such investments can be “held for a period of time to enable the sale or
disposition thereof on a reasonable basis consistent with the financial viability of the [investment]”.
(Kroszner 2000, 1)
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intermediation. This was matched by the moderating effects of compartmentalization on
competition in the first moment of financial intermediation, in order that commercial
banks might gain access to funds cheaply and thereby enhance their profitability despite
more vigorous subsumed class struggle in the second moment of financial intermediation.
This chapter traces the ways in which the success of financial compartmentalization
unleashed pressures to subvert financial compartmentalization, culminating in the
complete repudiation of this regulatory principle in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in
1999. However, little has been said throughout the dissertation concerning how the rise
and decline of financial compartmentalization impacted these joint objectives of low
subsumed class payments for access to money capital and stability in the commercial
banking system. Chapter 8 will speak to the issue of the stability of the commercial
banking system over this time period, however some comments on the costs of obtaining
money capital are in order here.
Thus far the question has not been posed as to whether New Deal financial
reforms succeeded in producing a low subsumed class payments for access to money
capital. Nor have we considered whether the undermining of the New Deal reforms
translated into an increase in this subsumed class payment. These questions have not been
posed since the assertion that the subsumed class payment required to obtain money
capital is overdetermined precludes establishing a cause and effect relationship between
the measures imposed by New Deal financial reforms and the subsumed class payment
that prevailed. We argue that the intensification of subsumed class struggle among
financial capitalist firms was promoted by the abolition of diversified financial capitalist
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firms. However, at the same time the contradictory possibility exists that
compartmentahzation might exert an upward pressure on the cost of securing savings in
the first moment of financial intermediation might translate into upward pressure on the
size of this subsumed class payment. Since the design of compartmentahzation contained
contradictory implications, it is impossible to conclude what the “success” of this reform
would produce in terms of its net effect on the subsumed class payment required to
secure money capital. Moreover, these particular reforms are not the only determinant of
this subsumed class payment. For example, subsumed class struggle among financial
capitalists were overdetermined by numerous factors, such as the imposition of
constraints concerning international capital flows, the dynamics of stock markets and
business cycles, the evolving tax treatment of debt verses equity capital and so on. In
addition, this subsumed class payment was overdetermined by subsumed class struggle
between productive and financial capital, which in turn is shaped by factors such as the
extent of retained earnings in productive capitalist firms, varying tax provisions, and so
on.
Nor can an overdeterminist analysis conclude that, as financial
compartmentahzation set in motion its own negation, this translated as an unambiguous
increase in the subsumed class payment required to secure money capital. Arguably the
reemergence of diversified financial capitalist firms again posed the possibility that such
firms could manage subsumed class struggle in the second moment of financial
intermediation in order to promote upward pressure on the subsumed class payment
required to secure money capital. However, the overdetermined context in which these
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diversified financial capitalist firms re-emerged differed vastly from the context that
prevailed in earlier encounters with “finance capital” a la Hilferding. For example, while
some financial innovations facilitated the re-emergence of diversified financial capitalist
firms, they also produced opportunities for productive capitalist firms to bypass financial
capitalist firms and access funds directly from savers. Add to these ambiguities all of the
other overdeterminants that were exerting diverse impacts on the subsumed class
payment required to secure money capital, and no ready assertion can be made as to the
relationship between the denouement ofNew Deal financial reforms and this subsumed
class payment.
Given that any policy initiative implies its own negation, and given the multitude
of overdeterminants that are set in motion by the contradictory impacts of the policy
intervention, the possibility of establishing a causal determination between policy
intervention and outcome is abandoned. Thus we forsake at the outset any attempt to
conclude that a policy “works” (or doesn’t “work”) to achieve its desired objective. This
represents a dramatic departure from the more conventional motivations for studying
policy. The economic history presented in this dissertation remains agnostic about the
matters typically advanced in economic history (namely offering conclusions about the
success of an intervention and offering suggestions as to how an intervention might be
improved). Instead, this dissertation follows the unfolding of the contradictions of a
particular set of reforms to illustrate the uncontrollability of policy from an
overdeterminist perspective.
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CHAPTER 7
THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DURING THEDECLINE OF NEW DEAL FINANCIAL COMPARTMENTALIZATION
Commercial Bank Response To The Competitive Threats During The Erosion Of
Financial Compartmentalization
Chapter six argued that, despite the intention ofNew Deal financial reforms to
enhance commercial bank profitability as a condition of existence for the stability of the
commercial banking system, these reforms ultimately had the unintended consequence of
provoking competitive struggles that undermined commercial bank profitability. As the
supports to commercial bank profitability contained in New Deal financial
compartmentalization were subverted by competition from non-bank financial capitalist
firms, commercial banks lost ground both in their ability to attract savings and in the
provision of funds in the second moment ol financial intermediation. These developments
culminated in a profitability crisis for commercial banks. While in 1970 the ROA of
FDIC member commercial banks stood at .85%, it decline thereafter until by 1985 it
stood at .66% and hit its low point in 1987 at .09%. (see Figure 21, chapter 5)
Commercial banks responded in several ways to the recognition that the New Deal
regulatory framework was increasingly impairing their profitability. While chapter 6
discussed some of these responses as they related to the creation of diversified firms via
the holding company structure, this chapter focuses on the practices adopted within
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commercial banking firms 1 to enhance their profitability. This chapter outlines two broad
categories of competitive strategies employed by commercial banks to manipulate the
confines ofNew Deal financial compartmentalization to their advantage. First,
commercial banks attempted to enhance their profitability by innovations within the
practice of commercial banking. These sorts of competitive responses will be referred to
as “commercial banking strategies”, since they fall within the confines of the definition of
commercial banking employed in this dissertation, namely that commercial banking
constitutes the taking of deposits and financing loans based on these deposits. These
commercial banking strategies focussed both on commercial bank activities in both the
first and second moments of financial intermediation. Secondly, commercial banks
sought to enhance their profitability by engaging in activities that expanded beyond the
class analytic definition of commercial banking. Commercial banks began seeking money
in the first moment of financial intermediation through sources other than deposits, and
they began to engage in fonns of value expansion other than the earning of subsumed
class and non-class revenue from the provision of loans. These sorts of competitive
responses will be referred to as “strategies beyond traditional commercial banking”,
despite the fact that these strategies were employed in firms that, for regulatory purposes,
were categorized as commercial banks.
1 By referring to the practices adopted “within commercial banking firm”, we mean activities within the
entity classified as a commercial bank. If that entity existed within a holding company structure that had
subsidiaries that engaged in non-commercial banking activities, we are not referring to the plethora of
activities occurring in the non-commercial bank subdivisions of the holding company.
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Whether within or outside of traditional commercial banking, these strategies
employed to enhance commercial bank profitability exhibited some commonalties. As
many of the benefits ofNew Deal compartmentalization were transformed into
competitive liabilities for commercial banks, commercial bank profitability was
constrained by both interest rate controls and the regulatory constraints that prohibited
commercial banks from engaging in non-banking forms of value expansion. Moreover, as
commercial banks lost their hegemonic status among financial intermediaries, the
necessity of maintaining required reserves was regarded as an increasingly burdensome
competitive liability. The evasion of these major regulatory constraints became a central
focus of commercial bank strategies to respond to the threats to their profitability posed
by non-bank financial capitalist firms.
However, commercial banks also formulated their competitive strategies with an
eye to maximizing their regulatory advantages. Their privileged access to the payments
system was increasingly eroded but not eliminated as a competitive advantage vis a vis
non-bank financial capitalist firms. However commercial banks’ most distinctive
advantage was their ability to offer government sponsored deposit insurance and their
explicit access to lender of last resort support. The existence of this safety net helped to
induce commercial banks to respond to their profitability problems by moving into
activities that implied greater risk exposure for the commercial banking system. Thus
while New Deal financial reforms had sought to support the stability of the commercial
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banking system, over time one of their unintended consequences was to induce
commercial banks to engage in activities that compromised the stability of the
commercial banking system.
Commercial Banking Strategies In The First Moment Of Financial Intermediation
In order to respond to the incursions of non-bank financial capitalists on their
traditional terrain, commercial banks sought ways of buttressing their access to savings in
the first moment of financial intermediation. Since New Deal interest rate controls
hindered the ability of commercial banks to attract savings in an environment of
accelerating inflation, commercial banks were obliged to subvert the interest rate controls
that had originally been enacted to support their profitability. Depending on the type of
deposit account in question, raising the interest paid to attract deposits involved
overcoming the Regulation Q cap on the rate of interest that could be paid on savings
accounts, or overcoming the complete prohibition on paying interest on transactions
deposits. However, if a commercial bank successfully managed to evade these
restrictions to increase their access to savings, this implied putting upward pressure on
the Y expenses associated with attracting deposits. Figure 29 illustrates how interest paid
on domestic deposits as a percentage of total domestic deposits grew dramatically during
the 1970s and 1980 as commercial banks were compelled to pay more to attract deposits.
Thus the success of commercial banks’ evasion of interest rate controls had contradictory
effects in that it both enhanced and detracted from commercial bank profitability.
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Figure 29: Interest On Deposits In Domestic Offices As A
Deposits Of FDIC Member Banks
S°urce : Historical Statistics on Banking CB06 and CB15.
Percentage Of Total Domestic
To deal with this dilemma, commercial banks sought to devise competitive
strategies that simultaneously promoted their access to savings while defraying the
upward pressure on their expenses of attracting these savings. One response to this
dilemma was the attempts by commercial banks to enhance the earning potential of
deposits. This so-called “liability management” sought to enable a given amount of
deposits (the liabilities of the commercial bank) to support more lending, thus
compensating for the increased costs of attracting funds from savers. One of the ways to
support the earning potential of deposits is to manage required reserve positions more
aggressively. Required reserves represent a forgone opportunity to make new loans and
they do not earn interest at the Federal Reserve. To the extent that commercial banks
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could reduce their holdings of reserves for a given amount of deposits, this freed funds to
generate new lending. However, as reserves decline relative to deposits, commercial
banks become more highly leveraged and thus more vulnerable to instability. Thus to the
extent that commercial banks attempted to enhance their profitability by diminishing their
holdings of required reserves per dollar of deposits, this development promotes
commercial bank profitability by creating greater fragility in the commercial banking
system.
Perhaps the most famous example of liability management was the development of
the federal funds market. As was discussed in chapter 3, lending conditions may be such
that a commercial bank may elect to hold excess reserves. Commercial banks developed
the federal funds market to take advantage of any slack in the required reserves of the
commercial banking system as a whole. The federal funds market is open almost
exclusively to commercial banks, and it allows a commercial bank with excess reserves
to “lend" them overnight to a commercial bank that has insufficient reserves to support
its lending opportunities. By improving the capacity of the commercial banking system to
fully employ any excess reserves, the development of the federal funds market enhanced
the profitability of the “borrowing'’ commercial banks (which could now advance new
loans) and “lending" commercial banks (that earns income for their provision of excess
reserves). When federal funds transactions by commercial banks first appeared in the
2
Prior to 1963 the federal funds market was constrained, since regulation forbade banks from making loans
to one borrower of more than ten percent of a bank’s capital. In 1963 the Comptroller of the Currency
deemed these transactions to be agreements to repurchase rather than loans. This freed banks with excess
reserves from the regulatory limits on lending to one borrower, which greatly stimulated the development
of the federal funds market. (Mayer, 2001, 171)
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FDIC s statistics in 1965, federal funds purchases on the books of FDIC-insured
commercial banks amounted to only about $2.4 billion. By 1980, commercial banks had
in excess of $133 billion in federal funds on their books, and by 1990 this figure reached
$245 billion. (HSOB, CB16)
However, the development of the federal funds market also had its perils. Federal
funds transactions are unsecured and are not protected by deposit insurance. In addition,
they are typically very short term (one day or weekend). In this context, commercial
banks rumored to be in distress may find themselves suddenly unable to roll over their
federal funds borrowings. As will be discussed below, problems rolling over federal
funds borrowing helped to provoke the failure of the Franklin National Bank (1974) and
the Continental Illinois Bank (1984). Thus commercial banks experiencing a profitability
crisis face a quandary. Borrowing heavily in the federal funds market allows a bank to
increase its loan portfolio and thereby earn its way out of difficulties, however a bank
employing this strategy is increasingly exposed to the possibility of a liquidity crisis
reminiscent of a depositor-induced bank run.
Another dimension of the competitive strategies of commercial banks in the first
moment of financial intermediation was to find ways of evading the prohibition on the
payment of interest on checking accounts. One such example of the financial innovations
designed to do this is the “sweep” account. Larger depositors often require extensive
checking privileges, particularly capitalist firms keeping large sums in checkable deposits
for payroll purposes or other “bulges” in their expenses. These deposits had been an
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attractive source of interest-free funds for commercial banks, yet they were threatened to
the extent that non-bank financial capitalists could mimic the checking privileges of bank
deposits. To prevent the loss of these deposits, commercial banks developed sweep
accounts to enable large depositors to earn a rate of return on their checking accounts.
Sweep accounts move funds in excess of some prearranged limit out of the depositor’s
checking account and into an overnight repurchase agreement 3 that would allow the
depositor to earn a return on these excess funds. In 1980, commercial banks won the
ability to extend these sorts of accounts to smaller depositors in the form of “automatic
transfer savings accounts that transferred funds from checking to interest-bearing
savings accounts.
Commercial banks also sought ways around the Regulation Q cap on the interest
payable on savings accounts. The development of certificate of deposit (CD) exemplifies
this strategy. A CD provides a saver with interest payments and the return of the principal
at maturity in a manner analogous to a bond. However, CDs are classified as time
deposits
4
,
and are thus covered by deposit insurance. In the early 1970s, commercial
banks successfully lobbied for CDs to be freed from Regulation Q limits altogether.
Thanks to these developments, the CD market grew ten-fold between 1965 and 1975.
(Meerschwam 1987, 79) However, CDs also add new sources of instability to
commercial banks. CDs are marketed widely (thus evading the prohibition on interstate
3
In such a repurchase agreement, the bank would sell its customer a Treasury bill overnight, and
repurchase the Treasury bill the following day. The repurchase would be at a given rate, equivalent roughly
to the interest earned on the Treasury bill in the intervening period.
4
Retail CDs are classified as small time deposits, in contrast to large negotiable CDs (wholesale CDs) that
are classified as large time deposits (see below).
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banking to some degree) and therefore enable commercial banks to access funds from
savers who have no longstanding relationship with the bank. While CDs enable
commercial banks to access additional funds quickly by making small changes in the
offering rate, they also contain the potential of losing funds quickly. 5
While the federal funds market enabled commercial banks to manage their
required reserve more effectively, and such innovations as sweep accounts allowed
commercial banks to evade New Deal interest rate controls, commercial banks sought
financial innovations that incorporated both the minimization of required reserves and the
evasion of interest rate controls. One of the ways of doing this was to manipulate the
regulatory categories under which deposits are classified. To the extent that a deposit
could be reclassified as a savings account rather than a “checking'’ account, the
reserves held against that account could be reduced. Moreover, while checking accounts
paid no interest, savings accounts could pay up to the Regulation Q ceiling. If a deposit
could be classified as a savings account, yet be made to function like a checking account,
the commercial bank would both economize on required reserves and evade the
prohibition on paying interest on checking accounts. This savings emanating from
lowering required reserves positions would to some extent counter-act the upward
pressure on Y expenses associated with paying interest on the deposits that were
previously interest-free. This strategy was exemplified by the introduction of Negotiable
5
The potential instability introduced by commercial bank participation in CD markets attracted concern in
1965 when several weakened commercial banks offered brokers of CDs bonuses to place their issues and
subsequently failed. (See Myers 1971, 384)
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Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts, which enabled commercial banks to offer
"negotiable orders of withdrawal” that function like checks on accounts that are not
categorized as transactions accounts.
Despite the variety of financial innovations employed to economize on required
reserves, pay interest on accounts that functioned like checking accounts, and evade the
Regulation Q cap on savings accounts, commercial banks were still under great pressure
in the late 1 970s. In response to this situation, commercial banks were increasingly
withdrawing from Federal Reserve membership because the Federal Reserve imposed
more stringent required reserves ratios than many state-chartered, non-member
commercial banks were required to maintain. 6 This declining Federal Reserve
membership created concerns among Federal Reserve officials about their capacity to
implement monetary policy. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 dealt with this by establishing uniform reserve
requirement for all depository institutions, regardless if they were members of Federal
Reserve.
7
This eliminated the incentive for commercial banks to flee their Federal
Reserve membership, however commercial banks were able to extract several
concessions in the Act. The DIDMCA lowered required reserves to 12% on transactions
6
Nationally chartered commercial banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve, while state
chartered commercial banks can chose whether or not to belong to the Federal Reserve.
7
The DIDMCA gave all banks access to discount window, check clearing
,
safekeeping of securities wire
transfers, automatic clearing facilitates and cash transportation services. These were once free, but now are
offered at cost to all depository institution that maintain their required reserves. (Gart 1994, 83)
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accounts and 3% on non-transactions accounts. 8 After further lobbying by commercial
banks, by 1 990 required reserves were eliminated on non-transactions accounts, and by
1992 the checking account required reserves ratio was reduced to 10%. The DIDMCA
also phased out Regulation Q over a period of 6 years, and overrode state usury ceilings
on mortgage, agricultural, business and consumer loans in excess of $25,0009
,
and
increased FDIC insurance to cover $100,000 per deposit account. Both the financial
innovations created by commercial banks to enhance their profitability in the first
moment of financial intermediation, and the legislative changes to required reserves
ratios, ultimately had a substantial impact on the reserves held in the commercial banking
system. As Figure 30, indicates required reserve holdings of the commercial banking
system were dramatically reduced as a proportion of the total financial assets held by
commercial banks.
8
As of 1951 required reserves were 6% on savings accounts, and as high as 23% on demand deposits
(depending on the classification of the bank). These required reserve ratios were eroded throughout the
post-war period prior to the passage of the DIDMCA. (See Feinman undated, 587-588)
9
States could re-impose usury laws by 1983 if they so chose.
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Figure 30: Vault Cash And Reserves Held At Federal Reserve
Total Financial Assets Of Us-Chartered Commercial Banks
Source: Flow of Funds
. L.l 10.
As A Percentage Of The
While the reserves held in the commercial banking system were diminishing,
commercial banks were succeeding in increasing the sorts of activities that were eligible
for deposit insurance. Thus the governmental safety net was widening while at the same
time the capacity of stabilizing attributes of required reserves were being compromised.
For example, while Regulation Q was undergoing its six year phase-out period,
commercial banks faced a quandary when interest rates soared during the early part of
Volker's tenure as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Regulation Q was a dire competitive
liability, particularly since MMMFs that could offer money market rates of return were
producing a hemorrhage of funds from savings deposits. To deal with this problem, the
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1982 Depository Institutions Act (the “Garn-St
.Germain” Act) authorized commercial
banks to offer money market demand accounts (MMDA). These accounts invested in
money market instruments just as MMMFs did, however they were covered by deposits
insurance, unlike MMMFs. In addition, MMDAs were classified as savings accounts
because of a regulatory compromise allowing only a fixed number of “checks” written on
the account per month, which helped to economize on the required reserves held to
support them.
1 he strategy of taking fuller advantage of commercial banks' access to the
government safety net was epitomized by development of so-called “brokered deposits".
A broker, typically an investment bank 10
,
could split an amount of funds in excess of the
deposit insurance cap among many commercial banks so that each bank held only the
maximum amount that is covered by FDIC. In this way, the depositor enjoyed deposit
insurance on their entire amount despite the explicit cap on deposit insurance for a single
depository account. If the funds were then put in a MMDA, the depositor could earn a
money market rate of return. As brokered deposits grew in popularity, the FDIC became
concerned that the heavy use of brokered deposits were promoting dubious banking
practices. Commercial banks in difficulties might be tempted to pay a premium to have
access to brokered deposits, and the insurance coverage on such deposits diluted the
incentive for the broker to avoid dealing with commercial banks of questionable
solvency. By the early 1980s the heavy use of brokered deposits were figuring
10
This financial innovation adds a third party, an investment bank, into the financial intermediation
process. Thus investment banks were able to derive fee income from facilitating the matching of depositors
and commercial banks, which marks a shift in the subsumed class struggle between commercial and
investment banks.
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prominently in bank failures, and in some cases brokered deposits were in excess of 50%
of total liabilities of the failed bank. 11 While the FDIC attempted to ban this practice in
1984 (by instituting an insurance limit of $100,000 per broker), this was defeated in
court. After a protracted struggle, limits on brokered deposits were included in the
Financial institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement act of 1989 (FIRREA) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991
Commercial Banking Strategies In The Second Moment Of Financial Intermediation
In addition to the attempts to enhance their deposit base in the first moment of
financial intermediation, commercial banks also endeavored to support their profitability
by adapting their competitive strategies in the second moment of financial intermediation.
The financial innovations described in chapter 6 were debilitating to commercial banks,
in that large corporate borrowers with good credit ratings were increasingly accessing
funds from securities issuance, the commercial paper market and other sources rather
than from commercial banks. To replace these borrowers, commercial banks increasingly
lent to riskier borrowers. This also enhanced the earning power of their loan portfolios
since the interest rate charged on a loan increases according to the perceived riskiness of
the loan. This movement into risky lending areas was particularly pronounced among the
largest commercial banks. A bank is in better situated to withstand default risks in its loan
portfolio if it is confident of receiving the fullest possible benefits of the government
11
This data is taken from a report by the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York quoted in d’ Arista, 137.
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safety net. Thus the largest banks which are perceived as “too-big-to-fail” were best able
to engage in riskier lending, since they benefited most from the moral hazard dilemma
implicit in the government safety net.
The increasing emphasis on credit cards in the 1970s and beyond exemplifies this
new trend in commercial bank lending. Technological developments (especially the
establishment of standards for magnetic strips in 1970) reduced the record-keeping
expense of these small consumer loans and enabled them to be standardized in credit card
format. Credit card lending is viewed as risky, given that credit card loans are unsecured
debt. However, credit cards have generally been able to evade usury limits to charge high
rates of interest. Hubbard cites an named Federal Reserve source indicating that the rate
of return from credit card lending is higher than that of any other asset — a premium of
12% above the interest rate applied to short-term default risk-free lending. (Hubbard
1996, 325) A final advantage of credit card lending is also that they can generate fee
income (see below), in the form of non-class revenue from the fees paid by stores that
accept the credit card, and often fees paid by the credit card holder. Thanks to these
advantages, credit card loans (and related loans) exhibited a compound annual growth
rate of 15% between 1970 and 1999, with many years in the 1970s and mid 1980s
exhibiting an annual growth rate in credit cards and other related loans in excess of 25%.
(author's calculations from HSOB CB13 and CB15) In the difficult times in the 1980s
and early 1990s, credit cards proved to be a salvation for commercial banks. Mayer
quotes a MasterCard official’s claim that “In 1992 Citibank was technically insolvent.
What kept them going was a billion-dollar profit on credit cards”. ( 1 997, 191)
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In addition to expanding into consumer lending, commercial banks expanded their
lending to third world states in the 1970s 12 . As large US commercial banks lent
aggressively to the third world governments (a practice that came to be know as “loan-
pushing”), these states experienced an alarming increase in the level of indebtedness. 13
By the end of 1982, the nine major US commercial banks had advanced LDC debtor
countries loans that constituted 288% of their bank capital. (Sachs and Huizinga 1987,
558) US commercial banks were plunged into crisis when, in the face of the high
interest rates in the early 1980s, it became apparent that Mexico (and other debtor
countries) could not meet its debt service commitments in 1982. For the next five years
commercial banks were able to manage this crisis, thanks in part to regulatory
permissiveness that allowed the banks to count as current income the interest payments
they received as a result of “involuntary” loans (that is, new loans made to the debtor in
order cover interest obligations and thereby prevent outright default, (see Sachs and
Huizinga 1987, 557) By some accounts, this regulatory forbearance was necessary lest
seven or eight of the ten largest US banks fall into official insolvency. (FDIC 1997, 207)
1
2
The banks were assisted in their zeal to lend to third world countries by a ruling of the OCC in 1979. A
nationally chartered commercial bank is generally subject to a 10% limit to loan to any one entity. The
OCC determined in 1979 that the various public sector borrowers in an LDC did not have to be considered
as a single entity, thus many commercial banks that would otherwise have been in violation of the 10% mle
were able to continue to engage in highly concentrated lending. A Senate report at this time observed that
“a single U.S. bank may have loans outstanding to 20 different public entities in Brazil, none of which
individually exceeds 10 percent of the bank's capital, but which taken together may far exceed the limit,
and still not be in violation of the rule” (in FDIC 1997, 204).
13
In 1970 the 15 most heavily indebted nations had external public debt of about $18 billion, or almost
10% of their GNP. By 1987 these states owed $402 billion, or about 47.5% of their GDP (see Ferraro and
Rosser 1994, 333).
14 US commercial banks other than these nine major banks were much less exposed to third world debt
,
since their loans consisted of 1 16% of bank capital by the end of 198. (Sachs and Huizinga. 1987, 558)
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By this mechanism, Sachs and Huizinga report that “ironically, during the 1982-86 the
debt crisis did not have a serious adverse effect on the reported current earnings of the
banks, even though it called into question their very solvency”. (1987, 567. italics in
original) This gave US commercial banks some time to respond to the problem, so that by
the end of 1986 their exposure to LDC debtors was 154% of capital, (ibid., 558) By 1987
the situation could be publicly acknowledged, as was symbolized when Citicorp
announced that it would increase in its loan loss reserve by $3 billion to address its third
world debt exposure. As a result of losses connected to the third world debt problem,
large commercial banks posted losses of about $10 billion in the second quarter of 1987.
(ibid., 570)
In the attempt to earn their way out of both their specific third world debt
difficulties and their general profitability problems, commercial banks turned to other
forms of risky lending. In the 1980s commercial banks increased their lending to
activities connected with commercial real estate, mergers and acquisitions, and oil and
gas sectors, all of which are traditionally perceived as risky lending areas. This was
facilitated, in part, by legal changes such as The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
that accelerated depreciation allowances L\ which made real estate investment more
attractive, and included other provisions that facilitated the use of debt to finance
corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts. (Wolfson 1994, 109-1 12) Real estate loans,
for example, constituted 17.8% of total commercial bank assets in 1980, however by
1990 this had climbed to about 27.1%. (FDIC 1997, 152) However these real estate loans
15 Many of these provisions were subsequently repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which contributed
to the collapse of the commercial real estate market in the later 1980s.
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had increasingly been advanced on the strength of the underlying collateral rather than on
the borrowers ability to generate earnings from the asset. 16 A collapse in commercial real
estate, particularly in New England, had disastrous implications for commercial banks,
and played a prominent role in commercial bank failures in the later 1980s and early
1990s.
As commercial banks experienced problems in the riskier lending activities
undertaken to buttress their profitability dilemma, the commercial banking system as a
whole grew more precarious. In 1986, nine US banks enjoyed a long-term triple A rating
from Moody’s, but by 1993 J.P. Morgan and Co. was the only bank left in this category.
(Mayer 2001, 220) The impact of non-performing loans aggravated the pressure that
commercial bank profitability was already experiencing, and contributed to an
accelerated incidence of bank failures. Before 1975, fewer that 10 FDIC-member banks
failed per year. Bank failures exceeded 120 per year between 1985 and 1992, and in some
years reached 200 or more per year, (see Figure 17, Chapter 5)
16 An account of the erosion in loan underwriting standards during the commercial real estate boom in the
1980s is given in FDIC’s History of the Eighties- Lessons for the Future: An Examination of the Banking
Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s
. (1997) Overall returns on commercial real estate properties fell form
18.1% in 1980 to a negative 6.1%, and remained negative or close to zero until 1994 (150).
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Responses Beyond Traditional Commercial Banking:
Competitive Strategies In The First Moment Of Financial Intermediation
Given the pressure experienced by commercial banks during the denouement of
financial compartmentalization, commercial banks increasingly engaged in activities that
fall outside of commercial banking as we have defined it in the dissertation. Chapter 3
defined commercial banking as the taking of deposits and using those deposits to make
loans. Thus commercial bank non-class revenues in the first moment of financial
intermediation consist exclusively of the receipt of deposits, while value expansion in the
second moment of financial intermediation consists of the subsumed class and non-class
revenues derived from interest income on commercial bank loans. As commercial banks
fashioned competitive strategies that moved beyond traditional commercial banking, their
mix of revenues and expenditures changed. In the first moment of financial
intermediation, commercial banks increasingly accessed funds via means other than
deposits. In the second moment of financial intermediation, commercial banks generated
value inflows through means other than earning interest income on loans. 17 The current
section will discuss the migration of commercial banks into activities outside of
traditional commercial banking in the first moment of financial intermediation, while the
following section will consider the efforts of commercial banks to expand value by
means other than earning interest income from loans.
17
For the purposes of this discussion, we leave aside the traditional activities that are incidental to
commercial banking, for example the provision of safety deposit boxes, that generate revenues that are not
interest income.
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In banking parlance, accessing savings in the first moment of financial intermediation
in forms other than traditional deposits is called “purchasing” funds. 18 Purchased funds
are a non-class revenue that requires the bank to incur a Y expense, similar to the Y
expense paid to attract deposits. Purchased funds are not subject to New Deal interest rate
controls or reserve requirements, nor are they eligible for deposit insurance. One of the
landmarks in the use of purchased funds by commercial banks was Citibank’s
development of the large negotiable certificate of deposit (CD) in 1961. 19 The large
negotiable CD has a relatively short maturity (typically 30 to 90 days), but the creation of
a secondary market for CDs enabled the owner to access funds prior to maturity. These
wholesale CDs are usually denominated in amounts of $1 million or more, and are
often purchased by institutional investors seeking a small premium over Treasury bills.
Other ways of accessing purchased funds include Repurchase Agreements (RPs) 20
,
commercial paper issued by a commercial bank via its holding company21
,
or via
borrowing in the Euromarket. Ironically, these instruments often enabled commercial
1
8
Purchased funds are also known as managed liabilities.
In the early post-war era, commercial banks held large amounts of government securities that they had
accumulated during the war effort. This provided commercial banks with a buffer, in that should they
require fund in excess of their deposit base, they could turn to the portfolio of government securities
.
However, by the 1960s commercial bank holdings of these securities had been depleted substantially, thus
commercial banks turned increasingly to purchased funds. (Mayer et. al. 1984, 66)
20 An RP is an agreement to sell and subsequently repurchase securities. A commercial bank in need of
funds will sell securities for some specified time period, with the agreement that it will repurchase them at a
later date.
21
Thanks to a 1962 ruling from the Comptroller of the Currency, commercial banks were permitted to issue
commercial paper. However, a struggle ensued when the Federal Reserve ruled that commercial paper
constituted a time deposit in 1966. Ultimately this was resolved as commercial paper came to be issued by
a bank holding company (or a non-bank subsidiary), and the funds were made available to the affiliated
commercial bank when the issuer of the commercial paper purchased the banks loans. (Wolfson 1994, 178-
9)
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banks to again access some of the funds that non-bank competitors had lured away from
the commercial banking system, as when a MMMF or a pension funds purchases a large
negotiable CD or commercial paper from a commercial bank.
Despite their advantages as another source of funds with which to earn income,
purchased funds are sometimes referred to as the “hot money” of bank funding (Sinkey
2002, 105) since they can dramatically exacerbate commercial bank instability.
Participants in the purchased funds markets tend to be very large, well-informed
institutions that react quickly to any adverse information (as well as rumor22 ) about the
wellbeing of a bank. Over a very short period of time, a commercial bank can find itself
virtually shut out of purchased funds markets, regardless of the return that it offers on its
CDs and other instruments with which it purchases funds. Moreover, participants in
purchased funds markets can reallocate their funds almost instantaneously through
electronic channels in a “purchased funds run” or “electronic bank run”. While a
traditional bank run might be attenuated by the dramatic arrival of money in an armored
truck to placate depositors, purchased money runs allow much less time for banking
regulators to respond before a bank becomes insolvent. To reflect the potential instability
of this source of funds for commercial banks, the FDIC defined many of these purchased
funds as “volatile liabilities”. 23 This descriptive regulatory designation has more recently
been changed to the more benign-sounding “non-core liabilities”.
" Rumors concerning the possibility that a Japanese bank would acquire Continental Illinois, or that the
OCC had approached other banks to assist Continental, helped to produced the electronic bank run that
devastated that bank in May 1984.
23 As defined by FDIC, volatile liabilities include large denomination time deposits (such as CDs), foreign
office deposits, federal funds purchased, and repurchase agreements and other borrowings. (Sinkey 2002,
435)
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As commercial banks came to rely more heavily upon them, purchased funds
were increasingly implicated in bank failures. The failure of Franklin National Bank in
1974 married both the tendency to extend loans to poor credit risks, alongside a heavy
dependence on purchased funds. (Wolfson 1994, 56) Once Franklin’s problems became
known, a purchased fund run hurtled Franklin towards outright failure very rapidly.
Although Franklin was not a particularly prominent bank, the Federal Reserve judged the
situation to be so potentially damaging to both the domestic market for bank CDs and the
Eurodollar market that it Franklin could not be permitted to fail. To resolve the situation
at Franklin, the FDIC required time to arrange for other banks to assume the Franklin’s
liabilities and purchase its assets. This implied that the Federal Reserve was obliged to
keep Franklin operating on life support for several months while the situation was
resolved. Franklin was kept open with borrowing from the discount window that
averaged slightly more than $1 billion per day between May 8 and October 7 (Sinkey
2002, 563), and Federal Reserve guarantees on a daily average of $300 million in loans
from other banks on the federal funds markets, (see Wolfson 1994, 56-59)
While lender of last resort support was conceived of as a support to the depositary
system, the increasing reliance of commercial banks on purchased funds has generated
the defacto understanding that the Federal Reserve stands ready to stabilize commercial
banks in their undertakings related to purchased funds. To the extent that the Federal
Reserve may be called upon to address a crisis that emanates from commercial banks'
involvement with purchased funds, this represents an expansion of this lender of last
resort mandate. Any financial capitalist firm may purchase funds in the first moment of
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financial intermediation. Indeed many of the instruments that commercial banks use to
purchase funds, such as commercial paper, are also used by non-bank financial
capitalists. Thus providing a government-backed safety net for commercial bank dealings
in purchased funds represents a movement towards the provision of emergency assistance
to financial capitalist activities in general - so long as a given crisis can be shown to
destabilize the commercial banking system. In this way, the migration of commercial
banks into purchased funds, and the increasing obligation that the government safety net
address banking crisis that have large purchased funds components, represents another
intensification of the moral hazard dilemma faced by the government.
This implied lender of last resort support assists commercial banks in the market for
purchased funds since it lowers the Y cost of attracting purchased funds vis a vis their
non-bank financial capitalist competitors. To the extent that lender of last resort support
assists commercial banks in attracting purchased funds, commercial banks have a
competitive advantages vis a vis the non-bank financial capitalist firms in purchased
funds markets. Moreover, the advantage conferred by this implicit governmental support
is greater the larger the commercial bank, since the “too big to fail” precept implies that
larger banks are more likely to receive this support than are smaller banks. Thus the
larger banks are more active in securing purchased funds than are the smaller banks.
Sinkey notes that in 1985, purchased funds constituted 35% of the average consolidated
assets of all FDIC-insured commercial banks, while the ten largest commercial banks
held purchased funds equivalent to almost 60% of their average consolidated assets.
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(2002, 106)24 Implicitly the importance of lender of last resort support is reflected in the
pricing dynamics of purchased funds markets. Wolfson cites research illustrating that,
during an instance of instability in the wholesale CD market, a “two-tiering” effect took
place in which banks regarded as too big to fail paid less on their CDs than did smaller
banks, regardless of the profitability indicators of the bank in question. (Wolfson 1994,
57)
Another implication of the defacto extension of emergency government
assistance to address the purchased fund activities of commercial banks is the increased
expense to the government of resolving bank failures. Deposit insurance was designed to
contain banking runs by insuring individual deposits, so an upper cap (currently of
$100,000) was seen as sufficient to prevent legions of small depositors from withdrawing
their funds. However, to address a purchased fund run, creditors must be assured that
their funds are protected in their entirety. This dilemma was illustrated by the failure of
Continental Illinois (ranked as the seventh largest bank at the time of its collapse).
Continental was a heavy user of purchased funds" 5
,
to fund its adventures lending
strategies in energy, real estate and other notoriously risky undertakings. But Continental
was by no means unusual among large US commercial banks, as Charles Partee, chair of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors committee on bank supervision, confirmed:
“ 4
While the largest commercial banks have diminished their reliance on purchased funds somewhat in the
1990s, (purchased funds constituted 45% of the average consolidated assets of the ten largest FDIC-insured
commercial bank in 1999), medium and small commercial banks held only 26% (medium sized banks) and
16% (small sized banks) of their average consolidated assets as purchased funds.
25
In part due to the unit banking laws in Illinois which limit the accessibility of deposits, Continental
funded its growth in the late 1970s via the purchased funds markets. In 1981 “core deposits” (i.e. traditional
deposits) made up just 20% of the bank’s total deposits (which include Negotiable CDs and Foreign
deposits from Euromarkets). (FDIC, 1997, 242 and 255)
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With Continental Illinois, when you get right down to it, here was a $40 billionbank with only $4 billion in deposits. The core of the bank was very, very smallThey re selling CDs, getting money from the Eurodollar market, selling
commercial paper from the bank holding company. It was an extreme case- but it
wasn t all that unusual. Citibank has a small core too. Lots of big banks do (in
Gneder 1987, 525-6)
Largely in response to the Continental collapse, the term “too-big-to-fail” gained
popularity in the banking lexicon. Given the possibility that the insolvency of a large
bank might disrupt the markets for purchased funds and potentially ramify to other large
banks, the LDIC was forced to guarantee that all depositors and other general creditors of
Continental would be “fully protected”, regardless of the cap on deposit insurance,
despite the fact that a number of the liabilities in question were not insurable deposits.
(LDIC 1997. 244)
From the point of view of the class analysis of financial capitalist finns developed
in this dissertation, a firm with only a minor emphasis on deposits would be more
accurately characterized a diversified financial capitalist firm. Chapter 6 described the
attempts by commercial banks to diversify their financial capitalist activity via the
holding company structure in which other subsidiaries engaged in non-banking financial
capitalist activity. However, the movement into purchased funds represents another
aspect of this diversification. Without changing the legal entity in which the commercial
bank was housed, commercial banking firms managed to diversify their financial
capitalist activities within the firm that continued to be classified as a commercial bank.
Of course, the monumental advantage to housing non-banking financial capitalist activity
within a firm categorized as a commercial bank was that it provided a way to extend
220
government safety nets to more types of financial capitalist activity. Thus commercial
banks could respond to their profitability squeeze by abusing their lender of last resort
and FDIC privileges to enable them to engage in activities that were increasingly similar
to financial capitalist activities in general.
Supplementing Profitab ility Beyond Traditional Commercial Bank Lending
As commercial banks found their profitability from lending activity had become
more problematic, one of their response was to supplement their profits with income from
sources other than interest on loans outstanding. Non-interest income became
increasingly important for commercial banks throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure
31). While in 1960 Commercial banks earned about 17 cents in non-interest income for
every dollar of interest income earned, by the late 1990s this figure had risen to over 30
cents per dollar. The contribution of non-interest income is indicated in Figure 32. Figure
32 displays the total ROA of FDIC- member commercial banks, and the ROA calculated
by excluding non-interest income. In every year since 1980 ROA would have been
negative if non-interest income were excluded from the numerator of the ROA
calculation.
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Figure 3 1 : Non-Interest Income As A Percentage Of Interest Income
Commercial Banks, 1960-1999
Source Historical Statistics on Banking
. CB04.
For FDIC-Insured
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Figure, 32
: fT
etum 0n Assets 0f FDIC-Member Commercial Banks Including AndExcluding Non-Interest Income, 1960-1999
Source: Historical Statistics on Banking
. CB04.
-Total ROA
~ ROA Excluding Non-interest Income
The wide array of activities that generate non-interest income provokes the
question of how to deal with this category of income in class analytic terms. Chapter
three assumed that non-interest income was a non-class revenue. Chapter three conceded
that, upon investigation, some subset of these activities could arguably be classified as
the production of a commodity. At this point, it may also be possible that the income
generated by these activities is subsumed class revenue, in that in some instances a case
can be made that these activities provide a condition of existence for capitalist
exploitation. The issue of the class analytic categorization of these various forms of non-
interest incomes will not be explored here. The preliminary assumption will be
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maintained that non-interest income is classified as a non-class revenue, with the caveat
that specific inquiry may result in any of these instances of non-interest income being re-
classified.
One of the sources of non-interest income for commercial banks is fee income. This
includes fees charged for activities connected with the operation of a deposit account (for
example, a fee might be levied on making withdrawals via an automatic banking
machines). Sinkey claims that service charges on deposits grew at an annual rate of 7.7%
between 1995 and 1999. (2002,470) Fees were also charged in association with lending
activities in the second moment of financial intermediation (such as annual fees changed
for the provision of credit cards). Moreover, fees were increasingly generated from some
of the new financial innovations. For example, to enable a given deposit base to support
more lending, commercial banks began to securitize aspects of their loan portfolio.
Securitization involves gathering together loans (usually of a given type, such as
mortgages and later credit card receivables and many other types of loans), packaging
them as securities, and selling them (both the claims to the interest and the principal
payments) to third parties. When the loans are securitized, they are moved off of the
balance sheet of the bank, thus freeing up funds to finance new loans. However, the bank
may retain the obligation to service the loans, thus it earns a fee for managing the
collection of the payments on the variety of loans that back the security. This financial
innovation not only assisted banks in their difficulties in the first moment of financial
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intermediation, it also enabled them to earn fees from their advantages in terms of their
status in the payment system and their other comparative advantages in administering
loans.
Many of the types of fee income generated by commercial banks had implications
for the moral hazard issues discussed in the previous section. Banks increasingly earned
fee income on various types of guarantees, such as lines of credit. A line of credit
constitutes the promise to provide a loan should the potential borrower wish to have it. 26
(Ironically, as chapter 6 explained, one of the unintended consequences of the growth in
the provision of lines of credit was that it enabled competitors to commercial banks to
raise money by stabilizing the commercial paper market). From a commercial bank's
point of view, lines of credit are lucrative in that a fee may be earned even though no loan
is ultimately provided. Y et lines of credit can also have a destabilizing influence on the
commercial banking system. Lines of credit are often activated when a would-be
borrower faces difficulty. Thus the commercial bank is obliged to advance a loan just at
the point when the likelihood of default on the loan is high. Firms in distress often
activate lines of credit prior to their failure, as was the case when Enron obliged several
large banks to honor their lines of credit prior to its collapse. If several firms tap their
lines of credit simultaneously and subsequently fail, this could threaten a commercial
bank’s survival. A crisis in one branch of productive capitalist activity can send these
firms to activate their lines of credit just as that industry is in profound crisis. Detrimental
economic events that adversely affect large numbers of firms simultaneously can provoke
26
The fee for this stand-by arrangement is distinct from any interest income paid when and if the loan is
actually provided.
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a widespread rush to activate lines of credit. By acting as a lender of last resort to any
entity that has a line of credit, commercial banks themselves may require lender of last
resort support, hence commercial banks have competitive advantage in the attempt to
earn fee income from guarantees such as lines of credit. However, the Federal Reserve is
exposed to the possibility that it may be prevailed upon to be the defacto lender of last
resort to non-bank firms via the mechanism of commercial bank lines of credit that
subsequently send commercial banks to the discount window.
Another area in which commercial banks generate fee income (as well as other types
of off-balance sheet income) is by acting as a dealer of derivatives. Derivatives are a
contract between two parties that provides the contract holder either the necessity (in a
futures contract) or the possibility (in an option contract) of engaging in a transaction in
the future whose value will be derived from the future values of some variable such as
interest rates, exchange rates, equity or commodity prices or the occurrence of a host of
other economic or non-economic events. For example, a bank may enter into a contract to
pay a party a fixed rate of interest, while that party will pay the bank the prevailing rate
on Treasury bills (applied to some notional amount which serves as the reference point
from which the contract pay-out is calculated). The dealer will build into this transaction
some margin which constitutes their fee, and is exposed to the possibility that the payout
may be either more or less than the value the bank receives from the counterparty.
226
Dealers in derivatives are exposed to a variety of risks. Ideally, derivatives dealers
engage in matched trading, meaning that a derivatives contract that pays the counterparty
it interest rates go up will be “matched” against another derivative that pays the bank in
the same event. However, even if this matching strategy is scrupulously followed, there is
credit risk inherent in many of these “over-the counter27” derivatives contracts. Although
the dealer has matched two derivatives contracts so that the net effect on the derivatives
trader is neutral, there is a possibility that one of the dealers’ counterparties may default
on the terms of their contract. In this event, the derivatives dealer continues to be exposed
to the necessity of fulfilling the terms of the contract for the other “matched”
counterparty. Thus potentially the counterparty whose derivatives contract benefits the
dealer may default, while the derivative contract that is costly to the dealer remains in
force. Moreover, this problem is intensified by the immense leveraging possible in
derivatives.
2
* For example, at the time of its failure, Long Term Capital Management was
reported to hold $1 .25 trillion of notional exposure in derivatives with an estimated value
of $125 billion, despite its own capital base being a mere $2.2 billion. (Mehrling 1998, 9)
Finally, derivative dealers may intentionally expose themselves to risk, as when they
establish a speculative position by refraining from balancing one derivatives contract
with another matching derivative.
~ 7
Derivatives traded in organized futures exchanges have a clearing house guarantee to mitigate credit risk.
(Edwards and Mishkin 1995, 15)
28
Derivatives traded in over-the-counter markets have no standard collateral or margin requirements,
despite the possibility that these provisions can be incoiporated into the derivatives contracts.
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Eager to partake of the lucrative aspects of dealing in derivatives, the derivatives
activities of US banks grew at a compound annual rate of about 20 percent between 1990
and 1999, until by 1999 US commercial banks held derivatives contracts with a notional
value of $33 trillion. 29 However, the potential exposure of a derivatives dealer to both
credit risk and other hazards related to the speculative use of derivatives can be
enormously damaging. This helps to explain why derivatives dealing is often housed
within a bank. Commercial banks benefit from their lender of last resort support to instill
confidence in derivatives users that the dealer will be capable of fulfilling its contractual
obligations despite a confluence of adverse developments. This further explains why only
a handful of the largest US commercial banks are responsible for the bulk of derivatives
dealing, since their status as too-big-to-fail bestows credibility on the likelihood of
their access to lender of last resort support in a crisis. By 1992 the seven largest US banks
accounted for more than 90 percent of all derivatives contracts held by US banks
(Edwards and Mishkin 1995, 14), and the number of money-center banks that dominate
derivatives dealing has dwindled further because of bank mergers in the late 1990s.
However concern persists that interconnections among the largest banks active in the
derivatives markets, in combination with the highly leveraged nature of many derivatives
transactions, may create a calamity that devastates the major US commercial banks. As
Warren Buffet famously commented.
We [his company, Berkshire Hathaway] try to be alert to any sort of
megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the
burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of
29
Greenspan (1999) claims that US commercial banks share of the global over-the-counter derivatives
market is about 25%, with US investment banks holding another 15%.
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uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view however
derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that while
now latent, are potentially lethal. (Buffet 2002, 16)
Conclusion: The Illusory Pursuit of Stability
This chapter has argued that one of the unintended consequences of the
government safety net to promote the stability of the commercial banking system has
been the negation of that agenda. As their profitability was squeezed, commercial banks
increasingly used their access to deposit insurance and lender of last resort support to
enable them to engage in a variety of activities that potentially compromise the stability
of the commercial banking system. Worse still, the incentives to abuse this safety net
were most enticing among the largest “money-center” banks, whose failure could most
severely damage commercial banking stability. The details of the negation of this
stabilizing project have been explored in this chapter to serve as an illustration of the
impossibility of achieving stability from an overdeterminist perspective. While this
chapter explored how a particular set of policies intended to promote stability were
subverted, the intent is not to critique this set of policies with a view to devising some
preferable set of policies that could be immune to negation. On the contrary, the intent is
to bring into question the quest for stability itself.
While this chapter emphasized various sources of commercial bank instability,
this analysis should not be construed as an argument that the history of commercial
banking since the New Deal can be understood as a unidirectional movement towards
instability. On the contrary, the rise of destabilizing impulses has provoked regulators,
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legislators and even commercial banks themselves to find new measures to promote
stability. For example, as required reserves were attenuated as a stabilizing force in the
commercial banking system, regulators sought ways of ensuring that banks had some
backstop other than lender of last resort support. This helped to propel the 1988 Basel
Accord, which imposed new capital adequacy regulations on commercial banks. The
Basel standards required banks to have a certain level of capital based on the riskiness of
their assets. Thus the sufficiency of bank capital, rather than required reserves, became
viewed both as a source of liquidity to stem bank panics and a means of restraining
wanton bank exposure to intensified risk. Another measure taken to retard excessive bank
risk-taking was the introduction of risk-based fees for deposit insurance in the 1991
Comprehensive Deposit Insurance reform and Taxpayer Protection Act. To protect
themselves against the devastating possibility of default in their increasingly risky
activities, commercial banks had devised credit derivatives that enable a commercial
bank to contract with other parties to make good on a defaulted contract (of course, in
exchange for a fee).
While in some instances these newer measures have contributed to commercial bank
stability, they in turn set in motion other ways in which may unintentionally contribute to
instability. For example, the imposition of capital requirements has an unintended
possibility of intensifying volatility. A commercial bank that enjoys a solid reputation
will be easily able to acquire new capital, which allows commercial banks to expand
lending dramatically during a prosperous times (particularly in stock market booms when
securing equity capital is relatively easy). However, a bank facing a crisis will have great
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difficulty acquiring new capital to stabilize its operations. Risk-based deposit insurance
premiums30 and credit derivatives31 have also had unintended effects that may exacerbate
instability in the commercial banking system and beyond.
From an overdeterminist perspective, this interplay between stabilizing and
destabilizing dynamics is illustrates the illusiveness of stability. Whether stabilizing or
destabilizing impulses are in the ascendancy in a particular overdetermined context, the
negation of these impulses is also set in motion. Thus to the extent that the Keynesian
agenda for economic growth and stability requires the stability of commercial banking,
this overdeterminist analysis brings into question the possibility of sustaining this goal.
As the Marxian tradition has pointed out in many contexts, the dynamics of the pursuit of
profit in a competitive market imply instability of various sorts. While this point is
argued frequently with reference to productive capitalist activity and the dynamics of
exploitation, the endogeniety of instability is also characteristic of financial capitalist
activity. Commercial banking in particular, and financial capitalist activity in general,
will always have risks associated with it, as well as opportunities to profit by intensifying
30
Risk-based deposit insurance premiums were intended to entrance the capacity of the FDIC to handle the
expenses of bail-outs, and to act as a disincentive for commercial banks to engage in riskier activities.
However, this regulation has favored large well-capitalized banks that were highly rated by banking
supervisors. During the many years in which the Bank Insurance Fund is above a given level, large banks
have been freed of the necessity of paying any deposit insurance premiums.
31 By transferring default risk to third parities, credit derivatives create the possibility that a crisis in the
commercial banking system may be transferred into a crisis among the counterparties in credit derivatives.
Thus when, for example, insurance companies act as counterparties in credit derivatives, the Federal
Reserve could be faced with a commercial banking crisis that manifests itself as a devastation of insurance
companies.
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these risks. Thus any public policy with aspirations to promote stability will continuously
be buffeted between the imperatives of promoting opportunities to pursue these profits,
and containing the implications of the pursuit of these profits.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation is written at a time in which
similarities exist between contemporary
numerous and provocative
economic developments and the circumstances
surrounding the implementation of the New Deal financial reforms. In the 1920s, as i n
the 1 990s, exuberance about a
-new era" of economic prosperity culminated in a stock
market bubble. In both periods, stock market euphoria was accompanied by a
reorganization of financial capitalist activity and an increasmg prevalence of diversified
financial capitalist firms. In both the early 1930s and the early 2000s, the stock market
decline heralded a period of economic stagnation coupled with financial scandals (such as
the fall of Enron in the contemporary period). In many cases, these scandals were shaped
by the various conflicts of interest animating diversified financial capitalist firms. These
questionable activities of diversified financial capitalist firms catalyzed public animosity
towards finance, and created conditions in which financial reforms were again debated.
Bearing in mind these similarities between the depression-era animosity towards
finance and contemporary financial critiques, an opportunity exists to inform the current
strategic choices of the left by revisiting the earlier New Deal experiment with financial
reforms. While the overdetermined context has changed dramatically from that which
existed at the dawn of the New Deal, in some ways the intentions of contemporary
progressive reformers to reshape finance in conformity with a larger leftist economic
agenda shows remarkable continuity with this earlier period. In the New Deal era, as
now, progressive financial reform initiatives have the potential to focus attention on
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finance at the expense of querying the specifically capitalist attributes of the economy.
While financial critiques could be raised in conjunction with the critique of exploitation,
in many instances financial critiques are framed within an analysis that endorses the
capitalist class process. The issues raised here is not whether financial reform should or
should not be a component of a progressive agenda, but the implications of a progressive
politics in which antipathy to finance eclipses critique of capitalism per se.
In an attempt to argue for the place of a class analytic anti-capitalism among the
discourses of leftist transformation, this dissertation has studied New Deal financial
reforms as a historical instance in which financial reforms were advanced devoid of any
intention to challenge capitalism. On the contrary, these reforms were motivated to
remedy the flaws in capitalism to enable it to sustain vigorous and stable economic
growth. From a Marxian class analytic perspective, this project of financial reform is
reprehensible in two respects. First, despite the many progressive characteristics that
might be incorporated into this economic agenda, it sought to provide the conditions of
existence for continued capitalist exploitation. Secondly, these reforms
embodied a
determinist logic, in that they sought to implement policy measures deigned to
remedy
certain defects that were seen as the essential impediments to stable
capitalist prosperity.
In order to critique New Deal financial reforms from an overdetermimst
Marxian
class analytic perspective, this dissertation emphasizes
the contradictions inherent in this
project of securing the financial conditions of existence of a
stable capitalist growth.
Particular emphasis has been made on the ways in which
the contradictory imperatives of
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New Deal financial reform interacted with the profit-maximizing strategies of financial
capitalist firms. We examine how these policies sought to achieve their desired
objectives, and how, thanks in part to actions of capitalist firms seeking to manipulate
these contradictions, they simultaneously set in motion developments that subverted their
desired objectives. The dissertation presents the case that, in some respects, the pastiche
of policies implemented by New Deal financial reforms helped to secure the financial
conditions of existence ol the stability ofpax fincincus and the economic growth
characteristics of the golden age of Keynesian welfare state capitalism. Yet
paradoxically, these policies also set in motion the negation of these achievements.
C onditions were promoted that in some ways moderated and in some ways raised the
subsumed class payment for access to money capital. In some ways the commercial
banking system was stabilized by New Deal financial reforms, and in some ways this
stability was further compromised.
What then can be the contribution of this economic history? It illustrates that New
Deal policies are animated by contradiction, but then, following overdeterminist logic,
everything is necessarily contradictory. This dissertation seeks to promote an awareness
of the ubiquity of contradiction in order to problematize the rejection of
overdetermination implicit in the search for some ideal policy configuration that could
escape contradiction. The stated motivation of the dissertation is to promote a radical,
class analytic Marxist alliance, and 1 consider the relentless search for policy optimality
to be inimical to this proposed alliance. So long as we are persuaded that radicals have
failed to achieve their objective because of some flaws in the policies they endorsed, then
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leftists will be engaged in the continuous refinement of their policy mix in hopes of
achieving their aims. This focuses leftist aspirations on what is, from an overdeterminist
perspective, a Sisyphean task. Thus an analysis of the inherent contradictions of the New
Deal is offered to persuade radicals to abandon an illusory quest for the ideal reforms.
However, leftists contemplating an alliance with class analytic Marxism should
note that the embrace of overdetermination also abolishes any comforting assurance that
the inclusion of an anti-capitalist agenda will produce interventions that necessarily have
a greater likelihood of achieving their desired non-class ends. Overdetermination implies
that, since all intervention is contradictory (and hence implies its own negation), it
follows that the inclusion of the Marxian surplus labor agenda with other radical agendas
can offer no claim that the resulting transformative project will be any less (or any more)
contradictory than were the New Deal financial reforms. Thus overdeterminist Marxism
can not offer guarantees that such an alliance will increase (or for that matter decrease)
the possibility of the success of radical non-class agendas. It can make the case that the
perpetuation of exploitative class relationships has detrimental consequences for the non-
class economic agendas of radicals, and that a variety of democratic and egalitarian
aspirations have been continuously frustrated under capitalism. However overdeterminist
Marxism cannot deny that its own theory of causation precludes any appeal to the
inevitable triumph of radical agendas once the prevalence of non-exploitative production
arrangements is established. Overdeterminist Marxism can only offer the commitment to
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struggle on behalf of a radical coalition agenda, which, from an overdeterminist
perspective, is the only commitment that can be made on behalf of any political
intervention.
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